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besides having theoretical and practical relevance. I am grateful to former 
and current colleagues at the Department of Urban Renewal and Housing 
for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of the articles comprising my 
thesis, namely Alex Curley, André Ouwehand, Anirban Pal, Christien Klau-
fus, Eva Bosch, Frank Wassenberg, Gelske van Daalen, Helen Kruythoff, Leeke 
Reinders, Marco van der Land, Mariska van der Sluis-van Meijeren, Reinout 
Kleinhans, Reijnt Sluis, Saskia Binken, Suzanne Davis, Talja Blokland, Ton van 
der Pennen, and Wenda Doff. Special thanks are due to Martijn Arnoldus and 
Gwen van Eijk; Martijn helped with constructing and adding variables to the 
main data file, and Gwen helped interview residents of Buitenveldert-Amster-
dam. Thanks are also due to Martine de Jong-Lansbergen and Truus Waaijer, 
who offered indispensable secretarial support, and to Itziar Lasa Epelde for 
the graphic design of the manuscript.
I would like to express my gratitude to Professor David Varady of Cincin-
nati University. I met him at the ENHR conference in Ljubljana in 2006 and 
then worked with him during his stay as a guest researcher at OTB. We took 
interesting trips to urban sites in Amsterdam, and he and his wife Adrienne 
visited us in Overveen. Speaking of home, the loving support of my parents, 
my sisters and their families, and my friends has been very important to 
me. I cherish the memory of celebrating not only my birthday with them in 
the first week of January this year but also the fact that the draft version of 
the PhD manuscript was ready by then. A special word of thanks goes to my 
friends Jan Giliam van Arkel and Nelleke den Herder, who will stand by me as 
my paranimfs when I defend my thesis.
Immeasurable gratitude goes to the three loves of my life, Luc Taal and our 
kids, Dominique and Catherine. Without them I would not have had the dis-
tractions, joy, and courage that were needed to finish this book. Do, too, has 
reached a milestone: (almost) finished with primary school and starting at 
the sports junior high school after the summer. And Cath, (almost) eleven, 
often makes us smile at her impatience about growing up and her outspoken 
ideas about what she wants to be. Do and Cath, whatever the future brings 
and whichever choices you make, I am proud of you both and hope you will 
always be true to yourselves.
Carlinde Adriaanse
Delft/Overveen, April 2011. 
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 1  Introduction
“The first thing to understand is that the public peace – the sidewalk and street peace – 
of cities is not kept primarily by the police, necessary as the police are. It is kept primarily 
by an intricate, almost unconscious, network of voluntary controls and standards among 
the people themselves, and enforced by the people themselves. In some city areas... the 
keeping of public sidewalk law and order is left almost entirely to the police and special 
guards. Such places are jungles. No amount of police can enforce civilization where the 
normal, casual enforcement has broken down.” 
Jane Jacobs, cited in: Bridge, G. & S. Watson (2010), The Blackwell City Reader, p. 274.
 1.1  First ideas for the thesis
When I started to work at OTB TU Delft as a general social scientist in 2003, 
I participated in the research programme Corpovenista, which was in prepa-
ration at that time.1 I developed the research plan for the study of problem-
free neighbourhoods of a vulnerable physical-spatial type. Especially with ur-
ban reconstruction high on the agenda in several Western European coun-
tries, with a lot of money involved and with a great impact on the lives of 
thousands of residents, it is important to learn from these positive exceptions 
on the rule. Entire libraries have been filled with literature about the preva-
lence of problems in these areas, devoting considerable attention to the back-
ground, causes and explanations of problems and to the effects of the meas-
ures taken (Prak & Priemus, 1984; Heeger, 1993; Schwedler, 1998; Turkington et 
al., 2003; Argiolu et al., 2008). However, much less is known about the factors 
that cause neighbourhoods to remain vital in physical, economic and social 
terms in the long run (Brower, 1996; Land, 1969; Lynch, 1960). 
In the Netherlands, especially early post-Second World War neighbour-
hoods are called vulnerable with respect to their physical-spatial character-
istics (Buys, 2002; Kruythoff en Haars, 2002). Shortly after the Second World 
War, mid-rise neighbourhoods were built around the world according to the 
principles of the CIAM (Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne) move-
ment in modern architecture. The areas are characterized by half-open blocks 
of buildings, open spaces between the blocks, separated transport routes, 
and a mix of high-rise and mid-rise blocks of flats and single-family dwell-
ings. Some of the dwellings are in the owner-occupied sector but most are in 
the (social) rented sector. Post-war housing areas are served by a distributed 
1 Corpovenista (‘housing associations renew the city’) is about the synergy between research, policy and practice 
in urban renewal. Corpovenista is a collaborative effort of several big housing associations, Aedes (the branch 
organization), OTB Research Institute for the Built Environment at Delft University of Technology, and research 
teams at the Universities of Utrecht and Amsterdam.
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main route network located between the various neighbourhoods. The local 
streets inside the areas have a non-distributed structure with few possibilities 
for through traffic. The streets have low inter-visibility and a low degree of 
social control, since few windows and doors face the streets (Van Nes & Rueb, 
2009). Open areas that cannot be watched or observed by residents from their 
apartments, long dark hallways, poorly lighted stairwells, and areas where no 
one in particular is responsible for monitoring activities – all these features 
reduce the levels of surveillance and the capacity for effective social con-
trol (Elliott, Menard, Rankin; Elliot, Wilson & Huizinga, 2006: 48, 49). Besides 
that, in the seventies and eighties of the 20th century, new groups of starting 
households and non-native households – among whom a large share of Turk-
ish, Moroccan and Surinamese origin – moved in. The new ‘mix’ – consisting 
of elderly people who had lived there since the 1960s and the new households 
– didn’t actually mix in most cases, which put more pressure on the social 
climate in these early post-Second World War neighbourhoods (Wilson, 1987; 
Adriaanse, van de Wardt & Hortulanus, 1997; Reijndorp, 2004; Dekker & Row-
lands, 2005). In many cases these neighbourhoods became problematic. Now-
adays, this type of neighbourhood is associated with below-standard living 
conditions, deprivation, isolated locations, poverty, a negative image, social 
isolation, pollution and crime (Prak & Priemus, 1984; Heeger, 1993; Wassen-
berg, 1993; Knol, 1998; Power, 1997; Van der Meer, 1996; Ministerie van VROM, 
1997a, 2000; Power, 1997; RIGO Research & Advies, 1995, 1996; Schwedler, 1998; 
Skifter Andersen, 2003; Turkington et al., 2004; Musterd & Van Kempen, 2005; 
Friedrichs, 1997; Groves, Middleton, Murie & Broughton, 2003; Van Kempen, 
2003; Turkington, Van Kempen and Wassenberg, 2003). Many early post-war 
neighbourhoods have encountered serious problems and are now being (or 
are scheduled to be) radically restructured. 
Early post-Second World War neighbourhoods like Kerschoten in Apeldoorn, 
De Pettelaar in Den Bosch, Mariahoeve and Morgenstond in The Hague, the 
Kuyperwijk and the Voorhof in Delft and Buitenveldert in Amsterdam are 
exceptions to the rule. Also these neighbourhoods were built in impecunious 
times, when good materials were scarce and expensive, and their sound and 
climate insulation is often of poor quality (Hebly, 2008). But nowadays they 
are largely free from social ‘urban’ problems, are highly appreciated by their 
residents and have developed a self-renewing ability over time, a condition 
that is the ultimate test for the sustainability of urban districts (Hebly, 2008). 
As a ‘potential environment’ these neighbourhoods were equal at the start, 
but due to differences in use and maintenance they developed very differ-
ently as an ‘effective environment’ (Gans, 1968; Van der Horst, Kullberg and 
Deben, 2002). Why do problems not occur in certain neighbourhoods where 
these might have been expected according to the physical-spatial neighbour-
hood type?
The following sections briefly describe this preliminary case study, con-
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ducted in 2004 in Buitenveldert-Amsterdam, because it influenced the 
design of the overall thesis. For the main research of this book, the empiri-
cal research was conducted in Buitenveldert in 2006, the results of which are 
analysed and described in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 1.1.1  Buitenveldert-Amsterdam; an exception to the rule2
To be able to choose a suitable case-study area for the preliminary study, 
namely ‘a problem-free neighbourhood’, the following criteria were defined: 
(1) the neighbourhood has an average-to-good position on the local hous-
ing market; (2) its socio-economic structure is not weak; (3) its liveability (so-
cial-cultural) is average-to-good. Buitenveldert-Amsterdam appeared to meet 
these requirements. Buitenveldert has the typical spatial-physical character-
istics of an early post-Second World War neighbourhood. But in contrast to 
what I expected, I didn’t find the ‘standard problems’ of early post-Second 
World War neighbourhoods. According to an objective safety index, Buiten-
veldert is even the safest neighbourhood in Amsterdam (Gemeente Am-
sterdam, 2010). Even now, more than forty years since it was established, it 
ranks among the most attractive of Amsterdam’s residential areas and has a 
good position on the regional housing market (Adriaanse, 2004a). This makes 
Buitenveldert a ‘critical case’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006), having strategic importance to 
the general aim of this thesis. 
The ‘garden suburb’ of Buitenveldert was created under the Amsterdam 
General Expansion Plan (Algemeen Uitbreidingsplan (AUP)) of 1934 at the 
south side of Amsterdam, together with the western and northern extensions 
of the city (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2). Van Eesteren was the inspiring leader of 
the team that produced this highly innovative plan. Urban planning of the 
AUP was no longer based on a pre-imposed urban aesthetic, as in Berlage’s 
South district of the twenties, but based on scientific geographical and social 
studies. Van Eesteren was well aware of the potential of rhythmic ordering. 
His ideas and designs were inspired by the artist Theo van Doesburg and his 
many international contacts in the CIAM. In 1958 he wrote that the neigh-
bourhood Buitenveldert “is designed within a rhythm of more or less equally-
spaced motifs, also called living units” (Van Eesteren, 1958).
The realisation of most parts of the AUP, as the Westelijke Tuinsteden and 
Buitenveldert, had to wait until after World War II. In 1958 the first housing 
blocks of Buitenveldert were built. Buitenveldert is positioned between the 
2 The preliminary research was – parallel to Buitenveldert-Amsterdam – also conducted in Mariahoeve-The 
Hague. Because the latter case-study research was focussed on Buitenveldert, the findings on Mariahoeve are left 
out here. The full description of both case studies is documented in a report (in Dutch) entitled ‘Succesfactoren 
van wijken die werken’; een verkennende studie in twee naoorlogse flatwijken (Adriaanse, 2004).
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southern highway A10 in the north, the river Amstel in the east, the border of 
Amstelveen in the south and Het Nieuwe Meer in the west (Hebly, 2007). The 
Gijsbrecht van Aemstelpark stretching out from west to east is the large struc-
turing urban space. The park divides Buitenveldert into a south and a north 
part. The system of dividing housing types over the area can be described as: 
different homogeneous neighbourhoods form together a heterogeneous urban 
district, a patchwork of different neighbourhoods. Every neighbourhood is 
dominated by one housing type, such as middle high-rise areas with a por-
tico or gallery access system, next to low rise areas and areas with detached 
and semi-detached houses (Hebly, 2007). Over 80% of the housing stock in 
Buitenveldert is in multiple-occupancy complexes. The many mid-rise apart-
ment blocks in Buitenveldert have four storeys (the ground floor being used 
for either residential or business purposes). There are also twelve-storey tower 
blocks interspersed with eight-storey blocks. Most of the housing stock dates 
from the 1960s. Buitenveldert has good road connections with surrounding 
areas of the Netherlands and good public transport to the city centre (Adri-
aanse, 2004a, b). These and more characteristics can be found in Table 1.1.
The findings of the preliminary study suggest that while Buitenveldert is 
indeed a neighbourhood that ‘works’, it is not entirely devoid of problems. 
Some of the problems commonly associated with early post-war neighbour-
hoods are seen in the study area. A number of these are directly or indirect-
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ly related to the specific type of neighbourhood and its construction peri-
od. Obsolescence of public areas, physical decay and technical obsolescence 
in parts of the housing stock are directly related to the building period and 
the age of the neighbourhood. Other problems, such as potential safety black-
spots and the lack of opportunity for young families to move into more suit-
able accommodation within the same area, are directly related to the type 
of neighbourhood that Buitenveldert represents. There is a strict division of 
functions (resulting in inadequate social control) and an overly uniform hous-
ing stock comprising mostly apartments in multiple-occupancy complexes 
and very few self-contained single-family units. 
In 2004 Buitenveldert has 18,456 residents. Over one-third (34%) of 
Buitenveldert’s population was aged 65 or above. The vast majority of res-
idents (67%) are of ‘native’ Dutch origin. Among them, two thousand resi-
dents (10% of the population of Buitenveldert) are Jewish3. Only 8% can be 
classified as belonging to non-Western ethnic minorities (see Table 1.2). 
Both the educational level and the income of Buitenveldert residents are 
markedly higher than in an average early post-Second World War neigh-
bourhood. The social problems encountered in many early post-war neigh-
bourhoods are not visible in Buitenveldert. There is not a high level of 
crime, no influx of lower-income groups, no influx of problem groups, and 
no large-scale exodus of existing residents, all of which could lead to poor-
er social cohesion (Adriaanse 2004a, b). 
3 Source: Joodse Gemeenschap Amsterdam, 2007. 
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Even though most of the residents are of Dutch origin – including a large 
Jewish community – the present-day population of Buitenveldert consists of 
distinct groups living parallel lives. Moreover, Japanese, Korean, English and 
American expatriates tend to live in the Netherlands only temporarily (rare-
[ 7 ]
ly longer than ten years). Like the members of the Jewish community, the 
expats operate primarily within their own group. In fact, few expats speak 
Dutch. Like the Jewish residents, they have their own shops, schools, restau-
rants, cafes and facilities; for instance, there is a Japanese drycleaner and an 
Asian video rental. There are also synagogues, Jewish schools, Jewish-orient-
ed stores and a Jewish home for the elderly in the area (Adriaanse, 2004a, b). 
In that light, Buitenveldert cannot be called strongly cohesive, but problems 
between the separate groups do not occur.
Many other early post-Second World War mid-rise neighbourhoods expe-
rienced a high turnover rate in the eighties and nineties of the 20th century. 
Where this was the case, many non-Western ethnic minority residents from 
restructuring zones elsewhere in the city moved in, bringing with them a life-
style which is different than that traditionally enjoyed by the existing resi-
dents. These processes have not yet become apparent in Buitenveldert, though. 
Many early post-war neighbourhoods have a somewhat negative image. 
A number of key informants report that even Buitenveldert has a less-than-
positive image in some regards. Unlike other early post-war neighbourhoods, 
however, this image is not determined by safety issues, crime or a poor hous-
ing-market position, but rather by the fact that Buitenveldert is seen as rather 
dull. Offering little opportunity for entertainment or spontaneous social con-
tact, young people in particular consider the area only suitable for the elderly. 
Which success factors did I find in the preliminary research? Some relate 
directly to the type of neighbourhood. Others derive from the context of the 
neighbourhood. Yet others may be traced to the management practice or the 
policy of local authorities and other stakeholders. Alongside the differenti-
ation in ownership status and the positive housing choice (i.e. people have 
chosen to live in Buitenveldert rather than having been ‘placed’ there), key 
informants cite a number of spatial-physical characteristics and the nature of 
the neighbourhood itself as success factors. Specifically, these are its position 
in the higher-status sector of the city (near to the cultural district of Amster-
dam-South with its museums, restaurants, and the concert hall), its acces-
sibility, its urban planning design and the plentiful greenery. Such physi-
cal-spatial characteristics typify the type of neighbourhood represented by 
Buitenveldert but also by its more problematic counterparts. 
Like all other early post-war neighbourhoods, Buitenveldert enjoys the ben-
efits of the faster, more extensive public transport facilities which have been 
developed in recent years, bringing the city centre and major cultural facili-
ties within easier reach. However, many early post-war neighbourhoods have 
become surrounded by newer residential developments, obviating the initial 
positive aspects of the location such as the proximity to greenery and water 
beyond the city perimeter. Buitenveldert still enjoys full access to large-scale 
recreational areas, which are practically adjacent to the neighbourhood and 
remain within easy walking or cycling distance. 
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Further analysis reveals that the construction date of Buitenveldert, slight-
ly later than many other early post-war neighbourhoods, is of significance. 
The lessons learned during the first wave of construction following the Sec-
ond World War could be put to good use in the planning. Moreover, the Neth-









than it had in the earlier reconstruction years. This enabled the planners to 
give Buitenveldert a more differentiated urban design structure with a slight-
ly better quality of construction and finishing (using better materials). 
Moreover, Buitenveldert was originally intended to attract the middle class-
es, and did so successfully. The high quality of the neighbourhood, its posi-
tion in the higher-status sector of the city of Amsterdam and the balanced 
mix of social, private rental and owner-occupied properties drew a more pros-
perous group of residents who had chosen to live there for positive reasons. 
For many years, the level of housing satisfaction was high and the turnover 
rate relatively low. This served to create a sound social climate, notable for a 
broad consensus among residents on how the district should be used. In the 
neighbourhood, a large proportion of the residents are greying. There is thus 
potential for a higher turnover rate and a greater influx of new residents. 
One contextual factor, which diminishes the effects of this development, is 
that relatively little new construction was undertaken in the immediate vicin-
ity for a long period. Thus, young families and more prosperous seniors did 
not have the opportunity to move up the housing ladder into more suitable 
accommodation within the neighbourhood. As a consequence, 25% of the 
population has lived in the same dwelling since the district’s inception (Adri-
aanse, 2004a, b).
The development of the new office district along Amsterdam’s south-
ern axis (called Zuid-as) is now in full swing and Buitenveldert will soon feel 
the effects. Residents and professional observers recognize both threats and 
opportunities here. They welcome both the vitalization of the immediate 
vicinity and the strengthening of Buitenveldert’s reputation as a quiet resi-
dential district in an urban setting. However, residents are wary of increased 
traffic and a shortage of parking facilities. Plans for densification of the area 
are also seen as a threat to one of the success factors identified by residents: 
the availability of large-scale recreation areas. 
Another aspect of the neighbourhood, distinguishing it from the standard 
early post-war development, is that there is ample employment opportuni-
ty either in the neighbourhood itself or nearby. Buitenveldert includes, or is 
close to, the Zuid-as office district, Schiphol Amsterdam Airport, the VU Uni-
versity Amsterdam, the RAI conference centre and the Amsterdam World 
Trade Centre. This makes the neighbourhood an attractive location for the 
highly qualified staff of prominent national and international companies. 
These factors – good employment opportunities and the presence of more 
prosperous residents – combine to create a greater level of support for local 
amenities (the international school, lunchtime catering establishments, shop-
ping facilities, etc.) and to promote the good reputation of Buitenveldert. 
The boost given to the neighbourhood by the high-quality construc-
tion boom of the 1980s served to compensate, at least in part, the trend of 
obsolescence and decline that neighbourhoods ‘of a certain age’ will inev-
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itably experience. Good management of the housing stock and the residen-
tial environment has also helped to slow the downward trends. Sections of 
the housing stock in the neighbourhood now require modifications in order 
to meet the demands of today’s residents (and future residents), as do the 
public areas (Adriaanse, 2004a, b). A final remark on the outcome of the pre-
liminary research relates to the speed of development in Buitenveldert. For 
many years, development was not particularly rapid. This ‘tempo moderato’ 
has enhanced the neighbourhood’s ability to adapt, as well as that of the res-
idents. People and neighbourhoods respond more easily to gradual change. 
Gradual change is also easier to anticipate, provided the effects are recog-
nized in time.
 1.1.2  ‘An intermediary structure of unwritten rules’ in 
Buitenveldert
During my preliminary research in the case-study area in 2003/2004, I of-
ten walked along the streets and sensed the atmosphere specific to Buiten-
veldert-Amsterdam as expressed in the curb-appeal of the dwellings and the 
overall appearance of the neighbourhood. What struck me was that I didn’t 
see any graffiti or litter in the streets. What I did see was well maintained 
empty balconies alongside balconies dressed up with plants and flowers in 
pots. When I passed the residents, they usually smiled or said ‘hello’. In the 
parks, in the indoor shopping centre Groot Gelderlandplein and in and around 
the shops in the Kastelenstraat I sensed an attentiveness and politeness be-
tween the people and towards me. The physical artefacts of good neighbour-
hood upkeep and the prevailing social norm of neatness and friendliness in 
the public realm gave me, as an ingenuous visitor, an overall impression of 
the state of affairs in the neighbourhood. It seemed like a pleasant place, an 
area that is cared about and an environment that feels viable and safe. 
These observations and the preliminary research suggested that the social 
order in Buitenveldert does not arise in the first place from intimacy and con-
nectedness. Neither does it appear to result from collective social action, as 
may be the case in ‘communities of limited liability’ or ‘contrived commu-
nities’, where all defend their interest collectively and social bonds emerge. 
Buitenveldert lacks strong social cohesion but is also free of strife. It is dis-
organized and orderly at the same time. My observations in Buitenveldert 
prompted the notion of an intermediary structure of unwritten rules that can 
be ‘felt’ by residents, their visitors and passers-by. An intermediary structure 
of unwritten rules would seem to be conducive to a viable social climate in 
Buitenveldert. 
Parallel to the preliminary case study in Buitenveldert, I conducted a multi-
variate data analysis with the objective register data of all Dutch neighbour-
hoods and the survey data of the Dutch Housing Demand Survey (WoningBe-
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hoefteOnderzoek, 2002). In line with the findings from the preliminary case 
study, the multivariate data analysis suggested that the perception and appre-
ciation of the residential social climate is decisive for the ‘success’ of a (early 
post-Second World War) neighbourhood (the findings are described in detail in 
Chapter 2 of this book). This insight triggered my interest in the mechanisms 
of informal social control in residential neighbourhoods. This is not about the 
obligation to have social relationships in the living environment. I sought to 
reconsider traditional understandings about what is required for peace and 
tranquillity in human affairs in liveable urban residential environments. The 
informal residential control I wanted to investigate is about unwritten rules 
of conduct and mutual trust and respect in informal residential interactions. 
What I wanted to know is how such an intermediary structure of unwritten 
rules can endure for a longer period. I came up with the following working 
definition of a residential social climate: 
The social climate of a residential environment is an individual’s perception of how others 
treat him or her, one another, and (how they will treat) the spatial artefacts within the area 
that the individual experiences as his or her living environment (Adriaanse 2005, 2008a).
A literature search in scientific journals revealed that the concept ‘social cli-
mate’ appears in studies on ‘total institutions’ (e.g., schools, workplaces, hos-
pitals and prisons). The term is used by social and developmental psycholo-
gists and bio-medical scientists. Research topics in these fields include ‘the 
physical, intellectual and social climate of the classroom’, ‘the role of the vir-
tual teacher with regards to the social climate in online-learning discussion 
groups’, ‘the atmosphere in care settings as experienced by patients’ and ‘the 
social climate of alcoholism treatment programs’. Social climate is general-
ly used as a construct that consists of several physical and social-cultural ele-
ments, which refer to the spheres of influence of various stakeholders. Social 
climate is a concept that is intuitively recognizable but difficult to define pre-
cisely. It is generally thought to be the sum of the working conditions that are 
associated with a company, location or work site, which are created by specif-
ic organizational policies, practices and behaviours (see for example Coleman, 
1961; DeYoung, 1977; Moos and Moos, 1978; LeBlanc, Vitaro & Tremblay, 2007; 
Ross, Diamond, Liebling & Saylor, 2008). Unless the fact that we cannot con-
sider a residential neighbourhood as a ‘total institution’ I use the term social 
climate, because it appears to be a useful concept for describing what goes on 
in a neighbourhood at an intermediary level between residents over time. The 
residential social climate as a whole cannot be observed, though its manifes-
tations can. The actions of neighbours can be observed as they occur; spatial 
artefacts of actions that have taken place in the past provide indications of 
the social climate in a subdivision or neighbourhood. For example, on one of 
my walks around Buitenveldert, I noticed cords hanging out of the mail slots 
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on the porch doors of the social rented flats – meant for opening the door 
from the outside. Clearly, these artefacts express the trust prevailing in that 
part of the neighbourhood. Through the trust-generating atmosphere they ex-
press, they form a manifestation of the experienced trustworthiness in the 
territory in the past and they encourage future trustworthiness. 
The term social climate carries no moral connotations and thus implies 
no value judgements. Every residential area has a social climate, which can 
be good or bad. In contrast, value judgements are implied by the concepts of 
‘community’, ‘social cohesion’, as well as by the notion of ‘liveability’. Social 
cohesion involves mutual understanding and similar orientation in thought 
and action. A good social climate, in contrast, involves a minimal social rela-
tionship, in the sense that people ‘trust one another’ and are ‘favourably dis-
posed towards one another’. Achieving this does not necessarily require 
mutual understanding. It merely implies being aware of each other’s vulner-
ability and that one’s own behaviour can cause inconvenience to other resi-
dents (Atkinson & Flint, 2003; Adriaanse, 2005; Völker, 2009). 
 1.2  Measurement theory, social dilemmas and 
behavioural game theory 
Reading renowned authors’ works on social capital, social cohesion and col-
lective efficacy, I tried to find starting points for a better understanding of the 
micro mechanisms and processes that I had observed and that construed the 
social state of affairs I had revealed in Buitenveldert during the preliminary 
research. In my search for a useful explanatory framework, I was led by three 
basic scientific principles. The first was methodological individualism. In so-
ciology, Jon Elster (among others) is known for following this guideline. “The 
elementary unit of social life is the individual human action,” he argues. “To 
explain social institutions and social change is to show how they arise as the 
result of the actions and interaction of individuals” (Elster, 1989, p. 13). In this 
thesis methodological individualism asserts that individual choices made 
by residents will determine whether or not, on an aggregate level, liveability 
problems will occur in neighbourhoods.
Second, this thesis takes a social-ontological perspective as a point of 
departure. From this perspective, we can distinguish between reflexive and 
pre-reflexive behaviour. Reflexive behaviour is based on a deliberate and 
intentional choice; it refers to actions that can be made reflexive, such as rou-
tines and habits. Pre-reflexive behaviour constitutes actions like falling asleep 
and riding a bike or skating, which cannot be made reflexive at all, or if so 
only partially. The focus of this thesis is on reflexive behaviour. 
The third principle was not to use notions couched in metaphor but rath-
er to be as precise as possible in defining the intention and extension of the 
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concepts. Here, I was inspired by the idea of Occam’s Razor, otherwise known 
as the law of parsimony. It is a rule for selecting among competing hypoth-
eses: choose the one that makes the fewest new assumptions, all hypothe-
ses being equal in other respects.4 To use the razor implies that we should tend 
towards simpler theories up to the point where some simplicity can be traded 
for increased explanatory power.
Finally, I found an analytical tool and theoretical framework in Behaviour-
al Game Theory. I was attracted by the clearly defined concepts and models 
of overt human behaviour and interaction and by the structure of the under-
lying social-dilemma situations and social control that have been developed 
within the school of Behavioural Game Theory (Camerer, 2003). This theo-
ry has a convincing empirical basis due to the fact that hundreds of exper-
iments have been conducted worldwide (Henrich et al., 2004). It suggests a 
way in which structures create incentives that shape individual choices and 
thereby collective outcomes. Central elements of Behavioural Game Theory 
that I will use are the notions of strong reciprocity and altruistic punishment 
in Prisoner’s Dilemmas and Assurance Games. Because an important part of 
this research is about the development of measuring instruments (scales) one 
central topic I will discuss in the theoretical framework, covers the measur-
ability of utility. This is followed by a discussion of the theory’s applicability 
for the description and analysis of interactions between residents when they 
are making interdependent choices and acting repeatedly as producers and 
maintainers of the ‘social climate’ in their daily living environment. 
 1.2.1  Measurement theory5
I can define any neighbourhood N as an empirical relational system (ERS) 
of neighbourhood objects O and agents A. The distinction between objects 
and agents is that agents have expectations of future states of an uncertain 
world and preferences over these states. Thus, agents have sets of possible 
outcomes and possible actions and preferences over action-outcome pairs. 
Choices of other agents are an important class of possible outcomes. Agents 
anticipate on actions of other agents. 
Properties and variables 
Anything relative to which objects O or agents A may vary is a variable. Age 
4 Occam’s Razor is attributed to the 14th-century English logician, who wrote that “entities must not be multi-
plied beyond necessity”.
5 The distinctions between properties, relations, variables, variable labels and the nine conditions of quantity 
that are described in the following sections, are derived from Chapter 3 of Joel Michell’s book  An introduction to 
the logic of psychological measurement (1990), New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
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is a variable: different houses of a neighbourhood may have a different age. 
The variable ‘age’ is simply the class of all ages. The class of all ages is a col-
lection of sets (all kinds of objects) which can be defined by the property ‘age’ 
that all its members share. Each particular age is an empirical property that a 
house might posses. So a variable is a class of properties, but not any class of 
properties constitutes a variable. The properties of being 70 years old, of be-
ing 6 meters high, of having a economic value of 400.000 euro taken togeth-
er do not form a variable because some houses may possess more than one of 
these properties simultaneously. Empirical properties form a variable if they 
are mutually exclusive, that is if no house can possess more than one of them 
simultaneously. The classes of all ages, all heights and all economic values 
are three variables for any house can only be one age, one height and one val-
ue at a time. 
Relations
Objects O and Agents A posses properties singly. The empirical fact that a 
house is 70 years old is a fact about a particular house and nothing else. Re-
lations involve pluralities of objects and agents. If the house is the one most 
closest to a busy highway then this situation involves both this particular 
house and all other houses of a neighbourhood. Binary relations involve two 
objects or agents, ternary relations three objects or agents, and so on. An n-
ary relation involves n objects or agents. A class of relations forming a vari-
able is the following: being a direct neighbour. If Agent A is the direct neigh-
bour of Agent B, then B is the direct neighbour of A. The binary relation ‘be-
ing a direct neighbour’ holds not simply between a pair of agents, but consti-
tutes an ordered pair. The class of binary relations ‘being a direct neighbour’ 
forms a variable because no more than one of the two relations within it (‘be-
ing direct neighbours’- ‘not being direct neighbours’) holds between a particu-
lar pair of agents at any one time. 
The structure of a variable
Those particular properties or relations of objects O and Agents A that con-
stitute variables are the values of that variable. For example, being 70 years 
old is a value of the ‘age’ variable, distance from highway is a value of the 
location variable, being direct neighbour of agent A1 is a value of the neigh-
bour-variable. The distinction between the empirical behaviour of any objects 
O or agents A possessing a value of a variable on the one hand and the logical 
structure of these variables on the other hand, is an important one. 




The conditions 1 and 2 do nothing more than describe the logical structure 
of the direct neighbour variable. How the symmetric and antitransitive struc-
ture of the ‘direct neighbour’ variable is reflected in the behaviour of partic-
ular agents A depends also on the kind of agents they are (empirical charac-
ter (for example extravert or introvert personality, his social economic status). 
An important example of a well known structure of a variable is the equiv-
alence relation. Consider the relation S ‘living in the same street’ in more 
detail. 
The logical structure of the empirical relation S, ‘living in the same street’ is: 
A
‘Living in the same neighbourhood’ is a reflexive relation because every agent 
lives in the same neighbourhood as itself. The relation S partitions a city in 
mutually disjoint equivalence classes (here: neighbourhoods). 
The logical structure of any quantitative variable
What are the structural marks of a quantitative variable? The following nine 
conditions characterize any quantitative variable. The first fact to note is that 
the values of a quantitative variable are ordered. Let H, I, J be any three values 
of variable D ‘distance from of Oi from highway’. 
The empirical relation D, ‘distance from highway’ is ordered if and only if: 
(1) if H ≤ I and I ≤ J  H ≤ J (transitivity)
(2) if H ≤ I and I ≤ H  H = I (antisymmetry)
(3) either H ≤ I or I ≤ H (strong connexity).
All quantitative variables are simply ordered by ≤, but are also additive. This is 
expressed by the following six conditions: 
(4) (H + I) + J = H + (I + J) (associativity)
(5) H + I = I + H (commutativity)
(6) H ≤ I if and only if H + J ≤ I + J (monotonicity)
(7) if J > H then there exist a value I such that J = I + H (solvability)
(8) H + I > H (positivity)
(9) there exist a natural number n such that nH ≥ I (where 1H = H and (n + 1) 
H = nH + H) (archimedean condition).
Measurement and scale type 
Having clarified the structural characteristics of a quantitative variable, we 
are able to describe the concept ‘measurement’. We take a simple example. 
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We wish to know the exact length of the distance between object O1 in neigh-
bourhood N and the highway H. This may be done by relating the distance 
O1 – H to a length called a meter. The distance is found to be r meters long 
(where r is some real number). More precise: r is the ratio of the length of 
the distance, O1 – H to that of a meter and this fact enables the length of 
the distance to be characterized. Any measurement of some unknown value 
of a quantitative variable is identified as being r units. A unit of measurement 
is simply a particular value of the relevant variable that is singled out as a 
standard to which all other values will be compared. If the value of a meas-
urement standard is already known (M = meter) and the aim is to identify a 
characteristic of object O1, the distance of O1 to H, then this is achieved by 
noting that Distance O1 - H = rM. So, any value of a quantitative variable can 
be expressed as a simple multiple of the unit of measurement. Which particu-
lar value of the relevant variable is singled as standard is arbitrary. Say we use 
the imperial scale (where yard is the unit). Then we simply multiply the me-
ter scale with a positive constant: 0.9144* rM = Yard. The numbers of different 
lengths of distances on the meter scale discover certain empirical attributes.
According to the representational theory of measurement we can pose 
the problem how unique the numerical assignments are in the case of the 
meter scale or any other length scale. Representationalists assign numbers to 
empirical entities in such a way that certain relations between the numbers 
assigned represent empirical relations between the entities. The American 
psychologist S.S. Stevens believed that four types of measurement scales were 
the most important: ratio, interval, ordinal and nominal scales. 
Ratio scales
We are not free to change the values of the distances Oi – H on the meter 
scale to anything, but it is easy to see when we multiply meter values with 
a positive constant, we simply change the meter scale into any length scale 
from the infinite set possible. We can generalize this and formulate: The me-
ter scale is unique up to multiplication with a positive constant. All scale 
types which have this property (a unit of measurement and a zero-point) are 
called ratio scales by Stevens (1946). 
Interval scales
Interval scales are unique up to a positive linear transformation (x = ay + b, 
where a is positive number and b is either a positive number or a negative one). 
A well known example is the temperature scale. The Fahrenheit (F) and Celsius 
(C) scales are related by the following linear transformation C = (5/9)*F – 160/9. 
Any interval scale is really a ratio scale upon differences. The Celsius scale 
measures temperature differences, not temperature as such. The unit of meas-
urement of the Celsius scale is itself a difference (one-hundredth part of the 
difference between the freezing and the boiling point of water) If object O1 is 
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built 70 years ago and O2 50 years ago, they differ in age the same as O3 and O4 
which were built 40 and 20 years ago, but the zero point Year 1 AD is arbitrary. 
Ordinal scales
Ordinal scales are said to be unique up to an increasing monotonic transfor-
mation, that is, we can change the values of an ordinal scale to anything at 
all providing their order of magnitude is left intact. Consider the partition of 
a collection of Oi into the following classes ‘close to Highway (10-15 meters)’, 
‘average distance from highway (15-50 meters)’, ‘Far away from Highway (50 
meters and further)’. We can label these classes with any number, but the or-
dinal scales we create have to respect the rank order of the magnitude of the 
distances.
Nominal scale
A nominal scale is just a classification. Numerical assignment follows the 
rule that each identical object is given the same number. We can change giv-
en numbers to anything at all providing that identical objects receive the 
same number. Suppose that houses are classified according to the kind of 
roof (pointed roof and flat roof). In this case the empirical relation observed is 
that of O1’s roof being the same as O2 ‘s roof. If this empirical relation is tran-
sitive, reflexive and symmetric, it may be represented by the numerical rela-
tion (=). Let’s assume that pointed roof = 1 and flat roof = 2, then the numbers 
1 and 2 of the nominal Roof scale could be replaced by any one-to-one trans-
formation of the nominal roof scale. 
Representationalists like Stevens do not recognize that there is a structur-
al difference between ratio and interval scales on the one hand, and ordinal 
scales on the other, because ordinal scales lack a unit of measurement. Using 
an ordinal scale, we can sort objects or agents with respect to a certain empir-
ical property, but it would be silly to say we are measuring objects or agents. 
Numerical coding is not identical to measurement as a procedure whereby 
values of a relevant variable are compared and their ratio assessed. Thus, all 
measurements are always of the same ratio scale type. Before measuring any-
thing we have to show that a particular variable is a quantitative variable. In 
other words, confirmation of the conditions (1) to (9) is necessary. Being quan-
titative is an empirical condition and not a numerical one. 
 1.2.2  Social dilemmas and behavioural game theory
The ordinal character of utility
I defined neighbourhood N as an empirical relational system of objects O and 
agents A, with agents having expectations of future states of an uncertain 
world and preferences over these states. Now, agent’s expectations and pref-
erences over possible action-outcome pairs and subjective probabilities over 
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outcomes are clearly psychological variables of a certain kind. As such, they 
cannot be measured directly, but have to be related to an observable quan-
titative variable of one kind of another (score on questionnaire, amount of 
money or token allocated in an experiment) which can be measured direct-
ly. An important class of action-outcome pairs are the choices of other agents. 
The games studied in game theory are well defined mathematical objects 
within which agents anticipate upon each other’s choices and make a choice 
for themselves. Agents have strategies (A, B, ...). Every agent chooses one and 
only one strategy. A vector of chosen strategies, one for each agent, is denoted 
s= (s1, s2, s3 ... sn). The part of this vector which removes agents i’s strategy 
from every other agents’s strategy is denoted S-i. Game theory is about conse-
quences. When agent i plays Si, and all other agents choose s-I, this will result 
in a consequence for agent I and all other agents. This is the possible out-
come structure of a game. It is important to distinguish outcome from utili-
ty. Utility means that none is better than this choice, as judged by the agent, 
agent I. In any game, utility represents the motivations and evaluations of the 
agents. A utility function for a given agent assigns a number to every possi-
ble outcome of the game, whereby a higher number implies that the outcome 
is more preferred. A Nash equilibrium is the situation arising when all agents 
in a game anticipate correctly upon each other’s choice and no player has any 
incentive to change his or her strategy unilaterally.
Thus, a key assumption of game theory is that agents can express their sat-
isfaction with an outcome-action pair on a numerical utility scale, U. Out-
come-action pairs are consequences and the satisfaction with an outcome-
action pair is called a pay-off in game theory. Agents have a set of possible 
pay-offs and subjective beliefs in the probabilities of a pay-off. Intuitively an 
agent would weigh the utility value of each outcome-action pair on utility 
scale U by its probability of occurrence P (0-1), U*P. However, agents often do 
not know the probability of occurrence of an action-outcome pair and are sub-
ject to competing motives, whose relative strengths are often indeterminate. 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern were rather optimistic in 1944 and took a 
different approach: they attempted to axiomatize agents’ preferences over dif-
ferent ventures with random prospects, as preferences over what they called 
‘lotteries’. According to Von Neumann and Morgenstern people’s preferences 
are formed over lotteries and from these preferences over lotteries, combined 
with objective probabilities, we can deduce what the underlying preferences 
on outcomes might be. Thus, in Von Neumann-Morgenstern’s theory prefer-
ences over lotteries logically precede preferences over outcomes. The essence 
of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility hypothesis was to confine 
themselves to preferences over probability distributions and then from that, 
deduce the implied preferences over the underlying outcomes. 
I am convinced that the Von Neumann-Morgenstern conceptualization is 
descriptively inaccurate. Moreover, experimental research has made the four 
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Von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms (transitivity, completeness, monotonici-
ty and substitution) even suspect. Bostic, Herrnstein & Luce, 1990; Grether & 
Plott, 1979; Hamm, 1980; Kami & Safra, 1987; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971, 1973; 
Lindman, 1971; Mowen & Gentry, 1980; Pommerehne, Schneider & Zweifel, 
1982; Reilly, 1982; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1983; Tversky, Sattath & Slovic, 1988; 
Tversky, Slovic & Kahneman, 1990; Keller, 1985; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
In the game-theoretic literature it is taken for granted that utility (pay-offs), 
one of the attributes that structures a game, is quantitative and, silently pre-
suming this, the distinction quantitative – merely ordinal is never explicitly 
discussed. 
In this thesis I assume that the statement “utility is a quantitative variable” 
is no more than a hypothesis which is not proven yet. With the best will in 
the world I cannot consider utility as a quantitative variable.
I shall digress briefly to demonstrate the importance of keeping in mind 
that utility numbers are ordinal. Not all authors distinguish clearly between 
utility, – the actual choice –, and anticipated possible outcomes, nor do they 
recognize the ordinal character of utilities. For example, Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) assume that players focus on maximizing their own benefit but are 
at the same time averse to the advantageous (jealousy) and disadvanta-
geous (guilt, inconvenience) inequalities between players. Because Fehr and 
Schmidt assume, without any proof, that the utility matrix has a metric struc-
ture, they think they are able to subtract advantageous and disadvantageous 
inequalities from a quantitative variable that they refer to as the utility. 
Following Fehr and Schmidt we can design an experiment in which we 
model in a stylized manner a transaction without repeated direct con-
tact between two persons (for example, on eBay). In this game we model an 
action-outcome structure with three possible outcomes. The first one is a suc-
cessful interaction (exchange) which gives the test persons 50 euros each; this 
is the case if both persons are cooperative with regard to the agreement. The 
outcome of a non-successful transaction is 20 euros each. And the third pos-
sible outcome is the situation when one player cheats the other (to defect): 
the cheater gets 70 euros, the other player nothing (which is equal to 20 euros 
damage for the cheated person). The possible outcome matrix for this game 
(describing the mathematical structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma) is thus (see 
Matrix 1.1). 
Fehr and Schmidt assume they can quantify utilities as follows: 
(1) Actor x will be jealous (jealousy, J) when there is a disadvantageous ine-
quality between x and another actor.
(2) Actor x will feel guilt (inconvenience, guilt, S) when there is advantageous 
inequality between x and the other.
In their deliberations Fehr and Schmidt assume that S and J are constants. 
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When S and J have a value of 0, they say we are dealing with a purely egois-
tic actor. Such an actor is unable to experience feelings of guilt or jealousy in 
social dilemma situations. Fehr and Schmidt speak of conditionally coopera-
tive players when S > 0 and J > 0. 
But the crucial question is how do Fehr and Schmidt quantify S and J? They 
assert that in the two-person game of Matrix 1.1, for both players when there 
is disadvantageous inequality, the utility for x is: 
U(x) = x - J (y - x). 
According to Matrix 1.1, this is 
U(x) = x - J (70 - 0). 
Now, Fehr and Schmidt suppose that J = 0.5. This changes the equation into:
U(x) = x – 0.5 (70 - 0) which is: 
U(x) = 0 – 35 = -35.
Doing the same for U(y) assuming that S =0.4, we find 
U(y) = y - J (x - y). 
According to Matrix 1.1, this is 
U(y) = y - J (0 - 70). 
Now, Fehr and Schmidt suppose that J = 0.5. This changes the equation into:
U(y) = y – 0.5 (0 - 70) which is: 
U(y) = 70 - 35 = 35.
Fehr and Schmidt define J = 0.5 and S = 0.4 assuming that where there are un-
equal distributions, people have more disadvantage from jealousy than from 
feelings of guilt. Matrix 1.1 will then change and we will find the following 
values in the possible outcome matrix which describes an Assurance Game 
(see Matrix 1.2). 
However, 70 euros cannot change into 28 euros due to feelings of guilt! We 
can thus conclude that it is impossible to assume a metric structure in a util-
ity matrix like Fehr and Schmidt did. Subjective feelings of guilt or jealousy 
cannot and will not change possible outcome matrices. We therefore have to 
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distinguish sharply between a possible outcome matrix which could be quan-
titative and utilities which are ordinal. 
A numeric or quantitative possible outcome structure like Matrix 1.1 and 
1.2 is the input for the actors’ deliberation. Subsequently, an Assurance 
Game will be played if both players have the preference order (me, other): 
(C,C)>(D,C)>(D,D)>(C,D) and choose C. However, a Prisoner’s Dilemma aris-
es when both players have the preference order (D,C)>(C,C)>(D,D)>(C,D) and 
choose D. 
Collective goods, egoism and strong reciprocity
If Agent A1 in neighbourhood N anticipates on choices of oth-
er agents, expecting that they will act according to the preference order 
(D,C)>(C,C)>(D,D)>(C,D) A1 does not necessarily have the same preference or-
der, when A1 chooses also D. If A1 wants to choose C, but A1 believes that oth-
ers will choose D, and A1 expects that others will also choose D, when A1’s 
choice is D, A1 expects that others will always choose D and then its rational 
for A1 to choose also D. A1’s preference order will change, when A1’s mental 
representation of other agents’ preference orders changes.
Agents strive for predictability so they can prepare themselves for interac-
tions with other agents living around them. The next step is that agents want 
to control the things that they can manipulate. Often, control is only possi-
ble with joint action by a group of agents. This refers to the notion of collec-
tive goods. Shared space makes agents recognize their shared interests; for 
example, they have an interest in living in a safe and clean street where their 
children can play. That safe and clean street would then be a collective good. 
In that light, collective goods may be defined as the Objects O1,2,..n Agents 
A1,2,..n know in common and really want to manipulate, but only can bring 
under control together. For instance, if A1 doesn’t want to invest time and 
effort in helping to clean up the street, but other agents do, A1 can profit from 
the collective good ‘the clean street’ without contributing anything. In so 
doing, A1 is a ‘free rider’ acting in short-term self-interest. 
Reciprocity is about balancing one’s own efforts with those of others 
in order to maintain a sense of fairness. Agent A1 is reciprocal if A1 thinks 
it is reasonable and wants to help others, but also applies this standard to 
actions of other agents towards himself. Over time, reciprocal agents devel-
op a friendly attitude towards each other as a result of mutual assistance, not 
as its cause. Besides being a predisposition to cooperate with others, reciproc-
ity is also a predisposition to verbally criticize or punish in another way (at 
personal cost, if necessary) those who violate the norms of cooperation (see 
Matrix 1.3).
Now we have agent Agent A1 who prefers, above all other options, a situa-
tion in which A1 and others sweep the street, but not A1 alone. This resident 
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behaves as a strong reciprocator. When residents all decide to help clean the 
street, and thus behave as strong reciprocators, they play not a Prisoner’s Di-
lemma but an Assurance Game or Trust Game. The formal structure of every 
Assurance Game is shown in Matrix 1.4.
Definition of the social climate of a residential neighbourhood
To refine the working definition of a residential social climate I have to as-
sume that common knowledge exists. It was given a mathematical formu-
lation in a set-theoretical framework by Robert Aumann (1976). A collective 
good is common knowledge if all of the agents know it (it is mutual knowl-
edge) and all of the agents know that all other agents know it and all other 
agents know that all other agents know that all other agents know it, and so 
on. This is much more than simply saying that a collective good is known by 
all, since it implies that the fact that it is known is also known by all, etc.
Now that the theoretical framework has been presented, I can refine my 
working definition of a residential social climate. The revised definition reads 
as follows:
For any residential neighbourhood N the proportion G of well defined collective goods 
of all neighbourhood Objects O1,2,...n  ERS, is equal to the degree of viability of the 
social climate of the neighbourhood. Well defined means: (1) when common knowl-
edge about the definitions of the collective goods exists among a significant subset of 
the residents of neighbourhood N; (2) when a significant subset of the residents of 
neighbourhood N intend to behave as strong reciprocators with regard to the collec-
tive goods; (3) when a significant subset of the residents of neighbourhood N agree on 
when and how to reciprocate in a negative or a positive way. 
When the foregoing is the case in a sequential context like a residential 
neighbourhood, habituation occurs and an intermediary rule system devel-
ops.
Predictability, coordination game and some examples
Reciprocal agents want to participate in a joint action only if other agents 
participate too. One way to coordinate is simply to communicate a message 
such as ‘Let’s all participate in X’. But since each person will take part only if 
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others do, for the message to be successful each person must not only know 
about the ‘X’ (the message); each person must know that each other person 
knows that each other person knows about it, and so on. That is, the ‘let’s par-
ticipate in X’ must be ‘common knowledge’. (Chwe, 2000). In their efforts to 
coordinate repeated actions in the semi-public and public areas, residents are 
aware of the circumstance that most of the state of affairs in a neighbour-
hood is unknown and that the known facts are often not easy to manipulate. 
In order to prepare oneself, a resident wants to be able to predict as much as 
possible what will happen. In game-theoretical terms, equilibrium in coordi-
nation game creates ‘predictability’. To create predictability they need certain 
conventions that guarantee a minimum of predictable behaviour. The follow-
ing is an example of a coordination game:
Residents, when passing me in the street or passing each other, want either the situ-
ation in which they are greeted and will greet back or the situation in which both do 
not greet each other. They avoid the situation in which one resident greets while the 
other doesn’t. By looking at each other’s face the two passers-by estimate what the 
other will do: the other will greet or will not greet. 
A situation in which one of the two greets and the other does not is experi-
enced as unpleasant or even embarrassing. It is not so much the ‘content’ of 
the action that is important; rather, the coordination within the action is im-
portant. In short, it is the coordination of the action that counts. In their ef-
forts to coordinate repeated actions in the semi-public and public areas, res-
idents are aware of the circumstance that most of the state of affairs in a 
neighbourhood is unknown and that the known facts are often not easy to 
manipulate. In order to prepare oneself, a resident wants to be able to pre-
dict as much as possible what will happen. He does this for example, by dem-
onstrating benevolence and pro-sociality when being asked the direction to a 
certain place by someone that comes across in the street. Empirical regulari-
ties will become ‘unwritten rules’ when there is equilibrium in a coordination 
game.
Controllability
During their repeated interactions in the shared semi-public and public are-
as in the living environment, and by the physical tracks of earlier actions that 
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cover the streets and walls of their dwellings, residents demonstrate the way 
they keep up the appearance of their house and garden and the gallery and 
how they handle their garbage. This state of affairs is more than ‘predictabil-
ity’ in a coordination game. What is strived for here is controllability. A via-
ble social climate in a residential environment or a micro-neighbourhood is 
not simply about the distribution of more-or-less unwritten rules of conduct; 
it also lets each resident know that other co-residents know, and so on. Com-
mon knowledge depends not only on me knowing that you receive a message, 
but also on the existence of a shared symbolic system which allows me to 
know how you understand it. Here we can determine a second aspect or var-
iation of common knowledge that is generated not only by communication 
but also by historical precedent. The type of common knowledge mentioned 
here not only helps a group coordinate, but also to some extent can create 
groups, collective identities, ‘imagined communities’ in which, for example, 
each newspaper reader is aware of millions of fellow-readers (Chwe, 2001). 
Anonymity, subtle communication strategies and distrust 
Common knowledge about in-group rules is generated by patterns and repeti-
tion that is recognized by individuals. ‘Solving’ free-rider problems that occur 
in a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation thus requires expanding the range of peo-
ple’s motivations. For example, legal or social sanctions can be imposed on 
free riders or repeated contexts in which engaging in free-riding now might 
make people unwilling to cooperate with you later (Suk-Young Chwe, 2001). 
The social environment moves between anonymity and community. Ano-
nymity can have either a positive connotation or a negative one. Positive ano-
nymity is a quality of urban life, expressed in terms of ‘freedom’. For exam-
ple, cities are associated with the freedom to adopt another social identity, 
for instance that of a dog-owner. Anonymity is not a problem as long as it 
is based on a person’s free will in choosing to be anonymous (Altman, 1975). 
But people who occupy mid-rise and high-rise buildings live close together 
in large numbers in a relatively small area with several shared spaces. As a 
consequence, they regularly experience coincidental encounters with more-
or-less anonymous co-residents. They are forced to interact, simply because 
they cannot avoid one another. A sense of insecurity about the actions of 
those (unknown) others in this type of residential area can easily occur. This 
is even more likely when collective goods are involved. In the first place, it is 
hard to address a certain ‘message’ to a norm offender, because you simply 
do not know who did it. Secondly, when you know to whom the ‘message’ (i.e. 
a complaint or request) can be addressed, you can still be insecure about the 
response that can be expected: “Will he apologize and obey the rule, or will he 
get angry or even aggressive?” In short, negative anonymity can hinder pre-
dictability and thus hinder controllability. That the physical environment can 
support the control over social interaction or hinder it is illustrated by the 
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following example of a woman (aged 82, living in the neighbourhood for 20 
years): 
“It is... yes... the contacts of the flats mutually... yes they are situated, and that makes 
really a difference, they are all situated with the backs towards each other. That is of 
course great because, there is the south and there is the balcony, but there is the ‘sleep-
ing side’. There you never see anyone; there is no balcony or something. And that is of 
course different in older neighbourhoods like Amsterdam-Zuid. There the dwellings are 
facing each other, and therefore you get a completely different ‘street-feeling’, and that 
is missing here. You step out of your door and every other person that steps out of the 
door... I don’t have a notion of where they live. (...) So you hardly have here... I definitely 
don’t know who lives next to me, definitely not. And at the other side either; I don’t know 
anyone in the street.”
Anonymity can be the starting point of a downward spiral that leads to neigh-
bourhood decline. It is relevant to refer here to the Broken Window Theory 
(Wilson-Kelling hypothesis; in: McLaughlin et al., 2003). This thesis suggests 
that neighbourhood disorder is indicated by visible cues that residents per-
ceive to be signs of the breakdown of social order and control (Wilson & Kel-
ling, 1982; Ross and Mirowsky, 1999; Skogan, 1990). Skogan calls this the con-
tagiousness of the problem of disorder: “To the extent to which disorder be-
comes self-generative and feeds on itself, current levels of disorder produce 
future levels of disorder” (Skogan, 1990, p. 49). This may cause neighbour-
hoods to decay and the quality of life of its inhabitants to deteriorate (Skogan, 
1990).
As recent empirical research in the Netherlands has demonstrated, when 
people observe that others have violated a certain norm or legitimate rule, 
they themselves are more likely to violate it and even other norms or rules, 
which causes disorder to spread (Keizer et al., 2008). Thus, visible physical and 
social disruption is a signal that the mechanisms by which healthy neigh-
bourhoods maintain themselves have broken down. If an area loses its capac-
ity to solve even seemingly minor problems, its character becomes suspect. 
Residents are thought to read nuisance as a sign of disorder and as evidence 
of a deeper neighbourhood malaise, undermining personal health and trust 
(see Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004). 
Thus, a completely anonymous living environment is, apart from the indi-
vidual preferences, socially undesirable because there are no boundaries for 
antisocial behaviour (Zimbardo, 1969). In the following quotation, a lady, aged 
67 who has lived with her husband in Buitenveldert for 11 years in a social 
rental apartment, expresses how the Broken Window Theory works in prac-
tice:
Lady: “The garbage containers are emptied regularly; I don’t have any complaints about 
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that. And yes the people can of course not come every hour to remove the stuff. The peo-
ple do it often on Friday afternoon and then they throw mess next to the dirt container. 
But then you cannot throw stuff in the container, ‘Then wait till Monday’.”
Interviewer: “Does it influence the behaviour of other residents?” 
Lady: “Yes I think so. You see, as soon as something is dirty – consider yourself, then you 
think ‘What does it matter, throw it also there’. Yes that is how it works. When garbage is 
put outside the container... when someone comes and sees that there is no garbage, then 
he will take it back to the house thinking ‘I can’t do this now’. But when there ís already 
dirt outside the container, then he will throw it also there; that is how it works…”
Newman had already found out that readable territories make it possible to 
control the social and physical environment because they facilitate surveil-
lance (Newman, 1972). Another way of exercising control over the physical en-
vironment is by making it more personal. A personalized environment is no 
longer anonymous and signals the message ‘being owned by’ and/or ‘being 
cared for’. Thus, in a situation where people hardly know their neighbours, 
various cues – graffiti on the wall, dirt in the doorway, a supermarket trol-
ley on the gallery, a radio that is switched on too loud, and other ‘negative ex-
ternalities’ – are ‘read’ to value the disposition of the neighbours (Adriaanse, 
2011). And the more fundamental coordination game becomes a problem: 
people’s actions become unpredictable. 
Game theory in qualitative empirical science
The mathematical structure of games can be applied in observations of dai-
ly face-to-face interactions, as Goffman does in his book Strategic Interaction 
(1969). Fundamental notions in his application of game theory are reflexive 
choice, anticipation and situation. Game theory, in Goffman’s view, sheds 
light on an area of social life that sociology has more or less missed. It iden-
tifies situations in which actors are mutually aware of each other, where eve-
ry move that someone makes affects all the actors, and where the decision 
that Actor A makes depends on what Actor B thinks that she will do (Swed-
berg, 2001). Goffman distinguishes three moves which are the basic elements 
of interaction situations. The first is the unwitting move, whereby the person 
acts without giving a thought to impression management (Goffman, 1969, p. 
17). Impression management occurs when a person makes use of the observ-
er’s use of his behaviour before the observer has a chance to do so (Goffman, 
1969, p. 13). The second is the naïve move, whereby the observer draws infor-
mation from what he takes to be an unwitting move. Thirdly, he defines the 
covering move, through which the subject attempts to influence the conclu-
sions that the observer draws. In the fourth move, Goffman states, the ob-
server is suspecting that what he might have treated as an unwitting move 
is actually or possibly an obfuscation or misinterpretation, suspecting that 
what appears to be ingenuous fact could be shot through and through with 
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a gamesman’s manipulation and design, suspecting this we can attempt to 
crack, pierce, penetrate, and otherwise get behind the apparent facts in order 
to uncover the real ones. The observer performs an uncovering move (Goffman, 
1969, p. 17, 18). 
Here Goffman points to a system of rules that has to be internalized to 
some degree to make way for politeness and altruistic punishment. One of 
the attributes about yourself that you want to communicate to others – to 
people with whom you have longer-lasting relationships – is that you know of 
the existence of the intermediary rule system, that you know how to practise 
it and that at least you respect it. Goffman refers to this reality as an expres-
sion game.6
 1.3  Research questions and structure of the thesis
The thesis starts from the perspective of the residents, eliciting their defini-
tion and perception of the success of their neighbourhood. Early post-Second 
World War neighbourhoods are called neighbourhoods of a vulnerable phys-
ical, spatial type by scholars and other professionals. But do the subjective 
perceptions of residents living in these neighbourhoods correlate with these 
professional opinions?7 The conceptual model (see Figure 1.3) depicts the 
main concepts of the thesis in their mutual relationship.
This research has a cross-sectional and non-experimental design. Because 
of limitations on time and money the research project includes no longitu-
dinal research. Therefore the best I could do was to develop reliable and val-
id questionnaires and to conduct a detailed case study in one (relatively) 
unproblematic neighbourhood, in order to make it plausible that the model is 
describing important and relevant variables. 
 1.3.1  First research question
The research project started with the construction of a quantitative database 
that contained objective register data for all Dutch neighbourhoods and sur-
vey data from the Dutch Housing Demand Survey (WoningBehoefteOnder-
zoek, 2002), a random sample of 75,034 respondents that is representative for 
the population of Dutch residents in 2002. The Housing Demand Survey is one 
6 What Goffman in 1969 could not know yet is that his description of an expression game perfectly fits the defini-
tion of what later was called a signalling game by Spiezer who in 1972 received the Nobel Prize for his work.
7 Also stakeholders like shop owners, (managers of ) housing corporations, the police and welfare institutions 
have an important role in the development and maintenance of neighbourhoods, nevertheless I focus on the per-
ception and role of the residents for this thesis.
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of the most extensive sample surveys in the Netherlands and was held every 
four years and its successor WOON is held every three years. 
The first research question is split into a methodological and an empirical 
subquestion:
1a How can neighbourhood success be measured with scale instruments? 
1b Which factors contribute to a problem-free or problematic functioning of neigh-
bourhoods in general and especially of early post-Second World War neighbourhoods 
in the Netherlands?
The first research question is answered in the second, the third and the 
fourth chapter of this book. In the second chapter an integrative and more 
comprehensive approach to the measurement of residential environmental 
satisfaction (see Boxes 3 and 1 of the conceptual model) will be introduced. 
Domains of residential environmental satisfaction will be empirically exam-
ined using techniques for multivariate analysis. Exploratory factor analysis is 
used to find out if empirical support can be found for the usefulness of the 
theoretically proposed three-component model of residential environmental 
satisfaction. Three separate domains of success are distinguished. First, the 
resident’s dwelling is perceived as appropriate. Second, the social climate in 
the neighbourhood is perceived as positive. Third, the internal reputation of 
the neighbourhood is evaluated in a positive way. By pattern detection in sat-
isfaction severity groups, it will be indicated which subdomain is the most 
significant component of overall residential satisfaction. 
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The main objective of the third chapter is to introduce a comprehensive 
approach for measuring the frequency of perceived nuisance in the residen-
tial environment (see Box 3 of the conceptual model). To that end, it presents 
some preliminary subgroup analyses investigating whether subsets of res-
idents rate nuisance differently. A residential nuisance scale is empirically 
tested using multivariate analysis. Exploratory factor analysis will be used to 
determine whether empirical support can be found for the claim that the pro-
posed model of reported frequency of residential nuisance is useful. Confir-
mation of the adequacy of the Residential Nuisance Scale – Dutch Language 
Version (RNS-DLV) is sought in reliability and validity tests to find out if it 
correlates as expected with various criterion measures. 
The fourth chapter builds upon results described in Chapters 2 and 3 to 
investigate the relationship between physical-spatial, demographic and eco-
nomic risk factors, and nuisance and environmental (dis)satisfaction. Two 
conceptual models are tested in multivariate analyses (zero- and partial-
order correlations). The goal is to investigate whether human-derived nui-
sance in the residential environment is an important source of residential 
environmental dissatisfaction. The parameters used for the Risk Scale identi-
fy variables on the meso level of the neighbourhood. Resident’s opinions and 
risk factors will be described on the average neighbourhood level. As such, 
this chapter deals with Boxes 1, 2 and 3 of the conceptual model and the rela-
tionships that are assumed between them.
 1.3.2  Second research question
The foregoing theoretical and empirical notions and considerations led to 
the second main research question of the thesis, which mainly concerns the 
case-study area of Buitenveldert. Research question 2 is split into a theoreti-
cal and an empirical part. The theoretical subquestion is:
2.1 Can central concepts of behavioural game theory describe and explain the proxi-
mate causes of a viable residential social climate? 
The empirical subquestion is:
2.2 What mediates the residents’ willingness to contribute or not to the production 
and maintenance of collective residential goods? 
The fifth and sixth chapters concern the strong dependency of a neighbour-
hood’s viability on the willingness of its residents to intervene (Box 2 and its 
feedback loop on the micro level). As will be described in Chapter 2, residen-
tial environmental satisfaction is expressed not only as satisfaction with the 
dwelling or in the internal neighbourhood reputation. Rather, it is mainly re-
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vealed by people’s evaluation of the social climate prevailing in their neigh-
bourhood. The game-theoretical framework developed in Chapter 1 is used 
for analysing the role of trust and altruistic punishment in the production 
and maintenance of collective neighbourhood goods in the case-study area 
Buitenveldert-Amsterdam. The central theoretical concepts are ‘social dilem-
mas’, ‘trust’, ‘communication’ and ‘verbal sanctioning’ as a specification of 
the concept of ‘altruistic punishment’. The results indicate that mutual trust 
built up by communication including verbal sanctioning is an essential aspect 
of solving collective action problems in a neighbourhood context. Chapter 
7 concludes the thesis by bringing together the key findings of the previous 
chapters and answering the research questions of the study. The final section 
offers some recommendations for policy and practice.
 1.3.3  Some notes on the approach of the research
As we have seen in the theoretical section, I shall expand on behavioural 
game theory in this thesis. To that end, I adopt a framework in which reflex-
ive choice and anticipation are crucial ingredients. In this section I try to jus-
tify this approach. From a social-ontological perspective we can distinguish 
between reflexive choice and pre-reflexive behaviour. In this thesis I do not 
focus on pre-reflexive behaviour. If a researcher wants to study pre-reflexive 
human behaviour, he has to make a field visit to a study ‘site’. He may consid-
er taking photographs at the site or may assume a specific role and actually 
participate in the events being studied there. 
I wanted to study intentional human behaviour, or more precisely, the 
intentional and goal-oriented behaviour of residents. Intentional human 
action is caused by desires and beliefs. Residents can give an indication of 
their desires and beliefs in a survey questionnaire. Now, from an ontologi-
cal perspective, one particular class of reflexive behaviour is called ‘practis-
ing science’. Reflexive behaviour is always analytical; therefore, practising sci-
ence as ‘being involved in a reflexive mode of being’ is by definition analyti-
cal. Indeed, science is always an analytical, rational, cognitive enterprise.
Subsequently we can distinguish between the instrumental and the sci-
entific task of analysis. The instrumental task amounts to the specification 
of an empirical procedure enabling any person to distinguish between cas-
es within a specified domain where the concept can be applied, on the one 
hand, from cases to which the scientific concept cannot be applied, on the 
other hand. The instrumental task is preceded by a logical investigation to 
ascertain that an attribute has a logically independent existence and by an 
empirical investigation to determine that an attribute is quantitative. Thus, 
speaking coherently about a state of affairs does not qualify as a scientific 
activity. A gathering of well educated, wide-awake adults discussing a rele-
vant social state of affairs can develop a rich and imaginative vocabulary with 
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which they can label and loosely describe elements of an empirical domain. 
But this cannot be qualified as science; it lacks a logical and empirical inves-
tigation into the ‘inner structure’ of the concepts used. By calling a rich and 
imaginative vocabulary ‘science’, one would be committing the social-sci-
ence fallacy, namely: ‘We agree that this sounds so beautiful that it must be 
true.’ Jon Elster also mentions social-scientific concepts for which no empir-
ical procedure in our sense is given. He states that at best these are useless 
and harmless metaphors; at worst, they open fruitless avenues of research 
and suggest false causal hypotheses (Elster, 2007, p. 455). As an example, 
Elster mentions the ideas of ‘cultural capital’ (Bourdieu, 1984) and ‘social cap-
ital’ (Putnam, 2000). The scientific empirical concepts describe properties 
of objects but also the relation between properties. A scientist is especial-
ly interested in those functional relationships between properties known as 
causal explanations. A special class of causal explanations that I would like to 
mention is called ‘abduction’.
Abduction
In logic, three kinds of logical reasoning can be distinguished: deduction, in-
duction and abduction. Given a precondition, a conclusion, and a rule that the 
precondition implies the conclusion, they can be explained in the following 
way. Deduction means determining the conclusion. It is using the rule and 
its precondition to draw a conclusion. Example: “When it rains, the grass gets 
wet. It rained. Therefore, the grass is wet.” Induction means determining the 
rule. It is learning the rule after numerous examples of the conclusion fol-
lowing the precondition. Example: “The grass has been wet every time it has 
rained. Therefore, when it rains, the grass gets wet.” Abduction means deter-
mining the precondition. It is using the conclusion and the rule to support 
that the precondition could explain the conclusion. Example: “When it rains, 
the grass gets wet. The grass is wet, therefore, it may have rained.” 
In the part of the thesis that seeks to answer the second research question, 
the term abduction is used to capture the kind of logical reasoning in play. 
Charles Sanders Peirce defined abduction as qualitative induction or hypothe-
sis. Later he called this way of reasoning abduction or retro-duction (Niiniluo-
to, 1999). In both induction and abduction, reasoning jumps from the specif-
ic to the general, but there is a difference. With induction, we generalize from 
several cases of a type for which we know something is true. Thus, we assume 
that this conclusion applies to all members of the group. With abduction, in 
contrast, we find a surprising fact that could be explained by assuming that 
it is a special case of a general rule. Therefore, we take that assumption to be 
the truth (Schuyt, 1995, p. 85, 86). Stated formally, the term abduction refers 
to the process of arriving at an explanation a from an observed surprising cir-
cumstance b. To abduct explanation a from a surprising circumstance b is to 
surmise that a may be true because then b would be a matter of course. Thus, 
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to abduct a from b involves determining that a is a sufficient but not neces-
sary condition for b. Abduction is in fact causal reasoning. For example, the 
absence of liveability problems in a neighbourhood of a vulnerable neighbour-
hood type such as Buitenveldert (b) can be explained by the prevalence of a 
viable social climate (a). The viable social climate is a sufficient but not nec-
essary condition of the absence of liveability problems. The surprising cir-
cumstance is that there are no liveability problems in terms of graffiti, report-
ed vandalism and unsafety. But if there is a viable social climate in terms of 
well defined collective neighbourhood goods, then it would be unsurprising 
that there are no liveability problems. This is good abductive reasoning from 
social climate to liveability problems. It involves not simply a determination 
that the presence of well defined collective goods is sufficient for the absence 
of liveability problems. It also implies that well defined collective goods are 
among the most economical explanations for the lack of liveability problems. 
Simplification and economy are what call for the ‘leap’ of abduction. 
Now that the theoretical framework has been presented, I can refine my 
working definition of a residential social climate. The revised definition reads 
as follows: 
For any residential neighbourhood N the finite set G of well defined collective goods 
has a cardinality which is identical to the degree of viability of the social climate of 
the neighbourhood. Well defined means: (1) when common knowledge about the def-
initions of the collective goods exists among a significant subset of the residents of 
neighbourhood N; (2) when a significant subset of the residents of neighbourhood N 
intend to behave as strong reciprocators with regard to the collective goods; (3) when 
a significant subset of the residents of neighbourhood N agree on when and how to 
reciprocate in a negative or a positive way.  
When the foregoing is the case in a sequential context like a residential 
neighbourhood, habituation occurs and an intermediary rule system devel-
ops. Having the tendency to do the same things that one has always done is 
often pre-reflexive. But pre-reflexive habitual behaviour can be made reflex-
ive by asking respondents about it in a survey or interview, as I have done for 
this thesis. 
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Abstract
The aim of this article is to introduce an integrative and more comprehen-
sive approach to measurement of residential environmental satisfaction. Do-
mains of residential environmental satisfaction were empirically examined 
using techniques for multivariate analysis. Data were mainly drawn from the 
Housing Demand Survey (WoningBehoefteOnderzoek 2002), an a-select sam-
ple of 75,034 respondents that is representative for the population of Dutch 
residents in 2002. The Housing Demand Survey is one of the most extensive 
sample surveys in the Netherlands and is held every 4 years. The results of 
exploratory factor analysis give empirical support for the usefulness of the 
theoretically proposed three-component model of residential environmen-
tal satisfaction. Furthermore, multi-group analysis supports the assumption 
of similarity of perceived quality of the living situation among people vary-
ing in degree of residential environmental satisfaction. Reliability and valid-
ity tests confirm that the Residential Environmental Satisfaction Scale-Dutch 
Language Version (RESS-DLV) is an adequate instrument and that it contrib-
utes to the understanding of the perceived quality of the living situation. The 
measure correlates as expected with various criterion measures. The compact 
and valid instrument RESS-DLV – and especially its abbreviated version – can 
be very useful as the dependent or the independent variable in research car-
ried out in the Netherlands and other European countries. First pattern detec-
tion in satisfaction severity groups indicates that satisfaction with the sub-
domain ‘residential social climate’ is the most significant component of over-
all residential satisfaction.
Keywords
Residential environmental satisfaction, multidimensional outcome measure, 
residential social climate, reliability
 2.1  Introduction
A recent trend in policy-oriented urban research is to make an inventory of 
problems at the local level and then classify neighborhoods along those lines. 
Local and national government can then use the results to hammer out urban 
regeneration policies. These neighborhood profiles are generally derived from 
objective measures and socio-demographic predictors of dysfunction and dis-
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satisfaction (RIGO, 1995; http://www.communities.gov.uk). While moving in 
a promising direction, the research has run into some conceptual challeng-
es. One of these involves the construction of indicators. They consist of social 
and physical variables as well as objective and subjective data. Due to their 
composite nature, the indicators combine the underlying causes of neighbor-
hood decline with its diverse manifestations.
Progress has been made, especially in analyzing the issues, formulating 
policy, refining the definitions, and classifying the problems. Nonetheless, 
stakeholders frequently take too narrow a focus in their approach to declin-
ing neighborhoods (see Buys, 2002). Countless policy programs define neigh-
borhoods as ‘problematic’ on the basis of their external appearance. They are 
characterized by a specific urban planning structure and the predominance 
of certain housing types (Kruythoff & Haars, 2002). Yet not every older mid-
rise area should be cast as a problem neighborhood. Look at the statistics. The 
outliers show that neighborhoods with the same initial urban planning struc-
ture can develop in a completely different direction. Thus, one may end up in 
the ‘problem’ category while another will not. These neighborhoods got off to 
an equal start as potential environments. Over time, differences in use and 
management imbued them with very different capacities to become effective 
environments (Gans, 1968; Van der Horst et al., 2002). Some of the key explan-
atory factors lie in the spheres of interpretation, social structure of the envi-
ronment, management, and use of the neighborhood by its residents (Blok-
land-Potters, 1998; Ministerie van VROM, 2004). These factors are critical to 
an understanding of why one area turns into a problem neighborhood while 
another does not, even though they are both of the same urban planning type.
Residents’ opinions about their neighborhood offer important insights. 
They shed light on which aspects of the setting have a greater impact on 
overall residential environmental satisfaction. This line of reasoning was set 
forth long ago by Herbert Gans, who stated that ‘‘The effective environment 
may thus be defined as that version of the potential environment that is 
manifestly or latently adopted by users’’ (Gans, 1968, p. 8). This definition has 
since been operationalized by Diener and Suh (1997). They say that to under-
stand the well-being of an individual, one must measure the person’s emo-
tional and cognitive reactions to his/her environment. Taking their cue, the 
present study focuses on the perspective of the residents. Data was collected 
on their perception of how successful their neighborhood was. The research 
described in this article explored the relationship between the individual and 
the environment at the neighborhood level.
First of all, this article describes the development and validation of a mul-
tidimensional outcome measure for residential environmental satisfaction. 
This measure could serve as the dependent or as the independent variable 
in future research models. Ultimately, these models should elucidate whether 
subsets of residents tend to use different standards for evaluating their resi-
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dential environment.
Furthermore, they might reveal which neighborhood characteristics have a 
positive influence on residential satisfaction and which do not. Thus far, few 
studies have explored how attributes of the residential environment influ-
ence residential satisfaction. In the absence of selection criteria, the research 
has been based on mere lists of physical and social neighborhood characteris-
tics that influence residential satisfaction. For instance, the literature reports 
on traffic noise, the presence of green space and services, the proximity of 
social relations, and nuisance such as rubbish (Van Poll, 1997; Bonaiuto et al., 
1999). But little is known about the interactions between these features.
Second, this article considers the extent to which overall residential sat-
isfaction is explained by the three components of the residential environ-
ment distinguished by Canter and Rees (1982), namely neighborhood, house, 
and neighbors. Thus far, little is known about the mutual interaction of these 
components. The insights emanating from the analysis may help housing 
associations – as well as other stakeholders that are developing urban, hous-
ing, and neighborhood renewal policy – find the right policy mix to improve 
overall quality of life.
The following section (2.2) presents the theoretical framework, and Section 
2.3 describes the data and methods used. Section 2.4 expands on the Residen-
tial Environmental Satisfaction Scale – Dutch Language Version (RESS-DLV) 
and its shorter version (the abbreviated RESS-DLV). Both are based on the data 
of the Dutch national housing sample Housing Demand Survey 2002. Section 
2.5 summarizes the initial outcomes of the multivariate analyses that were 
performed to determine which of the three subdomains dominates overall 
satisfaction. The concluding section (2.6) contains a discussion, policy recom-
mendations, and suggestions for further research.
 2.2  Residential environmental satisfaction:  
state of the art
Certain types of neighborhoods are considered more problematic than others 
due to their physical characteristics. Residential environments can be typified 
by objective criteria such as building period, architectural style, spatial struc-
ture, amount of green space, and geographic location. The allocation of neigh-
borhood characteristics is not generally disputed. But there are differences in 
the way residents perceive and use their environments.
The ‘iron variables’ of household composition, income, and age are gener-
ally set off against housing characteristics and the physical characteristics 
of the neighbourhood type. The relations this reveals are used to explain dif-
ferences in residential satisfaction. But this standard approach has recently 
been questioned. Apparently, residents evaluate their living environment on 
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the grounds of soft criteria too. Consequently, residents with a similar house-
hold composition may evaluate their living environment differently (Karsten 
et al., 2006). A focus on objective person – environment relations or objective 
neighborhood characteristics gives only a limited perspective on the determi-
nants of residential environmental satisfaction. Though fundamental to any 
understanding of location preferences, this narrow perspective excludes the 
experiential dimension of housing (Altman & Low, 1992). Over time, people 
develop a sense of ‘dwelling’ or ‘being in place’. Their habitual routines build 
up a cognitive awareness of the residential environment to the point that a 
person becomes psychologically fused with it.
Galster and Hesser assert that, ‘‘Given a set of felt needs and aspirations, an 
individual evaluates his or her current housing situation with regard to both 
the dwelling unit and neighborhood.’’ Those needs and aspirations are com-
prised of individual characteristics (e.g., social class, life cycle stage) and cul-
tural norms (Galster & Hesser, 1981, p. 737). Taking this as a point of depar-
ture, the outcome of an instrument like the RESS-DLV (described in this arti-
cle) may be expected to differ by the type of resident. At a higher level of 
aggregation, the outcome may be expected to differ among countries as a 
consequence of specific housing-market characteristics and socio-cultural 
traditions.
The empirical studies dealing with residential satisfaction take one of two 
approaches (Weidemann & Anderson, 1985). Some (e.g., Speare, 1974; New-
man & Duncan, 1979) consider residential satisfaction as a predictor of behav-
ior. It can predict behavior such as moving house or home improvement (Prie-
mus, 1986). This approach assumes that any incongruence between the set 
of needs and aspirations and the current residential status can be alleviat-
ed either by moving or making adjustments to the current unit or location 
(Galster, 1987a; Wolpert, 1984). Accordingly, studies dealing with residential 
mobility and its consequences use residential satisfaction as a predictor of 
moving/coping behavior.
The other approach uses residential satisfaction as a criterion of residen-
tial quality (Marans & Rodgers, 1975; Galster & Hesser, 1981; Bonaiuto et al., 
1999; Amérigo & Aragonés, 1990, 1997; Parkes et al., 2002; Pinquart & Burme-
di, 2004). The researchers seek to establish the factors – both those of the res-
idential environment and those of the individual – that determine the degree 
to which a person is satisfied with his or her residential environment. Factors 
such as length of residence, tenure status, the physical characteristics of the 
house and neighborhood, social bonds, and the socio-demographic character-
istics of residents are said to affect satisfaction levels (Galster & Hesser, 1981). 
A new direction within this approach started with the study of housing satis-
faction by Canter and Rees (1982). They used multi-dimensional scaling and 
developed a general model of housing satisfaction that places user goals at 
the center of the evaluation of the residential environment. They argue that 
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user assessment should form the cornerstone for evaluation research and 
that ‘feedback’ or ‘appraisal’ is integral to the design process (Canter & Rees, 
1982, p. 185, 186).
Some investigators use a single-item measure of satisfaction with housing 
conditions. Hadden and Leger (1990, p. 31), for example, asked ‘‘Is this neigh-
borhood better, worse, or about the same as your last neighborhood?’’ Oth-
ers consider this measure too coarse to represent the full range of residen-
tial satisfaction (e.g. Pinquart & Burmedi, 2004). Many surveys ask which qual-
ities people associate with a good housing environment and most surveys are 
presented to a random sample of residents. The typical procedure is to pre-
pare a list of potentially desirable qualities such as ‘convenient public trans-
port’ or ‘a friendly place’. The residents are supposed to indicate whether or 
not they appreciate these features and to express their opinion by using a rat-
ing scale. The scale they are given may elicit priorities (How important is it for 
a neighborhood to have each of the following qualities?) or degree of satisfac-
tion (How satisfied are you with your present neighborhood?).
Numerous empirical studies have examined characteristics of the users 
(either cognitive or behavioral) or of the environment, both physical and 
social. But few have organized these variables in a model in an effort to facil-
itate analysis of the relationships among these characteristics (Parkes et al., 
2002). Amérigo and Aragonés (1990, 1997) and Amérigo (2002) state that once 
the objective attributes of the residential environment have been evaluat-
ed, they become subjective. At that point, these attributes give rise to a cer-
tain degree of satisfaction. Naturally, subjective attributes are influenced by 
‘personal characteristics’, which include one’s socio-demographic profile. 
But subjective attributes are also influenced by one’s ‘residential quality pat-
tern’. This brings a normative element into the picture, since the individu-
al is asked to compare his/her real and ideal residential environments. The 
result of this evaluation constitutes a measure of residential satisfaction. It is 
defined as a positive affective state that the individual experiences towards 
his/her residential environment and that will cause him/her to behave in cer-
tain ways in order to maintain or increase congruence with that environment. 
A case in point is a study aimed at deriving the predictors of residential 
satisfaction in public housing of the city of Madrid (a study conducted by 
Amérigo et al.). The results show that psycho-social aspects such as relation-
ships with neighbors and the degree of attachment to the residential envi-
ronment are stronger predictors than physical features such as infrastructure 
and equipment of the house and neighborhood (Amérigo & Aragonés, 1990, p. 
323). Other researchers (Canter & Rees, 1982) established a working model to 
measure perceived residential quality. Their model distinguishes three essen-
tial elements of the residential environment: the neighborhood, the house, 
and the neighbors (Canter & Rees, 1982, p. 190-192).
The notion of ‘residential environmental satisfaction’ in the present article 
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is taken as a global attitude of a resident (or a household) towards the living 
environment. The following sections represent an attempt to use the theoreti-
cal insights mentioned above to develop an outcome measure for the purpose 
of evaluating residential environmental satisfaction. First the data and meth-
od are described.
 2.3  Data and methods
The analysis is based on Dutch survey and registry data. The results of the 
2002 national housing survey (Housing Demand Survey 2002) were used along 
with data on the characteristics of the Dutch housing stock at the zip-code 
level. The latter were derived from the Woningmarktmonitor (ABF, 2003) and the 
Wegener data file (2002). The Housing Demand Survey 2002 comprises an a-se-
lect sample of 75,034 respondents. The sample is representative for the popu-
lation of the Netherlands in 2002. The Housing Demand Survey, which is the 
successor of the general census of housing and population, has been held 
every 4 years since 1964. The results are used to develop government poli-
cy. The Housing Demand Survey provides information about household com-
position, housing situations, affordability, demand, and residential mobility. 
The survey includes questions on how residents feel about their living situa-
tion: about their evaluation of the current dwelling, their contacts with neigh-
bors, and the appearance of the neighborhood. The theoretical insights men-
tioned above provided a framework for the initial selection of variables from 
the questionnaire of the Housing Demand Survey. The selection criteria were 
refined in light of the present author’s own research in two mid-rise neigh-
borhoods in Amsterdam and The Hague (Adriaanse, 2004a, b). That research 
yielded insight into the factors contributing to the success of the neighbor-
hoods from the residents’ point of view. The factors they identified referred to 
physical and spatial characteristics of their neighborhood as well as to its so-
cio-cultural attributes.
Table 2.1 gives an overview of the Housing Demand Survey variables (trans-
lated from Dutch) that were selected for the analyses. Those questions that 
posed an undesirable situation – the ones with an * – were later recoded in 
order to use them in subsequent multivariate analyses.
Residents had to give an answer in one of the following two forms: either 
‘Do you agree with the following statements?’ or ‘How satisfied are you 
with...?’ The respondents were asked to choose their answer from a five-point 
Likert scale (1-5) that was constructed as follows for the first form: (1) strong-
ly agree; (2) agree; (3) neither agree nor disagree; (4) disagree; (5) strongly disa-
gree. For the second form, the scale was as follows: (1) very satisfied; (2) satis-
fied; (3) neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; (4) dissatisfied; (5) very dissatisfied.
[ 53 ]
 2.4  Development of the residential environmen-
tal satisfaction scale
Explorative factor analysis was used to develop the Residential Environmen-
tal Satisfaction Scale – Dutch Language Version (RESS-DLV). Before conducting 
that factor analysis, though, the inter-item correlation matrix of the 18 Hous-
ing Demand Survey items listed in Table 2.1 were carefully examined. The cor-
relation of ‘The dwelling has enough outdoor space’ with all other RESS items 
was between 0.09 and 0.28. The correlation of ‘I feel co-responsible for the 
liveability in this neighborhood’ with all other RESS items was between 0.09 
and 0.24. Because the correlation of these items with all the other items is 
low, it was decided to exclude these two items from further analysis.
The remaining 16 Housing Demand Survey questions were used in an 
unforced exploratory factor analysis with Varimax rotation. The factor analy-
sis resulted in three factors; see Table 2.2 for the rotated factor loadings.
Together the three factors accounted for 52% of the variance. The three fac-
tors (domains) were inspected and defined as described below.
Factor 1 can be interpreted as the residents’ general opinions and feelings 
about living in the neighborhood. It represents their experience of the phys-
ical environment and the population characteristics. This factor is therefore 
labelled ‘internal neighborhood reputation’ (see for example Suttles, 1972; 
Reitzes, 1983; Wacquant, 1993; Hortulanus, 1995). The value attached to a 
neighborhood is expressed in both internal and external image-forming pro-
cesses. The perception of the general public and the opinions of stakeholders 
make up the neighborhood’s external reputation; the image that the residents 
have is its internal reputation.
Factor 2 is labeled ‘social climate’. The social climate of a residential envi-
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ronment is an individual’s perception of how others treat him or her, one 
another, and the spatial artefacts within the area that the individual experi-
ences as his or her living environment (Adriaanse, 2005). Factor 3 is labeled 
‘dwelling satisfaction’.
 2.4.1  Reliability
Reliability is the most fundamental aspect of sociological measurement. 
There would be no reason to assess the validity of the RESS-DLV if its relia-
bility could not be established first. Multivariate analyses were performed on 
the data obtained with the RESS-DLV in order to assess the instrument’s re-
liability. Cronbach’s alpha provides a reliability estimate that simultaneously 
considers all possible ways of splitting the test items in an inter-item correla-
tional matrix. The degree of reliability was considered to be acceptable when 
Crohnbach’s alpha > 0.70 (Field, 2000). The coefficient alpha of the RESS-DLV 
was high, 0.86, suggesting that, on the whole, the 16 scale items measure the 
same construct. The next step was to build subscales based on the three re-
sulting factors and to consider the reliability of each subscale separately. Sub-
scale 1, ‘internal neighborhood reputation’ (INR), contains the first eight items 
shown in Table 2.2. The result of the reliability analysis shows Crohnbach’s al-
pha = 0.82. Thus, the internal consistency of the ‘internal neighborhood repu-
tation’ subscale is quite high.
Subscale 2, ‘social climate’ (SC), contains items 9 through 12. The result of 
the reliability analysis shows Crohnbach’s alpha = 0.75. Thus, the internal 
consistency of the ‘social climate’ subscale is satisfactory. Subscale 3, ‘dwell-
ing satisfaction’ (DS), contains items 13 through 16. The internal consistency 
of the ‘dwelling satisfaction’ subscale is satisfactory, as the result of the relia-
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bility analysis shows Crohnbach’s alpha = 0.68. This figure is rather low, part-
ly because so few items are included in this subscale. Overall, the reliability 
findings for the RESS-DLV and the separate subscales are encouraging.1
 2.4.2 Abbreviated RESS-scale
To make an outcome measure like the RESS-DLV more suitable for policy re-
search, it should be as compact as possible. For governments and other stake-
holders it is less time consuming and less expensive to add a restricted set of 
items to an existing monitor or survey questionnaire. To that end, ways were 
sought to construct an abbreviated version of the RESS-DLV. Specifically, the 
population sample was divided in two groups by dichotomizing the whole da-
tabase on the fourth quartile. One group consists of residents who are very 
dissatisfied (fourth quartile); the other comprises all other residents. The aim 
is to construct an abbreviated scale that can adequately classify most of the 
dissatisfied respondents.
The assumption underlying discriminant analysis is that each of the varia-
bles is normally distributed. In that light, it was necessary to test the hypoth-
esis that all group variances are equal and that the samples come from nor-
mal populations. The normal probability plots suggest a departure from nor-
mality for each group. The assumptions that must be met to use a discri-
minant analysis are thus violated. Consequently, the decision was made to 
devise a binary logistic regression model.
The model tests the extent to which the 16 items in the RESS-DLV matrix 
are associated with overall neighborhood satisfaction, as measured by the 
RESS-DLV scale. The two groups of residents – the ‘very dissatisfied’ and ‘all 
others’ – serve as dependent variables in the regression model. The varia-
bles (the 16 scale items) are entered (forward) stepwise in the analysis. The 
results may be summarized as follows. The abbreviated scale correctly clas-
sifies extremely dissatisfied respondents in 85% of the cases correctly, with 
a reduced set of eight items. With the same set of items, 95% of all cases are 
predicted correctly. (See Table 2.3 for details on the eighth step).
The purpose of abbreviation was to highlight the ability of a restrict-
ed number of scale items to predict membership in the 25% of respondents 
who are very dissatisfied. With eight scale items, 85% of the very dissatis-
fied respondents can be predicted correctly. The abbreviated scale consists of 
items of all three subscales. The abbreviated scale is highly correlated with 
1 The following values were found for the RESS-DLV total scale: mean 35; median 33; modus 28; min/max 16 and 
76. For subscale 1, ‘internal neighborhood reputation’, the values are as follows: mean 17; median 16; modus 14; 
min/max 8 and 38. For subscale 2, ‘social climate’: mean 10; median 10; modus 7; min/max 4 and 19. For sub-
scale 3, ‘dwelling satisfaction’: mean 7; median 7; modus 7; min/max 4 and 19.
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the total RESS scale, namely 0.96, which is highly satisfying. The restrict-
ed scale containing eight items instead of 16 is much more convenient for 
research. The eight items included in the abbreviated scale are as follows:
1. I have a lot of contact with other residents in my neighbourhood.
2. I am satisfied with my dwelling.
3. I feel at home in this neighbourhood.
4. Living in this neighborhood is not annoying.
5. I don’t feel an urge to move out of this neighbourhood.
6. The buildings of this neighborhood are attractive.
7. In this neighborhood residents treat each other pleasantly.
8. I am satisfied with my living environment.
The following subsection presents the reliability assessment of the abbreviat-
ed RESS-DLV. To assess the reliability of the abbreviated version, the first step 
was principal component analysis. It revealed one factor explaining 43% of 
the variance. For the scale constructed with these eight items, the coefficient 
alpha was 0.80, which is satisfactory.2
 
 2.4.3  Validity
Several analyses were performed to test the extent to which the RESS-DLV 
measures what it purports to measure: a resident’s satisfaction with the 
living situation and the neighborhood. Most attention was given to crite-
rion validity. First, as a measure of validity, the mean RESS-DLV score was 
determined in relation to the criterion ‘living in a Dutch post-war mid-rise 
neighborhood’. When data that link housing variables with deprivation and 
dissatisfaction are examined, several types of neighbourhood – types based 
on physical characteristics – emerge as more ‘problematic’ than others. The 
scientific, social, and policy literature identifies several types as dysfunc-
tional: post-war high-rise neighborhoods and prewar urban renewal areas, 
but also post-war low-rise areas. Despite historical variations in economic 
development, housing policy, and socio-cultural traditions, the problems in 
2 The findings for the abbreviated RESS-DLV are: mean 16.7; median 16.0; modus 14.0; min/max 8 and 38.
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these types of neighborhood are similar throughout Western Europe. These 
areas are associated with below-standard living conditions, deprivation, 
isolated locations, poverty, a negative image, social isolation, pollution, and 
crime (Prak & Priemus, 1984; Heeger, 1993; Adriaanse et al., 1997; Schwedler, 
1998; Turkington et al., 2004).
The post-Second World War mid-rise neighborhood was taken as the gold 
standard. This type of neighborhood is characterized by the following three 
conditions:
1. At least half of the housing stock in 2003 was built between 1945 and 1980.
2. The share of the dwellings in the total housing stock of the zip-code area 
is at least two standard deviations above the mean percentage of mid-rise 
flats in all Dutch neighborhoods.
3. The housing stock in the zip-code area is not predominantly (not 50% or 
more) of another type.3
For the analysis, the zip codes4 of register data from the Woningmarktmon-
itor (ABF 2003) and the Wegener data file were matched with the zip codes of 
the respondents of the Housing Demand Survey 2002 sample. 7% (4,934) of 
the respondents of the Housing Demand Survey live in a zip-code area that 
can be typified as a post-war mid-rise neighborhood. In total, 116 neighbor-
hoods in the country belong to the category ‘post-war mid-rise’. The question 
is, are the residents of post-war mid-rise neighborhoods significantly more 
dissatisfied than people who do not live in a neighborhood of this type? A 
t-test shows that the RESS-DLV and its subscales can discriminate well be-
tween residents of post-war mid-rise neighborhoods and people living else-
where. Table 2.4 shows the mean levels of satisfaction on the RESS-DLV and 
each of the RESS-DLV subscales for respondents who live in a post-war mid-
rise neighborhood and those who do not. The higher the mean score, the 
more negatively the residents evaluate the fit between their household and 
3 The zip-code area comprises at least 100 households. The variables for the construction of these criteria were 
derived from register data of Wegener and the ABF Woningmarktmonitor 2003.
4  Strictly speaking, Dutch ‘postcode’ areas (called zip-code areas here) do not exactly align with neighborhood 
boundaries. Nonetheless, this article refers to these zip-code areas as neighborhoods for the sake of convenience.
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their living and housing situation. 
Another way of demonstrating that the RESS-DLV measures what it pur-
ports to measure is to use all the available information. The first step was the 
division of the sample in 10 equal groups on the basis of the respondents’ 
scores on the RESS-DLV.5
The bar chart below shows the 10 deciles. The first decile contains 3% of the 
respondents living in post-war mid-rise neighborhoods, while the 10th decile 
has almost 15%. Assuming that the RESS-DLV is valid, it is expected that the 
higher the score on the RESS-DLV, the more likely it is that that score comes 
from someone in a post-war mid-rise neighborhood. The bar chart shows the 
association between the percentage of persons living in a post-war mid-rise 
neighborhood and the score on the RESS-DVL (Figure 2.1).
The chart clearly shows that the association between living in a post-war 
mid-rise neighborhood and evaluating the living situation as unsatisfactory 
has a monotone upwardly climbing tendency. We can conclude that the RESS-
DLV measures what it purports to measure. The higher the RESS-DLV score, 
the more dissatisfied the respondent is.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present the initial normative data, consisting of the 10 
deciles for the population. A norm is a factual outcome score that is used as 
a criterion to determine severity. The tables of the range of variation in RESS-
DLV scores and its abbreviated version may serve as baseline data for other 
5 The deciles are described in more detail later in the section on norms and distributions.
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researchers who may use the RESS-DLV or the abbreviated RESS.
 2.5  First pattern detection in satisfaction seve-
rity groups on the RESS
This section describes the first results of a multivariate analysis carried out 
with the RESS-DLV. They show that the impact of the subscales in overall res-
idential satisfaction varies significantly. In a study by Amérigo and Aragonés, 
multiple regression analysis revealed that attachment to the neighborhood 
and relationships with neighbors explained the greatest variance in residen-
tial satisfaction (Amérigo & Aragonés, 1990, p. 323). In the same vein, the out-
comes of the multivariate analyses described in the following sections dem-
onstrate that satisfaction with the social climate in the neighborhood is the 
most significant factor in overall residential satisfaction in the Netherlands.
The task was to find out which of the subscales dominates within the over-
all residential environmental satisfaction of Dutch residents (RESS-DLV). The 
first step was to make the RESS subscales independent of their length. This 
was done by dividing each subscale by the number of its items. The second 
step was to divide the sample of residents into four quartiles, ranging from 
residents who are very satisfied (1) to residents who are very dissatisfied (4). 
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Figure 2.2 depicts the weighted mean score of each quartile (i.e. group defined 
by severity of dissatisfaction) on a bar chart.
In view of the extent to which the RESS subscales depart from normality, 
Friedman’s tests were performed to find out which of the three weighted sub-
scales of the RESS predominates in the residential environmental satisfaction 
of each quartile. The findings lead to the following conclusions. For all quar-
tiles – from people who are (very) satisfied to people who are (very) dissatis-
fied – overall residential environmental satisfaction is dominated by the per-
ceived social climate of the neighborhood. That aspect is always followed by 
the internal reputation and, in third place, by dwelling satisfaction. Differenc-
es between the (weighted) subscales within each group are always statistical-
ly significant, with P = 0.000. The mean ranks of the subscales were as follows. 
First quartile: subscale ‘social climate’ 1.9; subscale ‘internal reputation’ 1.7; 
subscale ‘dwelling satisfaction’ 1.5. Second quartile: subscale ‘social climate’ 
2.4; subscale ‘internal reputation’ 1.9; subscale ‘dwelling satisfaction’ 1.7. 
Third quartile: subscale ‘social climate’ 2.8; subscale ‘internal reputation’ 2.1; 
subscale ‘dwelling satisfaction’ 1.9. Fourth quartile: subscale ‘social climate’ 
3.3; subscale ‘internal reputation’ 2.8; and subscale ‘dwelling satisfaction’ 2.4.
How can these outcomes be interpreted in more general terms? First of all, 
except for the variance among neighborhood types, the differences reflect 
general developments in society at large. These changes have influenced the 
relationship between aspects of the living environment. At the beginning of 
the 20th century, the quality of the housing stock was far below its current 
level, both in the Netherlands and in other Western European countries. Con-
sequently, slum clearance was a major policy issue at the time (Van der Horst 
et al., 2002).
Nowadays, most people in the Netherlands have access to a dwelling of rea-
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sonable quality. In the course of time, other aspects of the residential envi-
ronment have become more important to the perception and evaluation of 
neighborhoods. For instance, people are now more concerned about the con-
centration of certain population groups and the accumulation of problems 
in specific neighborhoods (RIGO, 2004). These concerns do not seem to relate 
exclusively to the quality of the housing stock in these areas; it is plausible 
that socio-cultural factors play an important part. It is often suggested that a 
lack of social cohesion is an important factor in these problematic neighbor-
hoods (e.g., Kearns & Parkinson, 2001).
A recent case study in the Buitenveldert district of Amsterdam – a problem-
free area of a vulnerable neighborhood type – expands on this topic. There, 
it is not the degree of social interaction or social cohesion among the resi-
dents that explain their residential satisfaction. Rather, it is the shared social 
identity and the unwritten rules that explain the favorable social climate in 
the neighborhood (Adriaanse, 2006a, b). Generally speaking, the residents of 
Buitenveldert do not express satisfaction with their neighborhood in terms of 
the quality of the dwelling or the aesthetics of the architecture in the sur-
roundings. Instead, they refer first and foremost to the favorable social cli-
mate. These research findings support the pattern detected in satisfaction 
severity groups on the RESS-DLV. Among those groups, satisfaction with the 
social climate in the neighborhood is significantly the most important ele-
ment of overall residential satisfaction – unless a resident is either (very) sat-
isfied or (very) dissatisfied.
 2.6  Conclusion and discussion
This article first described residential environmental satisfaction as a global 
attitude of a resident (or household) towards his dwelling, the social climate 
of the neighborhood and the internal neighborhood reputation. The article 
then described the development and validation of the RESS-DLV, an instru-
ment to measure residential environmental satisfaction. Though adequate, 
the instrument can be improved and refined and the subscale for dwelling 
satisfaction needs to be extended. The first analyses indicated that the RESS-
DLV is a valid instrument. It can generate important additional information 
for policy-making on urban renewal and neighborhoods in general. With the 
help of the RESS-DLV and its abbreviated version, researchers can offer in-
sight in the degree to which specific neighbourhood problems are of most 
concern – and to whom.
The pattern detection in satisfaction severity groups on the RESS-DLV dem-
onstrated that residential environmental satisfaction is expressed not only 
by satisfaction with the dwelling or by the internal neighborhood reputa-
tion. Rather, it is mainly revealed by people’s evaluation of the social climate 
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in their neighborhood. The importance of social climate for residential envi-
ronmental satisfaction raises interesting questions for follow-up research. For 
example, further study could identify the ingredients of a satisfying social cli-
mate. Does it mean that there are intensive local networks and a close-knit 
neighborhood community? Or are there other determining factors? Young 
residents, married couples, female heads of households and large families 
consistently record less satisfaction with any given housing setting. Moreover, 
their satisfaction ratings are more strongly tied to perceptions of crime, run-
down properties, and the similarity of neighbors (Galster & Hesser, 1981). Fol-
low-up research is needed to determine whether these groups differ signifi-
cantly in their perception of the three subdomains of residential satisfaction.
The RESS-DLV can help investigators conduct more selective and compar-
ative research on neighborhood life and the conditions for residential envi-
ronmental satisfaction. So far, little has been published on ways to compen-
sate negatively experienced attributes of the living environment by other resi-
dential attributes. The RESS-DLV and its subscales could serve as the depend-
ent or the independent variable in future research models. They could clarify 
whether subsets of residents tend to apply different standards when evaluat-
ing their residential environment.
Follow-up research should also consider the role differences in residen-
tial lifestyle play. And the picture would not be complete without the con-
straints on residential choice that households experience. Both are impor-
tant mediating factors in the way residents evaluate neighborhood attributes. 
There is need for more insight into the fact that residents of vulnerable types 
of neighborhood are satisfied with their housing and living situation. A case 
study by the author is a first attempt to explore in some depth the differenc-
es between successful and problematic neighborhoods of the same vulner-
able type (Adriaanse, 2004a, b). An interesting benefit of using the Housing 
Demand Survey data for this purpose is that it is feasible to measure residen-
tial environmental satisfaction and the way in which cognition is affected by 
changes in the environment such as reconstruction. Nowadays, it is possible 
to conduct longitudinal studies, as the data from the Housing Demand Survey 
go back over a long period of time.
Finding out which residents are most satisfied or dissatisfied with their 
neighborhood should provide policy-makers with additional information 
on where to target their improvement efforts. Comparison of the residents’ 
views with the ways in which other stakeholders (housing associations, 
municipalities, policymakers) define and interpret a neighborhood’s problems 
and success factors can bring to light any difference of opinion between the 
stakeholders. A fuller picture could then lead to more precise and probably 
more effective interventions in neighborhoods.
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 3  The Dutch Residen-
tial Nuisance Scale: an 
outcome measure for 
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subgroup analysis
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Abstract
Many neighbourhoods dating from the early sixties in western European cit-
ies have reached the end of their useful life and have been slated for restruc-
turing or are already in the process. Much is known about the prevalence and 
background of problems in these neighbourhoods and about the effects of 
measures taken so far. Less is known about the factors that keep neighbour-
hoods physically, economically and socially vital, however. What makes them 
‘good’ or ‘viable’? Some say that certain neighbourhood types are vulnerable 
by design, particularly the areas built after the Second World War throughout 
Western Europe. The main objective of this paper is to introduce a compre-
hensive approach for measuring the frequency of perceived nuisance in the 
residential environment. To that end, it presents some preliminary subgroup 
analyses investigating whether subsets of residents rate nuisance different-
ly. A residential nuisance scale is empirically tested using multivariate anal-
ysis. The results of an exploratory factor analysis offer empirical support for 
the claim that the proposed model of reported frequency of residential nui-
sance is useful. Reliability and validity tests confirm the adequacy of the Resi-
dential Nuisance Scale – Dutch Language Version (RNSDLV), since it correlates 
as expected with various criterion measures. In the future, this compact and 
valid instrument can serve as the dependent or independent variable in re-
search carried out in the Netherlands and other European countries. Such re-
search could elucidate which physical-spatial and socio-cultural factors de-
termine the perception of nuisance in different neighbourhood types by relat-
ing the RNS to a measure of residential environmental satisfaction. 
Keywords
Livability, reported frequency of nuisance in the residential environment, 
multidimensional outcome measure, reliability, subgroup analysis
 3.1  Introduction
In the Netherlands, as elsewhere in Western Europe, urban renewal policies 
are in place to restructure many post-Second World War mid- and high-rise 
neighbourhoods; some are already in the process of transformation (Turking-
ton et al., 2004). Ultimately, at the national level, the policies envision a nor-
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malised situation: no physical disadvantages, a pleasant living environment 
without nuisance, no concentrations of deprivation, no tensions between res-
idents, an average rentability or purchase price trend, and an acceptable im-
age. By extension, the quality of the living environment is an important policy 
issue for local governments and housing associations (Schalkwijk, 2007; Mi-
nisterie van VROM, 2007a, 2007b; Aedes, 2007; Shaw, 2004; Maclennan, 2006).
Most residents of Dutch neighbourhoods are satisfied with their living envi-
ronment (80%), and 6% are even very satisfied. Nonetheless, physical and 
social nuisance in the daily living environment pose a threat to its livability 
and can significantly reduce the quality of life there. Nuisance may be physi-
cal, such as neglect or it may be social, such as annoyance due to interaction 
between people (Adriaanse, 2005). Often, both forms appear in the same place 
and reinforce each other: people tend to feel unsafe in neighbourhoods sub-
ject to pollution and vandalism. The effect of nuisance on the assessment of 
the residential environment is pronounced when social nuisance is caused by 
threatening situations such as being assaulted or confronted with drug abuse 
(RIGO, 2004, p. 9). Compared to nuisance, the effect of criminality – i.e. rob-
bery, burglary and violent crime – is less pronounced, although it does have a 
negative influence on the appreciation of the neighbourhood. This is probably 
because people are more often confronted with nuisance than with criminali-
ty. Crucially, criminality is less bound to a place (RIGO, 2004, p. 9).
In common parlance, a ‘nuisance’ is a thing, person or situation that is 
annoying or that causes trouble or problems. The word is rarely used in sci-
entific work on neighbourhoods, unlike the word ‘livability’, which is close-
ly connected to the perception of nuisance. Although livability is also a com-
mon word, it has evolved to embrace everything that is wrong with the resi-
dential environment, especially in urban areas. It has thus become a concept 
reflecting an overall assessment of the residential environment, and usual-
ly a negative one at that (RIGO, 2004). Thus, as an entailment of livability, nui-
sance is part of a paired subjective concept. Nuisance in the residential envi-
ronment is reported and experienced by individual residents, while livabili-
ty refers to the quality of the residential environment and thus pertains to 
a higher aggregation level. People experience and appreciate places in vari-
ous ways in light of their own norms and values. But their assessment is also 
dependent on the specific functions of a certain place: noise and disorder are 
judged differently in the inner city than in a residential area.
Policy interventions attempt to restrict issues that limit or hinder livabil-
ity and enhance situations that have a positive influence on it and thereby 
increase the chance that livability will improve (Van der Burg, 2006). By its 
subjective nature, livability remains difficult to define and thus to measure. 
Therefore, the effort made in the present study to advance an objective and 
rigorous quantification and qualification through a set of accepted key per-
formance indicators meets a clear and present need. It is of critical relevance 
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to those involved in the planning, programming, and management of urban 
areas (Balsas, 2004).
A monitoring system is particularly suited to a dynamic and comparative 
study of neighbourhood livability, as it can show the effects of an accumula-
tion of problems at the neighbourhood level (Van der Meer, 1996).To be able 
to formulate local policies for improving livability, urban governments – with 
the aid of universities – select indicators to develop their own local monitor-
ing instrument (see, e.g. Gemeente Roermond, 2005; Kuijpers & Goudsmit, 
2007; Kellet et al., 2008). Municipal monitors provide useful input for local pol-
icies. But comparison at a higher level of aggregation, e.g. across cities, is not 
possible because of the incomparability of the data generated. The desired 
benchmarking between neighbourhoods and across cities would be possible 
if the monitoring system were used by not one but all local governments in 
a specific region or country. And that condition is met by the Dutch livabil-
ity monitor called LEMON. This general livability monitor was developed by 
the umbrella organisation of Dutch housing associations Aedes (Thedinga & 
Wilkens, 2006).
Like most local livability monitors, LEMON is a ‘stripped monitoring system’. 
But when a stripped monitoring system uses only a few indicators, which is 
common practice, it cannot provide sufficient insight in the actual neighbour-
hood dynamics (Van der Meer, 1996). That is an obstacle because, to identify 
what causes the perceived problems, it is necessary to relate the information 
output of the monitoring system to the broader context (Van der Meer, 1996). 
Various factors at different levels influence the quality of life and degree of nui-
sance that is perceived. For instance, perception is influenced by the individual 
characteristics of the residents and the social structure of the neighbourhood, 
but also by socio-cultural and macro-economic developments and government 
policies. Concretely, the presence of multiple ethnicities in many large-scale, 
formerly public, housing estates across Europe has often engendered conflict-
ing lifestyles that pose a challenge to nuisance prevention (Reijndorp, 2004; 
Adriaanse, 2006a, 2008, forthcoming). Therefore, as van der Meer concludes, the 
complexity of the problem itself, as well as the increased complexity of soci-
ety, which is reflected in less clear and less stable interrelationships between 
physical and social neighbourhood characteristics, must be reflected in the 
design of the neighbourhood monitoring system. To this we add that the sys-
tem should specifically reflect the complexity of the problem of nuisance.
The aim of this article is to describe the development of a Residential Nui-
sance Scale based on data derived from The Netherlands Housing Demand 
Survey. This large national survey contains data on how people evaluate 
aspects of their residential environment. It includes the respondents’ back-
ground variables, which might be considered risk factors that contribute to 
(the perception of) residential nuisance. As Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) 
point out, perceptions of disorder vary, depending not only on the observed 
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conditions but also on the characteristics of individual residents and the 
neighbourhood’s social structure. This is of particular interest here because, as 
the present study suggests, disorder is often connected with ‘nuisance’. The 
importance of devising a compact measure for the reported frequency of resi-
dential nuisance as part of a larger database that is renewed every four years 
is that the instrument creates opportunities for follow-up research. Such stud-
ies might explain the differences in the frequency of reported nuisance and 
the nuisance perception between places and groups of people. But the instru-
ment described here has another advantage. The large sample size makes it 
possible to distinguish norm scores for different groups of residents, which in 
turn creates opportunities for benchmarking and evaluating time series.
The next section (3.2) presents the theoretical framework, and Section 3.3 
describes the data and methods used in this study. The Section 3.4 expands 
on the Residential Nuisance Scale – Dutch Language Version (RNS-DLV). 
There, we consider the reliability and validity of the new scale and present 
the norms and distribution. The predictive value of individual items on the 
nuisance scale is then explored in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 is devoted to mul-
tivariate analyses that elucidate the relation between the RNS and residen-
tial environmental satisfaction. The paper concludes with a discussion, policy 
recommendations, and suggestions for further research.
 3.2  Perception and the reported frequency of 
nuisance in the residential environment
Nuisance has an impact in several domains of life. There is evidence that the 
perception and the reported frequency of nuisance are related to an individ-
ual’s health. People who often experience noise nuisance are twice as like-
ly to have middling to poor health compared with people who are never ex-
posed to noise pollution. The same applies to the relation between noise nui-
sance and psychological problems or trouble sleeping. Although city-dwellers 
report noise nuisance more often, they are not the only ones with this prob-
lem. In both the city and the countryside, people who experience noise pol-
lution tend to have more psychological complaints, middling to poor health, 
and trouble sleeping (Jabaaij, 2005).1
The experience of nuisance is also related to income. According to a recent 
study, lower income groups in the Netherlands generally live in areas with 
less favourable environmental qualities, particularly due to traffic and air pol-
1 The analyses reported here are based on LINH data of the second national study on illnesses and minor 
procedures in the family doctor’s office (2001; www.nivel.nl/nationalestudie). The survey was answered by 12,699 
residents. LINH is a project carried out jointly by NIVEL, WOK, LHV, and NHG.
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lution (Kruize, 2007). These same areas often accommodate diverse cultural 
and ethnic groups and have a high rate of unemployment. Moreover, these 
neighbourhoods are confronted with social nuisance, crime, poverty, and oth-
er livability problems (Turkington et al., 2004). In sum, people who are already 
in unfortunate socio-economic circumstances have a significantly higher 
chance of being exposed to environmental quality problems, but also to social 
nuisance and livability problems in their residential area.
Countless policy programmes classify neighbourhoods as ‘problematic’ on 
the basis of their external appearance. They are characterised by their master-
planning structure and the predominance of certain housing types (Kruythoff 
& Haars, 2002; RIGO, 1995). But the physical structure of neighbourhoods does 
not adequately explain the differences between neighbourhoods with regard 
to residential environmental satisfaction (Adriaanse, 2007a, 2007b) or the con-
centration of nuisance, criminality, and other livability problems.
Neighbourhoods with the same initial planning structure can develop in a 
completely different direction. Thus, one may end up in the ‘problematic’ cat-
egory while another will not. Neighbourhoods that got off to an equal start 
as potential environments over time became different effective environments 
due to differences in use and management (Gans, 1968; Van der Horst et al., 
2002). Therefore, the improvement of problematic neighbourhoods focuses 
not only on the physical but also on the social dimensions. The housing stock 
is being improved; steps are taken to combat criminality; and adequate facil-
ities are provided. But one question remains (RIGO, 2004): which aspects pre-
dominate in the residents’ perception of livability?
Why are certain neighbourhoods experienced as attractive? Why are the 
residents satisfied with their living environment? And why are other neigh-
bourhoods not considered appealing? In earlier work it was concluded that 
the perception of the social climate in the neighbourhood dominates in res-
idential environmental satisfaction, regardless of the level of overall resi-
dential (dis)satisfaction. The primacy accorded to perceived social climate is 
always followed by internal reputation and, in third place, by dwelling satis-
faction (Adriaanse, 2007a, 2007b). In view of the implications of nuisance for 
the quality of life, it is urgent to find out more about the distribution and 
background of nuisance experience and about the extent to which nuisance 
in the residential environment makes the difference between a satisfying and 
a dissatisfying living situation.
 3.3  Data and methods
First, this section presents a comprehensive approach for measuring the fre-
quency of perceived nuisance in the residential environment. Then some ini-
tial subgroup analyses are presented to discern whether subsets of residents 
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perceive different ratings of nuisance. The analyses are based on Dutch sur-
vey and registry data. The results of the 2002 national housing survey (Hous-
ing Demand Survey, 2002) were used along with data on the characteristics 
of the Dutch housing stock at the zip-code level. The latter were derived from 
the ABF Woningmarktmonitor (2003) and the Wegener data file (2002). The Hous-
ing Demand Survey 2002 comprises a random sample of 75,034 Dutch resi-
dents. This survey, the successor to the general census of housing and pop-
ulation, has been held every four years since 1964, and its results are used to 
develop government policy. It provides information about household compo-
sition, housing situations, affordability, demand, and residential mobility. The 
survey includes questions on how residents feel about their living situation: 
about the frequency of their perception of different types of nuisance and 
their evaluation of the residential environment. The theoretical insights men-
tioned above provided a framework for the initial selection of variables from 
the questionnaire of the Housing Demand Survey. The selection criteria were 
refined in light of the present author’s own research in two mid-rise neigh-
bourhoods in Amsterdam and The Hague (Adriaanse, 2004b). That research 
yielded insight into the factors contributing to the success of the neighbour-
hoods from the residents’ point of view. The factors they identified referred 
to physical, spatial, and socio-cultural characteristics of their neighbourhood 
as well as to (the absence of) sources of nuisance. Table 3.1 gives an overview 
of the Housing Demand Survey variables (based on the English-language ver-
sion) that were selected for the analyses.
 3.4  Development of the Residential Nuisance 
Scale
Before reporting on the development of the Residential Nuisance Scale, it is 
important to discuss the advantage of a scale as an outcome measure for the 
reported frequency of nuisance, as described above using single-scale items. A 
reliable and validated outcome measure – a scale – is a better technique in a 
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sociometric sense because it distinguishes clearly between the measurement 
error and the true scores. Moreover, a scale provides more information as it 
combines different variables that are interrelated and describe the same un-
derlying construct – here, the reported frequency of nuisance (Drenth & Sijts-
ma, 1990). According to Kotval (2001, p. 44, cited in Balsas, 2004), an indicator 
is a measure or a set of measures that describes a complex social, econom-
ic, or physical reality. Specifically, a measure is one data point that acts as a 
gauge to tell us how well or poorly we are doing with respect to an indicator. 
Indicators offer knowledge and insights about the health and well-being of a 
community. Indicators provide a tool for analysis, mediation, and decision-
making among urban actors. Measures use quantifiable data, preferably col-
lected over time, to identify trends and assess whether conditions are improv-
ing, continuing at a steady pace, or deteriorating. Measures can change over 
time to reflect relevance, availability of new data, and development in society.
Explorative factor analysis was used to develop the Residential Nuisance 
Scale – Dutch-Language Version (RNS-DLV). Before conducting that fac-
tor analysis, though, the inter-item correlation matrix of the ten Housing 
Demand Survey items listed in Table 3.1 was carefully examined. On item 2 
– Does it hardly/never, sometimes or often occur that phone booths or bus or 
tram shelters are damaged in this neighbourhood? – more than 12% of the 
cases were missing after list-wise deletion. Therefore, this item was not sub-
jected to further analysis. The remaining nine Housing Demand Survey ques-
tions were used in an unforced exploratory factor analysis with Varimax rota-
tion. The factor analysis resulted in two components; see Table 3.2 for the 
rotated factor loadings.
We can interpret the outcomes as follows. The items that load on the first 
component all are sources of nuisance; in other words, they are ‘things that 
are experienced as a nuisance’. In particular, the presence of adolescents that 
gather together in public spaces is often experienced as a threat, especially 
by elderly people. The items that load on the second component represent 
sources of (mainly) noise pollution to which nuisance is ascribed by residents.
An alternative interpretation of the two factors would be that the first one 
refers more directly to environmental or street-based problems and the sec-
ond more directly to people-related problems. Possibly the nuisances of the 
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second factor have to do with anti-social behaviour (Upson, 2006). But also an 
environmental factor such as ‘houses with thin walls’ can be a structural fac-
tor causing noise nuisance, without anti-social behaviour being an issue.
Now the nuisance scale can be constructed. The Residential Nuisance Scale 
(RNS) is a self-reporting instrument consisting of nine rating scales for meas-
uring the frequency of experienced nuisances. The respondents’ answers are 
scored on a Likert scale with three possible answer categories: hardly/never = 
value 1; sometimes = value 2; often = value 3. The total score is calculated by 
counting up the individual answers on each of the nine Likert scales.
 3.4.1  Reliability
There would be no reason to assess the validity of the RNS-DLV if its reliabil-
ity could not be established first, reliability being the most fundamental as-
pect of sociological measurement. Multivariate analyses were performed on 
the data obtained with the two components (see Table 3.2) in order to assess 
the instrument’s reliability.2 The degree of reliability was considered to be ac-
ceptable when Crohnbach’s alpha > 0.70 (Field, 2000).
With respectively 0.70 and 0.67 as the alpha scores of each component, it 
was decided to consider them as reliable separate subscales, except when 
the alpha score of the second subscale is rather low and must be improved. 
Together the two components accounted for 48% of the variance. The coef-
ficient alpha of the total RNS-DLV was sufficient, 0.76. This suggests that, 
on the whole, the nine scale items measure the same construct. The follow-
ing values were found for the RNS-DLV total scale: mean 12.5; median 12.0; 
modus 9.0; min/max 9 and 27 (N = 65,862). These measures of central ten-
dency show that the distribution of the RNS scores is strongly skewed to the 
right.
 3.4.2  Validity
Several analyses were performed to test the extent to which the RNS-DLV 
measures what it purports to measure: the reported frequency of a resident’s 
experience of nuisance in the neighbourhood where he or she resides. Atten-
tion was given to criterion validity. First, as a measure of validity, the mean 
RNS-DLV score was determined in relation to the criterion ‘living in a Dutch 
post-Second World War mid-rise neighbourhood’. The scientific, social, and 
policy literature identifies several neighbourhood types as dysfunctional: 
post-war high-rise neighbourhoods and pre-war urban renewal areas, but al-
2 Cronbach’s alpha provides a reliability estimate that simultaneously considers all possible ways of splitting 
the test items in an inter-item correlation matrix (Field, 2000).
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so post-war low-rise areas. For the following analysis the post-war mid-rise 
neighbourhood is taken as a criterion.
Despite historical variations in economic development, housing policy, 
and sociocultural traditions, the problems in this type of neighbourhood are 
similar throughout western Europe. These areas are associated with below-
standard living conditions, deprivation, isolated locations, poverty, a negative 
image, social isolation, pollution, and crime (Prak & Priemus, 1984; Heeger, 
1993; Adriaanse, 2004a, 2004b; Schwedler, 1998; Turkington et al., 2004).
This neighbourhood type is characterised by the following three conditions:
1. At least half of the housing stock in 2003 was built between 1945 and 1980.
2. The share of the dwellings in the total housing stock of the zip-code area 
is at least two standard deviations above the mean percentage of mid-rise 
flats in all Dutch neighbourhoods.
3. The housing stock in the zip-code area is not predominantly (i.e. not 50%
 or more) of another type.3
For the analysis, the zip codes4 of register data from the ABF Woningmarkt-
monitor (2003) and the Wegener data file were matched with the zip codes 
of the respondents of the Housing Demand Survey 2002 sample. 7% (4,934) 
of the respondents of the Housing Demand Survey live in a zip-code area 
that has the characteristics of a post-war mid-rise neighbourhood. In total, 
116 neighbourhoods in the country belong to the category ‘post-war mid-rise’ 
(Adriaanse, 2007a). The non-parametric testing procedure Mann-Whitney was 
used to determine whether residents of a post-war mid-rise neighbourhood 
experience nuisance significantly more often than people who do not live in 
such a neighbourhood. The test results are convincing and support the hy-
pothesis that people living in a post-war mid-rise neighbourhood experience 
nuisance significantly more often than people who don’t live in a neighbour-
hood of that type (See Table 3.3).
Second, as a measure of validity, the mean RNS-DLV score was determined 
in relation to the criterion ‘qualitative dwelling type’. The typology of dwell-
ings is as follows: 1. detached house, 2. semi-detached house, 3. corner house, 
4. terraced house, 5. flat, apartment. If the respondent’s dwelling did not fit 
into one of these descriptors, the answer was ‘none of these’; this answer cat-
egory was considered as ‘missing’ in the analyses.
It appears from earlier research that, with respect to nuisance caused by 
3 The zip-code area comprises at least 100 households. The variables for the construction of these criteria were 
derived from register data of Wegener and the Woningmarktmonitor.
4  Strictly speaking, Dutch ‘postcode’ areas (called zip-code areas here) do not exactly align with neighbour-
hood boundaries. Nonetheless, this article refers to these zip-code areas as neighbourhoods for the sake of 
convenience.
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neighbours and co-residents, where you live does make a difference. In 2006 
a representative sample of 2,000 Dutch residents were asked questions about 
their neighbourhood. It appeared that people in cities report nuisance signifi-
cantly more often (38%) than people in the country (27%). Furthermore, home-
owners experience significantly less nuisance than renters: almost half of the 
renters sometimes experience nuisance. Four out of ten residents of apart-
ment dwellings report nuisance, compared to one-third of the people living 
in a single-family dwelling. Only two out of ten residents of detached houses 
had any complaints (Putter, 2007). The question is, do the respondents to the 
Housing Demand Survey who live in the qualitatively differing dwelling types 
distinguished here report levels of nuisance that are significantly different on 
the RNS scale? The bar chart in Figure 3.1 visualises the mean RNS scores of 
respondents for each qualitative dwelling type.
A non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was performed because of the marked 
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asymmetry permeating the distribution of the dependent variable. (See also 
the histogram in Figure 3.3.) The test shows that the RNS-DLV can discrimi-
nate well between residents living in different dwelling types. Table 3.4 shows 
the mean levels of experienced nuisance as reported on the RNS-DLV for each 
qualitative dwelling type as well as their mean rank scores. The higher the 
mean scores, the more often the residents report nuisance on the RNS scale.
As Table 3.4 shows, the Kruskal-Wallis test reveals significant differences 
between the five qualitative dwelling types, except for the corner house and 
the terraced house, for which the mean ranks are almost the same. We can 
conclude that the RNS scale discriminates well between more and less luxuri-
ous dwelling types.
Third, as a measure of validity, the mean RNS-DLV score was determined 
in relation to the criterion ‘tenure and price range of the dwelling’ (see Figure 
3.2). More than one-third of the Dutch population is said to experience nui-
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sance caused by immediate neighbours or local residents (34%) (Putter, 2007). 
Their assessment of their residential environment appears to depend part-
ly on the location of the place of residence and partly on the respondent’s 
personal background. City-dwellers apparently consider their neighbourhood 
unsatisfactory more often than people living in the countryside. People who 
reside in one of the four biggest cities are significantly more dissatisfied with 
their residential environment. Taking their personal background into account, 
it appears that more of the dissatisfied residents are renters (RIGO, 2004, p. 8). 
Differences in income are less important.
The physical characteristics of the neighbourhood also influence the res-
idents’ perception: the higher the density and the number of flats, the low-
er the environmental satisfaction of the residents (RIGO, 2004, p. 8; Adri-
aanse, 2007a). Renters and apartment-dwellers complain most (Putter, 2007). 
It should be noted that the building type affects the overall assessment of 
the neighbourhood. Environmental satisfaction is influenced by the fact that 
neighbourhoods with high densities and a high proportion of flats have a dif-
ferent population composition from low-density neighbourhoods. In com-
bination with the higher prevalence of criminality and nuisance in these – 
mostly big-city – neighbourhoods, the effect of the building type is distorted 
by the associated social phenomena (RIGO, 2004, p. 8).
The dwelling typology constructed according to the price range and the ten-
ure type of the dwellings was taken as a third criterion. The typology is as fol-
lows: 1. cheap social rental dwelling; 2. semi-cheap social rental dwelling; 3. 
expensive rental dwelling; 4. cheap owner-occupied dwelling; 5. semi-cheap 
owner-occupied dwelling; 6. expensive owner-occupied dwelling.
Table 3.5 shows the mean levels of reported nuisance on the RNS-DLV for 
each dwelling type defined by price range and tenure. It also shows their 
mean rank scores. The higher the mean scores, the more often the residents 
experience nuisance.
The differences are also significant when a Kruskal-Wallis test is performed 
on the six dwelling types defined by price range and tenure. We can conclude 
that the RNS scale differentiates well between these dwelling types. We can 
also conclude that the RNS-DLV measures what it purports to measure. The 




 3.4.3  Norms and distribution
The histogram in Figure 3.3 clearly shows that the distribution of the RNS 
scale is strongly skewed to the right.
Table 3.6 presents the initial normative data, consisting of the four quar-
tiles for the population. A norm is a factual outcome score that is used as a 
criterion to determine severity. The tables of the range of variation in RNS-
DLV scores may serve as baseline data for other researchers who may use the 
RNS-DLV.
 3.5  Predictive value of individual RNS items
Colleague researchers may want to develop the subscales of the RNS in order 
to make them more suitable to an investigation of the frequency of reported 
nuisance within specific subgroups of residents. With that in mind, the pre-
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dictive value of the individual scale items was investigated. The results of a 
multivariate analysis carried out with the RNS-DLV show that the impact of 
the individual scale items on the overall perception of nuisance varies signif-
icantly. The task was to find out which of the scale items predominate within 
the overall nuisance experienced by Dutch residents (RNS-DLV). Subsequently 
the sample was dichotomised on the extreme 90th percentile (score 17); 11.6% 
of the respondents report 17 or more points on the RNS scale.
In total, 8,682 respondents perceive severe nuisance. But which of the 
RNS items classify these cases correctly? To investigate this, a binary logis-
tic regression was performed (forward conditional). Logistic regression pro-
grammes provide classification tables that indicate the predicted and 
observed values of the dependent variable for the cases in the analysis. In 
classification models, the goal is to classify cases according to whether they 
satisfy a specific criterion (Menard, 2002).
The findings of the binary logistic regression analysis allow us to draw the 
following conclusions. Most (92%) of the variance was explained by the four 
forms of nuisance that are the most significant for residents who perceive 
extreme nuisance. The following four RNS scale items dominate the most fre-
quently reported nuisance: ‘litter on the street’; ‘dog dirt on the street’; ‘noise 
nuisance’; and ‘traffic nuisance’. Similarly, findings from the United Kingdom 
also show that litter and noise have the most significant impact on reported 
nuisance perception (Upson, 2006).
Separate investigations for each dwelling type give more detailed insight in 
the way sources of nuisance are related to dwelling types. In order to investi-
gate the patterns of reported nuisance for each type, the 90% extreme scores 
were calculated. The cut-off scores are shown in Table 3.7.
The results demonstrate that the frequency of nuisance reported by resi-
dents of different dwelling types refers to nuisance items of both components 
of the RNS (see Table 3.2 for the nuisance items by component). This can be 
understood by regarding the differences in the environmental setting and 
housing conditions and – strongly related to this – the differences in location 
of the neighbourhoods where the respective dwelling types are found.
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 3.6  Do subgroups have different frequencies of 
reported nuisance?
This section presents some subgroup analyses to clarify whether subsets of 
the population apply different standards when evaluating their residential 
environment. It is interesting to investigate whether, respectively, men and 
women, respondents with distinct educational levels, and residents of dif-
ferent age groups report different levels of nuisance. The method used here 
is to determine the value of Kendall’s tau. This rank correlation coefficient is 
used to measure the degree of correspondence between two rankings and as-
sess the significance of this correspondence. In other words, it measures the 
strength of association of the cross-tabulations. The Kendall’s tau coefficient 
(τ) has three properties: (a) if the agreement between the two rankings is per-
fect (i.e. the two rankings are the same), the coefficient has a value of 1; (b) 
if the disagreement between the two rankings is perfect (i.e. one ranking is 
the reverse of the other), the coefficient has a value of -1; (c) for all other ar-
rangements, the value lies between -1 and 1, and increasing values imply in-
creasing agreement between the rankings. If the rankings are completely in-
dependent, the coefficient has a value of 0 on average.
We started by performing univariate analyses. The RNS norm scores were 
first related with gender. The Kendall’s tau value for women is -0.13; for men 
Kendall’s tau is -0.11. The values are close to 0, which means that the rank-
ings are almost completely independent. We then related the RNS norm 
scores to age.5 The Kendall’s tau coefficient is -0.12, which means that the 
correspondence between RNS and age is insignificant.
The same procedure was followed for the variable ‘educational level’. The 
following ten levels of education were distinguished, which form an ordinal 
range: (1) none; (2) primary school; (3) lower secondary vocational (LBO), low-
er vocational technical (LTS), junior commercial (LEAO), junior domestic sci-
ence (LHNO), etc.; (4) junior general secondary education/higher elementary; 
(5) pre-vocational secondary; (6) upper general secondary; (7) upper secondary 
vocational; (8) pre-university; (9) higher professional; (10) university. The Ken-
dall’s tau rank correlation coefficient for correspondence between RNS and 
educational level appears to be 0.069 (N = 65,862). Also this value is close to 0, 
which means that the rankings are almost completely independent.
We can conclude from these subgroup analyses that a respondent’s score 
on the RNS is not related to one’s age or gender, nor to one’s educational lev-
el. These analyses were all performed in a univariate way. A multivariate anal-
ysis is more sophisticated and would allow us to confirm what we found by 
univariate analysis.
5 The following age groups were constructed: 18-24, 25-44, 45-64, 65-84, and 85 years and older.
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The selected multivariate method is cluster analysis, which seeks to iden-
tify a set of groups that would minimise within-group variation and maxim-
ise between-group variation. SPSS offers three general approaches to cluster 
analysis. Here, K-means clustering was chosen, whereby the researcher speci-
fies the number of clusters in advance and then calculates how to assign cas-
es to the K clusters.
Three readily interpretable clusters come out of the analysis taking gender, 
age, and educational level as the variables. The first cluster consists of the 
younger respondents, with a mean age of 28 years (min. 18 and max. 38; N = 
31,730). The second cluster consists of the middle-aged category, with a mean 
age of 49 years (min. 39 and max. 60; N = 26,879). The third cluster comprises 
elderly respondents, with a mean age of 71 years (min. 60 and max. 104; N = 
16,021). The youngest group has the highest mean educational level, namely 
senior vocational education. The oldest group has the lowest level, with jun-
ior general secondary education as the median. The group with a mean age of 
49 has a median educational level, whereby junior general secondary educa-
tion is the median.
The second step is to investigate the degree of correspondence between the 
RNS score and the distance to each cluster center for the cases. With a value of 
0.041, Kendall’s tau – this time applied to a multivariate cluster analysis – again 
appears to be almost zero. Now we can state that multivariate subgroup analy-
sis also shows that the correspondence between the ranking of the RNS scores 
and the background variables of age, gender, and education is insignificant.
 3.7  Conclusions and discussion
This article has described the development and validation of the RNS-DLV, 
which is the Dutch-language version of an instrument to measure experi-
enced residential nuisance. The initial analyses indicated that the RNS-DLV is 
a valid instrument. Although adequate, the instrument can be improved and 
refined by adding new items, especially to the second component, to get more 
reliable and valid subscales. Although the RNS is based on Dutch data sourc-
es, the potential utility of the scale and the findings arising from it have a 
wider application that can be of considerable interest to scientific researchers 
and policy-makers in other European countries.
The compact and valid instrument RNS-DLV is useful. It can serve as the 
dependent or the independent variable in more detailed research on the 
physical-spatial and sociocultural factors that relate to the reported frequen-
cy of nuisance in different countries, cities, and neighbourhood types. The 
RNS-DLV can help investigators conduct more selective and comparative 
urban, national, and European research on neighbourhood quality of life and 
the reported frequency of nuisance.
[ 83 ]
The article sheds light on the extent to which nuisance is perceived by 
Dutch residents and specifically on where the reported nuisance comes from. 
The first pattern detection in logistic regression analysis, with the RNS-DLV 
as the dependent variable and the individual scale items as the independ-
ent variable (as described in Table 3.7), demonstrated that litter on the street 
and noise pollution are the most significant contributing factors in the over-
all nuisance, which supports similar findings from UK. Apart from that, it was 
concluded that Dutch residents who occupy different dwelling types experi-
ence distinct kinds of nuisance. Other test results supported the hypothesis 
that people living in a post-war mid-rise neighbourhood experience nuisance 
significantly more often than people who do not live in a neighbourhood of 
that type. The different nuisance perception of subgroups is another indica-
tion of the need for extensive monitoring systems instead of stripped moni-
toring systems.
A brief subgroup analysis was performed. Univariate as well as multivariate 
subgroup analyses demonstrated that the degree of correspondence between 
the ranking of the RNS scores and the background variables of age, gender, 
and education is insignificant. Follow-up research with the RNS could reveal 
whether other subsets of residents tend to apply different standards when 
evaluating their residential environment. To what extent do young residents, 
married couples, female heads of household, and large families consistent-
ly report different levels of nuisance experience? Are their nuisance ratings 
tied to perceptions of criminality, run-down properties, and the similarity of 
neighbours in a different way? For example, follow-up investigations should 
consider whether ethnic minority residents tend to experience less nuisance 
than people of the majority population who live on the same block. This 
would build upon the findings of Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) in their 
study of perceptions of disorder – which in the present study is considered 
to be related to nuisance. Further analyses are needed to find out whether it 
is problematic that specific groups differ significantly in their perception and 
their frequency of nuisance experience. Moreover, further study is needed to 
determine the extent to which anti-social behavior underlies certain nuisanc-
es in the residential environment. In earlier work, the present author devel-
oped an outcome measure to define the degree of residential environmental 
satisfaction reported by residents. In a follow-up study, the RNS-DLV will be 
related to this residential satisfaction measure and its three subscales.
Planners and housing officials still want to know what, if anything, they 
can do to increase livability in neighbourhoods. The present article has dem-
onstrated why this nuisance scale should be of interest to city and regional 
planners, city managers, researchers, and all those involved in urban policies 
in general but especially in urban regeneration activities in the Netherlands 
and other European countries. The RNS generates important additional infor-
mation for policy-making on urban renewal and neighbourhoods in general 
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as part of a broader neighbourhood-monitoring instrument and as an inde-
pendent indicator of the livability in residential neighbourhoods.
Comparison of the residents’ perceptions with the opinions of other stake-
holders (housing associations, municipalities, policy-makers) about the per-
ception and the reported frequency of nuisance and other livability prob-
lems in (parts) of neighbourhoods can bring to light any difference of opinion 
between the stakeholders. So far, little has been published on ways to com-
pensate negatively experienced attributes of the living environment by oth-
er residential attributes. Follow-up research should also consider the role that 
differences in residential lifestyle play. And the picture would not be com-
plete without noting the constraints on residential choice that households 
experience. Both are important mediating factors in the way residents evalu-
ate neighbourhood attributes. A fuller picture could then lead to more precise 
and probably more effective interventions in residential areas.
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 4  The relationship between 
risk factors, nuisance 
and residential environ-
mental (dis)satisfaction
  C.C.M. Adriaanse. Submitted.
Abstract
When linking data on housing structures to deprivation and residents’ dissat-
isfaction, certain physical-spatial neighbourhood types emerge as more prob-
lematic than others. But statistical outliers demonstrate that neighbourhoods 
based upon the same ideology and constructed on the same town-planning 
principles can develop differently, whereby one turns out problematic and an-
other not. This paper builds upon results from earlier work on perception of 
the residential environment to investigate the relationship between physical-
spatial, demographic and economic risk factors, nuisance and environmental 
(dis)satisfaction. Two conceptual models are tested in multivariate analyses 
(zero- and partial-order correlations) using quantitative data from a random 
sample of 75,034 Dutch residents. The outcomes show that human-derived 
nuisance in the residential environment is an important source of residen-
tial environmental dissatisfaction. The results will be of interest to research-
ers and all involved in urban policies in general but especially in urban regen-
eration activities in the Netherlands and other European countries. 
Keywords
Environmental (dis)satisfaction, risk coefficients, nuisance, multivariate anal-
ysis, objective and subjective perspectives, neighbourhood types
 4.1  Introduction
When we link data on housing structures to deprivation and residents’ dissat-
isfaction, some physical-spatial neighbourhood types – notably, post-Second 
World War neighbourhoods – emerge as more problematic than others. In the 
Netherlands, as elsewhere in Western Europe, urban renewal policies are in 
place to restructure many post-Second World War mid- and high-rise neigh-
bourhoods; some are already in the process of transformation. Ultimately, at 
the national level, the policies envision a normalized situation, which means: 
no physical disadvantages, a pleasant living environment without nuisance, 
no concentrations of deprivation, no tensions between residents, an aver-
age rentability or purchase price trend, and an acceptable image. By exten-
sion, the quality of the living environment is an important policy issue for lo-
cal governments and housing associations (Schalkwijk, 2007; Ministerie van 
VROM, 2007a,b; Aedes, 2007; Shaw, 2004; Maclennan, 2006).
Entire libraries have been filled with literature about the prevalence of prob-
lems in mid- and high-rise estates, devoting considerable attention to the 
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background, causes and explanations of problems and to the effects of the 
measures taken. Relevant publications include Power (1997), Heeger (1993), 
Vestergard (1996), Schwedler (1998), Prak and Priemus (1986) and Turkington 
et al. (2004). But not every high-rise estate or post-Second World War mid-rise 
neighbourhood can be called problematic. The statistical outliers demonstrate 
that neighbourhoods that are based upon the same ideology and that are 
built according to the same town-planning principles can develop in a com-
pletely different way, whereby one neighbourhood turns out to be problemat-
ic and another does not. 
In earlier work I introduced an integrative and more comprehensive 
approach to the measurement of residential environmental satisfaction and 
nuisance. A Residential Environmental Satisfaction Scale (RESS) and a Resi-
dential Nuisance Scale were developed. Residential environmental satisfac-
tion appeared to be a global attitude of a resident (or household) towards his 
dwelling, the social climate of the neighborhood and the internal neighbor-
hood reputation (Adriaanse, 2007). With the help of the RESS, it was discov-
ered that especially in unproblematic neighbourhoods of vulnerable neigh-
bourhood types, the social climate of the neighbourhood appeared to be an 
important success factor (Adriaanse, 2007). 
The social climate of a residential environment I defined as an individu-
al’s expectation of how others will treat him or her, one another, and how 
they will treat the spatial artifacts within the area that the individual expe-
riences as his or her living environment (Adriaanse, 2007, 2008a, 2010). The 
most critical element of a favourable residential social climate is determined 
not by the level of social cohesion – the intensity of social interaction – or by 
the homogeneity of the neighbourhood population, but rather by the degree 
to which diverse residents share norms such as civility and mutual respect 
(Adriaanse, 2004b, 2005, 2010). The present paper applies quantitative analy-
sis to investigate the relationship between objective risk factors and subjec-
tive factors such as residential evaluation and the perception of nuisance in 
public and semi-public spaces. Nine objective risk factors are combined into a 
one-dimensional Risk Scale.
Urban reconstruction is high on the agenda in several Western Europe-
an countries. Since this ambition involves huge amounts of money and has 
a great impact on the lives of thousands of residents, it is important to know 
how and where policies should be directed. 
The theoretical section presents the two conceptual models and defines the 
main concepts (Section 4.2). The methods section describes the quantitative 
data from a random sample of 75,034 Dutch residents as well as the meas-
ures used for the analysis, two of which were formulated in my previous work 
(Adriaanse, 2007, 2008) (Section 4.3). In the results section, the two concep-
tual models are tested in multivariate analyses (zero- and partial-order cor-
relations) (Section 4.4). The outcomes of the analyses are discussed in the 
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final section (Section 4.5). The insights offered in this article may be useful for 
urban policy, housing policy and neighbourhood renewal policy, particularly 
for finding a good balance of policies directed towards improving the overall 
liveability of neighbourhoods.
 4.2  Theoretical framework
 4.2.1  Characteristics and problems of early post-Second 
World War neighbourhoods
The parameters of the Risk Scale described in this article, include the typi-
cal characteristics of high-rise and mid-rise estates of the type common in 
the Netherlands and many other European countries. High-rise and mid-rise 
construction in the Netherlands began shortly after the Second World War. In 
countries such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, 
the majority of new housing at this time was in the social sector. Because of 
the acute housing shortage caused by war damage and the construction hia-
tus during the war years, it became essential to maximize housing production 
by reducing the variety of dwelling types, repeating construction patterns and 
using new architectural forms, such as the high-rise apartment building. 
Besides being a means of resolving the housing shortage, high-rise con-
struction can also be seen as an expression of planners’ and politi-
cians’ desire to build in the tradition of the CIAM (Congres Internationaux 
d’Architecture Moderne) movement. According to Le Corbusier and the modern 
architects, high-rise served as a potent symbol of a ‘new architecture for new 
people’ in a modern age of multi-family living, communal facilities and social 
equality. In the eyes of architects, town planners and civil servants, high-rise 
was the symbol for this modern society. A number of design principles played 
a central role (Mentzel, 1990: p. 369): repetition, regularity and symmetry, the 
separation of functions, the use of open blocks, uniformity, straight lines, 
the large-scale nature of housing blocks and open spaces, the use of modern 
materials and building methods, and the provision of communal facilities. 
The Dutch 1950s neighbourhood is typically a mix of low-rise apartment 
blocks and single-family homes, mostly in the rental sector. It is character-
ized by half-open blocks of buildings, arranged in a fixed pattern with a com-
munal courtyard. The urban design rationale was strongly influenced by the 
CIAM philosophy, with much attention to light, air and space. Most of these 
dwellings had three or four rooms, with a total living space of about 50-60 m2. 
They were designed to house young families and apparently this floor space 
was considered adequate at the time. Rents were generally low, though high-
er than in many pre-war rental dwellings. The high-rise units of the 1960s dif-
fered in their physical layout and were generally more luxurious. Facilities 
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such as central heating gave the new high-rise dwellings an initial qualitative 
advantage compared to earlier social rental dwellings, in which this luxury 
was not yet available (Mumford & Frampton, 2002). 
From the early 1970s, many single-family houses were built in new suburbs, 
which addressed the needs of many household types, especially families with 
children. The suburban setting combined good-quality housing with an envi-
ronment that was well suited to the ‘family lifestyle’ in that period of time. The 
booming Dutch economy resulted in higher wages and thus a greater number 
of people could now afford to purchase their own home. Many high-rise flats 
of the 1960s subsequently lost their tenants to the new suburbs and were una-
ble to attract the middle-income families for whom they had originally been 
intended. In their place came renters with less choice in housing, many of 
whom relied on housing allowances to pay the rather high rents. The high-rise 
estates were not the most attractive residential settings. In periods of scarcity 
they enjoyed full occupancy, but when the market eased, as in the mid-1980s 
and late 1990s, vacancies occurred (Krantz et al., 1999; Wassenberg, 2004).
The problems affecting the Dutch post-war housing stock have been 
described and categorized by many observers (cf. Heeger, 1992, 1993). The 
inexpensive social rental apartment blocks built between 1960 and the mid-
1970s often dominate the housing stock in these neighbourhoods. As a result, 
low-income households with limited options are often obliged to rent these 
houses, while there is a selective out-migration of middle-class and higher-
income households from these neighbourhoods. Apart from this, the live-
ability of many post-war neighbourhoods is also threatened by unpopu-
lar site design, pollution, social insecurity, the disappearance of neighbour-
hood shops, crime, vandalism, addiction to drugs or alcohol, and social ten-
sions between different (ethnic) groups (www.keicentrum.nl). Significant local 
unemployment is also frequently cited as an indicator of a problem neigh-
bourhood, as is the influx of children with an educational deficit, the depar-
ture of good pupils from the local schools, and ethnic tensions between var-
ious groups of residents. Finally, the problem neighbourhoods often suffer 
from a poor image among outsiders. 
 4.2.2  Risk factors, nuisance and residential (dis)satisfac-
tion 
One of the purposes of this article is to present a risk measure which is a 
scale. The advantage of a scale as a measure for the level of risk, above using 
separate parameters, is that a reliable and validated scale is a better technique 
in a socio-metric sense because it distinguishes clearly between the measure-
ment error and the true scores. Moreover, a scale provides more information 
as it combines different variables that are interrelated and describe the same 
underlying construct – here, the degree of risk (Drenth & Sijtsma, 1990).
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Risk factors put pressure on the social climate of the neighbourhood
Repeated interactions between neighborhood residents in the spatial environ-
ment produce a social climate (for definition see Introduction of this article). 
This subsection highlights some subtle processes of the interplay between re-
spectively the physical-spatial artifacts of the residential environment and 
the reasons residents contribute to the cooperative social climate or not. 
The residential area and its semi-public and public spaces are the spots 
where co-residents see each other and act and interact. At these spots the 
residents reveal, by the way they act, whether they are playing the mutu-
al cooperation equilibrium or the mutual defection equilibrium. According to 
the behavioural economic approach – specifically the strong reciprocity thesis 
- in these actions positive and negative reciprocity are exchanged and altru-
istic punishment takes place (Camerer, 2003). In other words, in their residen-
tial environment residents can observe from each other whether they sub-
scribe the same residential norms or a free-ride strategy is chosen. When 
community residents share norms that underlie any collective effort on their 
part to establish social order, a viable social climate is developed and main-
tained (Adriaanse, 2011). 
Behavioural game theory is based on the concept of choice which implies 
that the individual chooses between free riding and normative behavior. Free 
riding can be considered as a choice to act in a rational egoistic way. However, 
individuals in their daily routines are not continuously taking conscious deci-
sions. Choice is by definition intentional and reflexive. Allen (2005) states that 
pre-reflexive being is an important component of human existence. The con-
cept of pre-reflexive being is additional to behavioural game theory because 
it is not about what one does, but in which way he does it (unintentional). 
It is perfectly possible that my ‘pre-reflexive being myself’, conflicts with the 
norms of other residents. 
For example, due to certain physical characteristics of dwellings in anon-
ymous and densely populated areas certain pre-reflexive behaviour can 
become a hindrance for co-residents. In a situation with a viable social cli-
mate co-residents will give me feedback in an attempt to make me aware of 
the consequences of my pre-reflexive behaviour, and by doing so making it 
reflexive. But suppose, due to cultural and linguistic barriers between native 
and non-native groups, co-residents cannot give me this kind of feedback. 
Then residents will not develop shared residential norms and thus nuisance 
will easily arise due a lack of altruistic punishment. 
Newman (1972, 1979) already reported that the larger the apartment build-
ing or multiple-unit housing project, (...), the less social interaction takes 
place among neighbors, and the less sense of control is felt over both the 
interior and exterior public areas. Open areas that cannot be watched or 
observed by residents from their apartments, long dark hallways, poorly light-
ed stairways, and areas where no one is specifically responsible for monitor-
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ing activities all reduce the levels of surveillance and the capacity for effec-
tive social control (Elliott et al., 2006). Therefore public spaces with a low 
degree of inter-visibility of neighbors and high- and mid-rise apartment 
buildings with few doors connected to streets can have a negative effect on 
the degree of positive reciprocity and altruistic punishment and must be 
called risk factors.
In the seventies and eighties of the 20th century, in the Netherlands, new 
groups of starting households and non-native households – among whom 
a large share of Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese origin – moved into the 
post-war neighbourhoods. The new socio-demographic ‘mix’ – consisting of 
elderly people who had lived there since the 1960s and the new households 
– didn’t actually mix in most cases, which – in a lot of neighbourhoods - put 
more pressure on the social climate in these post-Second World War neigh-
borhoods (e.g. Reijndorp, 2004; Dekker & Rowlands, 2005). 
Nuisance and residential (dis)satisfaction
The curb appeal of dwellings, gardens, streets, and other the semi-public 
and public spaces is a manifestation of the norms applied by residents with-
in the area and also of the degree of neighborhood efficacy. Also in a situa-
tion where people hardly know their neighbors, various cues – graffiti on the 
wall, dirt in the doorway, a supermarket trolley on the gallery, a radio that is 
switched on too loud, and other ‘negative externalities’ – are used to value the 
disposition of the neighbors (Adriaanse, 2011). 
It is relevant to refer here to the Broken Window Theory (Wilson-Kelling 
hypothesis, in: McLaughlin et al., 2003). This thesis suggests that neighbor-
hood disorder is indicated by visible cues that residents perceive to be signs 
of the breakdown of social order and control (Ross & Mirowsky, 1999; Skogan, 
1990). Skogan (1990) calls this the contagiousness of the problem of disorder: 
‘To the extent to which disorder becomes self-generative and feeds on itself, 
current levels of disorder produce future levels of disorder’ (Skogan, 1990, 
p. 49). This may cause neighborhoods to decay and the quality of life of its 
inhabitants to deteriorate (Skogan, 1990).
In recent empirical research in the Netherlands, it was empirically demon-
strated that when people observe that others have violated a certain norm or 
legitimate rule, they themselves are more likely to violate these and even oth-
er norms or rules, which causes disorder to spread (Keizer et al., 2008). Thus, 
visible physical and social disruption is a signal that the mechanisms by 
which healthy neighbourhoods maintain themselves have broken down. If an 
area loses its capacity to solve even seemingly minor problems, its character 
becomes suspect. Residents are thought to read nuisance as a sign of disorder 
and as evidence of a deeper neighbourhood malaise, undermining person-
al health and trust (see Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004). Thus, through daily 
exposure to a threatening environment, where signs of disorder are common, 
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residents may learn that other people cannot be trusted. They may view those 
around them with suspicion, as enemies who will harm them rather than as 
allies who will help them (Ross et al., 2001, p. 568). 
As stated in my earlier work, the social climate of the residential environ-
ment is the most influential component of global residential environmen-
tal satisfaction. Perceived frequency of nuisance will influence social climate, 
because it will change the expectations of residents and people tend to feel 
unsafe in neighbourhoods subject to pollution and vandalism (Adriaanse, 
2008). Subsequently it can be expected that the perception of nuisance will 
influence the appreciation of the residential environment. 
According to the literature vulnerability of neighbourhoods, nuisance and 
residential environmental dissatisfaction are related elements of one struc-
ture. We can distinguish objective factors such as the spatial, economic and 
demographic characteristics on the one hand and subjective factors such as 
residential evaluation and free-rider behaviour on the other hand. The rela-
tion between objective and subjective factors can be conceptualized in two 
different models (see Figure 4.1 and 4.2).
Model 1 
The literature suggests that certain elements of the objective environment 
– such as percentage of single-family dwellings, proportion of immigrants, 
share of the housing stock that is not owner-occupied but private or social 
rental – are strongly related to the residents’ levels of environmental (dis)sat-
isfaction. Model 1 implies that these objective risk factors have a direct bear-
ing on residential dissatisfaction. It suggests that politicians and housing 
companies should be aware that the greater the geographical concentration 
of risk factors, the more environmental dissatisfaction the residents are like-
ly to experience. 
Model 2 
The assumption that the empirical relation between risk factors and residen-
tial environmental (dis)satisfaction also depends on a third variable, name-
ly nuisance and disorder caused by residential behaviour, is depicted in the 
second model. Model 2 points to an empirical connection between risk fac-
tors and dissatisfaction; however, only an indirect association can be detect-
ed. It implies firstly, that residents living in a high-risk area are likely to re-
port more stress associated by other residents than those residents not liv-
ing in a high-risk area; and secondly, that stress associated by other residents 
is directly empirical connected with dissatisfaction. If the second model ap-
pears to be correct, this outcome will have considerable other and/or comple-
mentary political and practical implications.
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 4.3 Methods 
 4.3.1 Data
 
The analyses are based on national Dutch survey and registry data. The re-
sults of the 2002 national housing survey (Housing Demand Survey, 2002) 
were used along with data on the characteristics of the Dutch housing stock 
at the zip-code level. The latter were derived from the ABF Woningmarktmon-
itor (2003) and the Wegener data file (2002). The Housing Demand Survey 2002 
comprises a random sample of 75,034 Dutch residents. This survey, the suc-
cessor to the general census of housing and population, has been held eve-
ry four years since 1964, and its results are used to develop government poli-
cy. It provides information about household composition, housing situations, 
affordability, demand, and residential mobility. The survey includes questions 
on how residents feel about their living situation, the frequency of their per-
ception of different types of nuisance and their evaluation of the residential 
environment. The theoretical insights mentioned above provided a frame-
work for the initial selection of variables from the questionnaire of respec-
tively the Housing Demand Survey, the ABF Woningmarktmonitor (2003), and 
the Wegener data file (2002). The analyses on the neighbourhood or zip-code 
level concern 3479 zip-codes with a mean of 21 respondents (minimum = 1; 
maximum = 418; standard deviation = 26). 
 4.3.2 Measures
The Housing Demand Survey 2002 is representative for the population of the 
Netherlands in 2002. Respondents completing the Housing Demand Survey 
had to give their answers in one of the following three forms: either “Do you 
agree with the following statement?”, or “How satisfied are you with…?”, or 
“Does it occur that …”
Twenty eight items of the national Housing Demand Survey were used to 
construct respectively the Residential Environmental Satisfaction Scale and 
the Residential Nuisance Scale (see Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 and Table 3.1 in 
Chapter 3).The Risk factors Scale is based on the ABF Woningmarktmonitor 
and the Wegener data file. 
Residential Environmental Satisfaction Scale (RESS)
With respect to the Housing Demand Survey-questions that were used for the 
RESS, the respondents were asked to choose their answer from a five-point 
Likert scale (1-5) that was constructed as follows for the first form: (1) strong-
ly agree; (2) agree; (3) neither agree nor disagree; (4) disagree; (5) strongly dis-
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agree. For the second form, the scale was as follows: (1) very satisfied; (2) sat-
isfied; (3) neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; (4) dissatisfied; (5) very dissatis-
fied (Adriaanse, 2007). (See Table 4.1 for the 16 Housing Demand Survey items 
used for the construction of RESS). On the whole the sixteen scale items 
measure the same construct as suggested by coefficient Cronbach’s alpha 
which was 0.86.
T-test shows that the RESS discriminates well between residents living in 
post-Second World War mid-rise neighborhoods and people living elsewhere. 
Because investigating a qualitative concept such as ‘satisfaction’ is a complex 
task, explorative factor analysis was used to identify different components 
of residential satisfaction. The factor analysis resulted in three factors which 
together accounted for 52% of the variance. The first factor was interpreted as 
the residents’ general opinion about the neighborhood; the second as the res-
idents’ opinion about the residential social climate and the third about the 
dwelling of the resident (Adriaanse, 2007).
Residential Nuisance Scale (RNS)
With respect to the items of the Housing Demand Survey that were used for 
the RNS, the respondents were asked to choose their answer from a four-
point Likert scale (1-3) that was constructed as follows: (1) never/hardly ever; 
(2) sometimes; (3) often (Adriaanse, 2008) (see Table 4.1 for the 9 Housing De-
mand Survey items used for the construction of RNS). On the whole the nine 
scale items measure the same construct as suggested by coefficient Cron-
bach’s alpha which was 0.76. 
A Kruskal-Wallis test shows that the RNS discriminates well between res-
idents living in five different qualitative dwelling types. The typology of 
dwellings is as follows: (1) detached house, (2) semi-detached house, (3) cor-
ner house, (4) terraced house, (5) flat, apartment. The RNS-scale differen-
tiates well between dwelling types constructed according to the price range 
and tenure type. Residents living in cheap social rental dwellings report a sta-
tistically significantly higher level of nuisance compared to residents living 
in owner occupied dwellings. The initial analyses indicated that the RNS is a 
reliable and valid instrument (Adriaanse, 2008).
Explorative factor analysis was used to investigate the different aspects of 
nuisance. The factor analysis resulted in two RNS-components. The first com-
ponents are anonymous nuisances. The items that load on the second com-
ponent represent non-anonymous nuisances. With respectively 0.70 and 0.67 
as the alpha-scores of each component and a coefficient alpha of the total 
RNS of 0.76 (Adriaanse, 2008), it was decided to use the total RNS and not its 
subscales. 
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Risk Factor Scale (RS)
For this study I developed a uni-dimensional Risk Factor Scale (RS) and ran 
a reliability and validity study on it. The Risk Factor Scale is not an attitude 
scale like the RESS and the RNS. The RESS and RNS are Likert scales and as 
such have an ordinal level of measurement. The RS has a absolute level of 
measurement, consisting of, for example, percentages of residents living in 
specific dwelling types; percentage of native residents and immigrants and 
the percentage of the housing stock that is owner occupied. Six ratios were 
used to construct the Risk Scale; these ratios – all of their constituent items 
being percentages – are depicted in Table 4.1. 
The procedure followed to construct the RS is to divide the difference of 
two percentages by their sum. The resulting ratios can be considered as the 
mean percentages relative magnitude of differences. Subsequently, the vari-
ables that were identified as risk factors of environmental distress, as derived 
from the literature, can be expressed with a value between -1 to +1. The next 
step is to calculate the reliability of the Risk Scale. Cronbach’s alpha of the six 
Risk Scale items was 0.87; the standardized value of alpha was 0.91. The inter-
item correlations varied between 0.47 and 0.83 (Table 4.2).
The validity of the Risk Scale was tested by Anova analysis with post hoc 
tests. As expected the scale clearly differentiates between high-risk and low-
risk neighbourhood types (F = 6463.57; df = 3; P = 0.000). The mean scale val-
ues of the different neighbourhood types were as follows: post-Second World 
War -0.04; urban renewal +0.06; recent low-rise +0.4; all other types +0.35. 
Validity was also investigated by correlating the total Risk Scale with variables 
that, according to theoretical insights, are supposed to be related to risk. The 
variables used in the correlation analysis and their correlations with the Risk 
Scale are follows: 
▪ % of pupils with low-educated parents at primary schools in the neighbour-
hood correlates -0.65. 
▪ % of non-native pupils with low-educated parents at primary schools in the 
neighbourhood correlates -0.79.
▪ % of non-active heads of household correlates -0.52. 
Thus, we may conclude that the reliability and validity of the Risk Scale are 
encouraging.
Principal component analysis was used to identify the underlying structure 
that accounts for most of the variance observed in the six manifest risk vari-
ables. A principal component analysis detected one single factor explaining 




 4.4.1 Levels of perceived environmental (dis)satisfaction
In an earlier article I developed a measure of ‘residential environmental sat-
isfaction’. The measure for the perception of environmental (dis)satisfaction 
is defined as the average degree of residential environmental (dis)satisfaction 
of residents at the zip-code level. The zip-code area comprises at least 100 
households. Strictly speaking, Dutch ‘postcode’ areas (called zip-code areas 
here) do not exactly align with neighbourhood boundaries. Nonetheless, this 
article refers to these zip-code areas as neighbourhoods for the sake of con-
venience. The histogram in Figure 4.3 shows that the distribution of the RESS 
is symmetrical. A P-P plot confirmed normality. The characteristics of the nor-
mal distribution were a mean of 34.5 and a SD of 3.49. Further findings for the 
RESS total scale were median 33; modus 33; min/max 16 and 76. 
 4.4.2 Levels of perceived nuisance (RNS)
The measure for the perception of nuisance is defined as the average degree 
of nuisance of residents at the zip-code level. The histogram depicted in Fig-
ure 4.4 clearly shows that the distribution of the RNS is skewed to the right. 
The following values were found for the RNS total scale: mean 11.8; median 
10.0; modus 8.0; min/max 8 and 24 (N= 65862) (Adriaanse, 2008). 
 4.4.3 Distribution of the Risk Factor scale
The histogram in Figure 4.5 clearly shows that the distribution of the Risk 
Scale is strongly skewed to the left. The mean value of the Risk Scale is 0.32; 
min/max is -0.53/0.72; percentile 25 is 0.18; percentile 50 is 0.39; percentile 75 
is 0.50. 
 
 4.4.4 Relationship between risk, nuisance and environ-
mental (dis)satisfaction
In order to quantify the strength of the association between risk coefficients, 
nuisance and environmental (dis)satisfaction, I calculated all correlation coef-
ficients and first-order partial correlation coefficients between the three vari-
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ables. The zero-order correlations between risk factors, levels of nuisance and 
residential dissatisfaction were as described in Table 4.3.
All correlations are statistically significant at the 0.001 level. Now, regard-
ing the two models described in the first section, we can state the following. 
A zero-order correlation of -.69 between the risk factor and the RESS suggests 
that model 1 is correct (see Figure 4.6). 
However, an analysis of the partial correlations suggests that model 1 is 
wrong. Table 4.3 depicts all first-order partial correlation coefficients. As 
we can see when comparing Tables 4.3 and 4.4, the correlation between the 
RESS and the risk factor changes significantly from -.69 to -.31. In the analy-
sis of the partial correlations, it is assumed a priori that risk factors – which 
are objective variables – influence the subjective variables such as behaviour, 
as measured by nuisance and the perception of residential satisfaction. Nui-
sance and residential satisfaction are measured by questionnaires. Figure 4.7 
describes Model 2 and suggests first a significant connection between nui-
sance and satisfaction (0.44, P = 0.00) when controlling for the effects of risk 
factors and second a significant correlation between risk factors and nui-
sance (-0.51, P = 0.00).
Thus model two means, the lower the score on the Risk Scale, the more nui-
sance is experienced and subsequently the more residential dissatisfaction is 
[ 101 ]
reported. In the next section I will answer the question which risk factors are 
associated with the experience of extreme nuisance.
 4.4.5 Additional subgroup analysis
The Pearson correlation coefficient and the partial correlation coefficient de-
scribe a linear relationship. It appears to be important to examine correlation 
coefficients together with a detailed subgroup analysis since the same corre-
lation coefficients can result from different underlying relationships. Next to 
that it is important to explore which risk factors are related to nuisance. First 
step in the additional analysis is to standardize the Risk Scale with the fol-
lowing algorithm:
Standardized risk value (rv) = rv + |minimum rv| / 0.1 (maximum rv + |minimum rv|). 
Thus, for the Risk Scale the algorithm was rv + |-0.53|/0.1 (0.72 + |-0.53|) result-
ing in a linear transformation. To obtain an easy interpretable Risk Scale from 
0 till 10, the transformed values were rounded on integer numbers.
Second step was to construct four equal groups on respectively the RESS 
and the RNS. The total resident sample of 75,034 was decomposed in to four 
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equal groups using the 25th, 50th, 75th percentiles. The Tables 4.5 and 4.6 
depict the quartiles of the RESS and the RNS in relation to the deciles of the 
transformed Risk Scale. 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 depict two ordered variables. A measure that can attain, 
or nearly attain +1 or -1 for any ordered r × c table is Kendall’s tau-c. Kendall’s 
tau-c for Table 4.5 describing the relation between RESS and Risk Scale was 
-0.60 (P = 0.000). Kendall’s tau-c for Table 4.6 describing the relation between 
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RNS and Risk Scale was -0.63 (P = 0.000). 
Inspecting the tables we can conclude that if we adopt a criterion for sub-
group size of at least 30%, there is a significant group of very satisfied resi-
dents that don’t experience any nuisance, when the Risk Scale has a value of 
at least 8. 
Vice versa Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show that using the criterion of at least 30%, 
there is a significant group of very dissatisfied residents, when the Risk Scale 
has a value of 6 or lower. For the RNS the same tendency is found: Table 4.6 
shows that using the criterion of at least 30%, there is a significant group of 
residents experiencing severe nuisance, when the Risk Scale has a value of 
6 or lower. The interval between 6 and 7 on the standardized Risk Scale is of 
crucial importance and can be used to predict whether a significant group of 
residents is dissatisfied or experiences severe nuisance or not.
Taking the neighbourhood as the unit of analysis, I compared the deciles 
0 and 1 (1) with deciles 8 through 10 (2) in order to investigate neighbour-
hood characteristics associated with dissatisfaction and nuisance. If we want 
to predict which neighbourhood characteristics are associated with extreme 
dissatisfaction and nuisance, we should focus on the deciles zero and one of 
the Risk Scale. If we want to predict which neighbourhood characteristics are 
associated with moderate to strong satisfaction and the absence nuisance, we 
should focus on the deciles eight, nine and ten of the Risk Scale. 
Neighbourhoods with only dissatisfied residents are characterized by high 
population density, are dominated by relatively small dwellings mainly built 
in the period 1906-1960. The population in these neighbourhoods is dominat-
ed by immigrant groups. Compared to the neighbourhoods with moderately 
to strongly satisfied residents, the high risk areas have more singles, people 
in the age group of 20-34 and inactive household heads. 
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 4.5 Conclusion and discussion 
The present article demonstrates that the perception of nuisance in the living 
environment is an important additional guide to understanding residential 
(dis)satisfaction. The Risk Scale, the RESS and the RNS can be used on eve-
ry level of aggregation – housing blocks, streets, neighbourhoods, cities- when 
connected to register data on the specific scale level. The results also demon-
strate that certain physical characteristics of the environment inevitably lead 
to nuisance (Table 4.7). In Table 4.7 a description was given of the built envi-
ronment where vulnerable households are concentrated. We can explain the 
extreme dissatisfaction and nuisance as follows: in anonymous and dense-
ly populated high- and mid-rise neighbourhoods with a lot of residents be-
ing underprivileged, we can expect that due to cultural and linguistic barri-
ers especially between native and non-native groups, residents do not devel-
op shared residential norms. Therefore, social control and altruistic punish-
ment mechanisms are lacking. 
In the analyses of this paper, first, thirty-four variables were reduced to 
three scales. Secondly, I investigated the relations between these three scales 
by calculating partial correlations. In addition, a detailed subgroup analy-
sis was conducted. The aim of the analyses was to demonstrate the useful-
ness of a Risk Scale and to investigate to what extent neighbourhood char-
acteristics cause nuisance and nuisance causes residential environmental 
dissatisfaction (Model 2). Subsequently, we can state that the processes and 
mechanisms that cause nuisance or prevent it can adequately be investigat-
ed by a monitoring system such as the Risk Scale that was described here. 
After determining the problematic areas on the specific aggregation level 
with the Risk Scale, residents can be asked to fill in the RESS and the RNS in 
order to analyze which problems can be detected. After quantitative research, 
more qualitative research methods are needed to gain insight in which types 
of behavioural mechanisms and social interactions on the block level and in 
semi-public spaces are responsible for specific types of nuisance and which 
feedback loops are active that create a negative social climate. 
Nuisance triggers attributions and predictions not only in the minds of 
insiders, but it can also change the calculus of ‘outsiders’ like prospective 
homebuyers, real estate agents, insurance agents, investors, the police and 
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politicians, and it shapes the perceptions of residents who might be consid-
ering moving in. Further longitudinal research is needed to find out to what 
extent individual, household and neighbourhood variables influence the deci-
sion to leave the neighbourhood in case of decline. 
Evidence of nuisance and disorder also gives a running account of the 
effectiveness of residents seeking neighbourhood improvement, and the 
record may encourage or discourage future activism. Further longitudinal 
investigations are needed to find out to what extent individual household 
and neighbourhood variables influence the decision of residents who haven’t 
yet left their neighbourhood in case of decline, to behave in a pro-social man-
ner towards co-residents and give face-to-face assurance and altruistically 
punish norm defectors? Another question to be answered in future research 
is to what extent the choice between leaving and contributing to the neigh-
bourhoods viable social climate influence the rates of ethnic minorities, pov-
erty and physical deterioration in the neighbourhood?
In this article the micro mediation between residents’ perceptions, attribu-
tions and actions was not explicitly investigated because the RESS and the 
RNS describe attitudes which are the resulting effects of such micro media-
tions. The parameters used for the Risk Scale identify variables on the micro 
level of the neighbourhood. Allen (2005) discusses micro-mediation which 
he relates to pre-reflexive behavior. Allen for example emphasizes that soft 
drugs use and criminal activity can only be explained via recourse to pre-
reflexive reasons. Following Heidegger, in our practical concerns with ‘get-
ting on with things’ we behave in an ‘average everyday’ mode of being (Allen, 
2005). 
In this article resident’s opinions and risk factors were described on the 
average neighbourhood level. In pre-reflexive terms the average is ‘What 
comes naturally’ or ‘Just happens because we can expect it’ (Allen, 2005, p. 
201). Epistemologically, I argue that correlations and averages between items 
of an attitude scale describe what Heidegger calls ‘Das Man’ (Heidegger, 1926, 
p. 126). I argue that Allen’s ‘the neighbourhood-they-self’ (Allen, 2005, p. 204) 
is the Heideggerian ‘Das Man’. Following this line of thought I use the neigh-
bourhood average of an opinion scale, as the best approximation of ‘Das Man’ 
and ‘the neighbourhood-they-self’. This is where statistical thought and phe-
nomenology meet (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 504). I invite fellow researchers 
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and policy makers to use the objective parameters that are already availa-
ble, for the construction of their own risk scale and to use the RESS and the 
RNS to identify high risk streets, blocks or micro-neighbourhoods and subse-
quently investigate the micro-mediation of problems in these specific envi-
ronments.
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 5  The importance of norms: 
behavioural game theory 
as a tool to understand 
neighbourhood events




A neighbourhood’s viability depends strongly on the willingness of its resi-
dents to intervene. According to Mancur Olson’s free-rider theorem, collective 
action will neither be initiated, nor sustained unless it is found profitable by 
every single participant. This ‘n-person prisoners’ dilemma’ indicates that the 
successful cases of cooperation, not the failures, call for an explanation; this 
is the theoretical starting point for a study of resident interactions in the via-
ble Dutch mid-rise post-Second World War neighbourhood Buitenveldert-Am-
sterdam. This article attempts to show that behavioural game theory is ap-
propriate for the description and explanation of the reasoning and behaviour 
of residents who perceive collective good games. The deductive methodolo-
gy known as analytic narrative is used to blend behavioural game theory and 
narration into the study of liveability problems. The results indicate that so-
cial norms are important as determinants of ‘what types of games residents 
play’, which in turn determines the degree of cooperative behaviour and the 
effectiveness of social control in a neighbourhood.
Keywords
Residential interactions, behavioral game theory, collective neighbourhood 
goods, trust, norm-oriented, interactive behaviour
 5.1  Introduction
In an earlier work it was demonstrated that residential environmental satis-
faction is expressed not only as satisfaction with the dwelling or in the inter-
nal neighbourhood reputation. Rather, it is mainly revealed by people’s eval-
uation of the social climate prevailing in their neighbourhood (Adriaanse, 
2007). The social climate of a residential environment is defined as an indi-
vidual’s expectation of how others will treat him or her, one another, and how 
they will treat the spatial artefacts within the area that the individual experi-
ences as his or her living environment (Adriaanse, 2007, 2008a). The most crit-
ical element of a favourable residential social climate, that is, one that is ap-
preciated by its residents, is determined not by the level of social cohesion – 
the intensity of social interaction – or by the homogeneity of the neighbour-
hood population, but rather by the degree to which diverse residents share 
norms such as civility and mutual respect (Adriaanse, 2004b, 2005).
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Moving away from a focus on private ties, because of the changes in urban 
reality (Blokland, 1998; Fischer, 1982; Putnam, 2000; Wellman, 1979; Well-
man & Leighton, 1979), this paper focuses on mechanisms that facilitate res-
idential cooperation on behalf of the collective neighbourhood goods with-
out requiring strong ties or associations (Olson, 1971). This article attempts 
to show that the insights and tools of behavioural game theory (Camerer, 
2003) are sufficient for the description and explanation of the behaviour of 
residents in neighbourhoods. The central question is: what mediates the res-
ident’s willingness to contribute or not to the production and maintenance 
of collective and public residential goods such as clean shared entrances and 
stairways, well-maintained collective gardens, and public goods such as clean 
and safe streets and parks (Olson, 1971)?
The main thrust of this article is the development and application of a the-
oretical framework that explains the proximate causes of liveability prob-
lems in neighbourhoods. This entails the precise analysis on a micro level of 
the underlying causal mechanisms that determine the reasoning and behav-
iour of residents who perceive collective good games. The point of departure 
is methodological individualism, which states that individual choices of resi-
dents determine whether or not on an aggregate level liveability problems in 
neighbourhoods will occur. The theoretical framework relies on behavioural 
game theory and especially on the strong reciprocity thesis. It will be ques-
tioned whether the conventional theory of collective action, telling us that 
individuals are inherently self-seeking (Olson, 1971), gives a reliable descrip-
tion of actual behaviour of people in neighbourhoods.
The field of mathematical game theory came into being with the 1944 book 
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Mor-
genstern. The power of game theory is its generality and precision.1
Rational choice theory, in particular the theory of games, offers a theo-
ry of structure: it suggests a way in which structures create incentives that 
shape individual choices and thereby collective outcomes (Bates et al., 1998: 
234).2
In Strategic Interaction Erving Goffman states that game theory identifies an 
area of social life that sociology has more or less missed, namely situations in 
which actors are mutually aware of each other, where every move that some-
one makes affects all the actors, and where the decision that Actor A makes 
depends on what Actor B thinks that she will do (Swedberg, 2001). Games 
describe different situations of interacting entities and provide a taxonomy 
of strategic situations. Three games are well known in the social sciences: the 
1 The theory was developed extensively in the 1950s by many scholars and explicitly applied to biology in the 
1970s. Mathematical game theory has been widely recognized as an important tool in many fields.
2  A core concept of game theory is the Nash equilibrium (Voss, 2001: 105).
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Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Trust Game or Assurance Game, and the Battle of the 
Sexes. All three of these games can be applied to the behaviour of residents. 
Two major criticisms of game theory are, first, that it assumes more calcu-
lation, foresight, perceived rationality of others, and (empirical applications) 
self-interest than most people are naturally capable of; and, second, that in 
most applied domains there is too much theorizing about how rational peo-
ple would interact strategically, relative to the modest amount of empirical 
evidence on how they do interact (Camerer, 2003: 465). Because of these crit-
icisms I focus in this paper on behavioural game theory, which starts from 
bounded rationality; secondly I define the social dilemmas in terms of inten-
tions not in terms of outcomes.
Also Bo Bengtsson uses a game-theoretical framework for the study of ten-
ant involvement in Swedish housing estates (Bengtsson, 1998, 2001). The 
empirical analysis in Bengtsson’s project was carried out on the estate lev-
el; in the paper at hand the empirical analysis is carried out on the individu-
al level. In this article I use behavioural game theory as the conceptual frame-
work for the narrative interpretation of descriptions of social interactions in a 
neighbourhood context. The case study focuses on a post-Second World War 
neighbourhood, namely Buitenveldert-Amsterdam in the Netherlands. It is a 
viable neighbourhood with a good reputation and a favourable social climate, 
even though its physical-spatial layout bears the characteristics of a ‘vulner-
able’ neighbourhood type (Adriaanse, 2004b, 2006). Section 5.2 develops the 
theoretical framework, in which norms, trust and dominant response tenden-
cies serve as the main elements, using Elster’s distinction between respec-
tively moral norms, quasi-moral norms, and social norms (Elster, 2007). Sec-
tion 5.3 deals with the methods used. A profile of the case-study district, 
Buitenveldert-Amsterdam, is presented in Section 5.4, which includes a sub-
section on the characteristics of the post-Second World War neighbourhood 
type. The sample characteristics are presented in Section 5.5. Then, in Section 
5.6, the empirical results are described in relation to the prevalence of Pris-
oner’s Dilemmas and Assurance Games, the prevalence of altruistic punish-
ment and reported negative externalities, and respondents’ descriptions of 
the social climate of Buitenveldert. The article closes with a section compris-
ing the conclusions and a brief discussion.
 5.2  Theoretical framework
In past times, the smaller scale and the higher frequency of interactions 
among individuals in classic community settings such as the church, the 
neighbourhood or the schoolyard prevented residents from becoming ‘inti-
mate strangers’. Nowadays communities are less close-knit, and the impor-
tance of the neighbourhood as a framework for social and spatial integration 
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has declined due to macro developments of mobility, globalization and mod-
ernization processes in the economy and employment (Blau, 1986; Gans, 1961; 
Keller, 1968; Offe & Fuchs, 2002; Paxton, 1999; Suttles, 1972; Völker, 2004; Adri-
aanse, 2004b, 2006). Subsequently, traditional loci of bonds such as religion, 
neighbourhood and work have become less influential settings for the devel-
opment and maintenance of social norms and moral attitudes (Adriaanse, 
2006). A sense of insecurity about the actions of those (unknown) others in 
residential areas can easily occur because nowadays the inhabitants do not 
necessarily know each other (e.g. Dekker & Rowlands, 2005; Reijndorp, 2004).
People who occupy mid-rise and high-rise buildings in particular live close 
together in large numbers within a relatively small area. While they may not 
occupy the same worlds in a social sense, they do share the same physical 
space, which they call their living environment. They ‘come across each oth-
er’ or ‘run into each other’ in the elevator, on their way to the neighbourhood 
shops, and in other spaces outside of their homes. In contrast to the social 
interactions in small rural communities or immigrant ethnic enclaves (Forrest 
& Kearns, 2001), these coincidental encounters in shared (semi-)public space 
can be characterized as ‘interacting without meeting’ (Adriaanse, 2006).
Residents are assumed to want to live in a safe and clean neighbourhood, 
free of crime, vandalism and nuisances such as dirt on the street, noise and so 
forth (Adriaanse, 2008b). After all, there is no evidence of which we are aware 
showing public approval of crime or disorder by any population group (Samp-
son & Raudenbush, 1999). The term collective efficacy is important here. Col-
lective efficacy – defined by Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) as cohesion 
among neighbourhood residents combined with shared expectations for infor-
mal social control of public space – is considered a major social force inhib-
iting both crime and disorder. The starting point of this article is that friend-
ship networks are not considered a necessary condition for a stable and viable 
community, whereas avoiding nuisance and sharing the common standards 
that underlie collective efforts to establish social order and safety are (Samp-
son, Raudenbush & Earls, 1997; Sampson, Morenoff & Earls, 1999).
 5.2.1  Norms and trust
Collective efficacy is about the expectations for actions that are essential for 
the realization of public goods, such as public safety, clean environments and 
education for children (Sampson, 2003). Perceived collective efficacy will in-
fluence what people choose to do as a group, how much effort they put into it, 
and their staying power when group efforts fail to produce results. Collective 
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efficacy is rooted in selfefficacy (Bandura, 1986: 449).3
Achievement of collective efficacy requires cogent means of relating fac-
tional interests to shared purposes. The unifying purposes must be explic-
it and attainable through concerted effort (Bandura 1986:453). Which are the 
mechanisms that facilitate residential cooperation on behalf of the common 
neighbourhood good, without requiring strong ties or associations?
Norms
Cooperation in human societies seems to be grounded in norms; thus, it is 
necessary to explain norms to be able to understand human cooperation (Fehr 
& Fischbacher 2004:185). According to Emile Durkheim, norms are social facts 
(faits sociaux), outcomes of actions, and, as such, they are collective phenome-
na. He says that norms exist independently of the consciousness of individu-
als; they are objective and causally relevant if they are enforced within a com-
munity or group of actors (Hechter & Opp, 2001). Durkheim does not analyse 
the logic of the interaction that leads to norms. A group in which norms ex-
ist can be a family, a peer group, (part of) a neighbourhood, an organization, 
or even a whole society. We can distinguish two aspects of norms that are cru-
cial: (1) the norm as a standard to judge the behaviour of others; (2) the norm 
as a tool to control one’s own behaviour.
Regarding the first aspect, certain scholars state that norms are standards 
of behaviour that are based on widely shared beliefs about how individual 
group members ought to behave in a given situation (Ellickson, 2001; Elster, 
1989; Horne, 2001; Voss, 2001). With an emphasis on enforcement, norms can 
be defined as behavioural regularities in a population of actors. Some meta-
phors that have been used to describe this first aspect of norms are ‘the rules 
of the game’ (Hechter & Opp, 2001), ‘the internal morality of a social system’ 
(Coleman 1990), ‘the cement of society’ (Elster, 1989), and ‘the basic values 
that shape beliefs’ (Collins & Chippendale, 1991).
The second aspect of norms reflects the degree to which individuals agree 
to mediate or control their own behaviour. According to Weber (1978: 755) an 
individual may change his behaviour and especially his social actions, either 
to protect his interests under new external conditions or simply to promote 
them more effectively under existing conditions. Actors may actively calcu-
late the course of action that is most likely to produce desired ends at the 
lowest costs, or they may more passively simply imitate those around them 
(Asch, 1956; Sherif, 1936). Other key social science thinkers would however 
describe the norm in quite different terms and adopt a much more critical 
3 Among the various aspects of self-knowledge, self-efficacy involves a generative capability in which cognitive, so-
cial, and behavioural subskills must be organized into integrated courses of action to serve innumerable purposes. 
Competent functioning requires both skills and self-beliefs of efficacy to use them effectively (Bandura, 1986).
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approach (i.e. Foucault). But in this article the starting point is that human 
deliberations are a phenomenon sui generis and not the product of for exam-
ple power relations.
Trust
Closely related to norms is the concept of trust. As a first approximation, 
trust may be defined as the expectation that another player will not defect 
in a sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma. Sztompka defines trust as “a bet about 
the future contingent actions of others”. A functional culture of trust, as 
Sztompka calls it, includes strong norms with positive sanctions motivat-
ing trustworthiness, and strong taboos with negative sanctions prohibit-
ing breaches of trust (Sztompka, 1999: 111-112). Trust encourages cooper-
ative behaviour by creating a social obligation: “trust in someone engen-
ders reciprocal trust” (Sztompka, 1999). Trusting people enter relationships 
with the presumption that others can be trusted. Because trusting individ-
uals can form effective associations with others, the presumption of trust 
can be an advantageous strategy, despite the risk of investing while others 
neglect to do so (Molm, Takahashi & Peterson, 2000; Orbell & Dawes, 1991; 
Sullivan & Transue, 1999). This refers to the first aspect of the definition of 
norms. Once trust becomes embedded in a cultural, normative system, it 
acquires functions and dysfunctions of its own. A trust-generating atmos-
phere encourages cooperation and community (Sztompka, 1999).
Sztompka treats the concept of distrust as the negative mirror-image of 
trust. It is a negative bet. “It involves negative expectations about the actions 
of others (…) and it involves negative, defensive commitment (avoiding, 
escaping, distancing myself, refusing actions, taking protective measures 
against those I distrust)” (Sztompka, 1999: 26). Not able to predict the future 
conduct of those who are different from us, we react to such uncertainty with 
suspicion. Sztompka also introduces the term ‘mistrust’ to refer to a neu-
tral situation in which both trust and distrust are suspended. “It means the 
lack of clear expectations, as well as hesitation about committing oneself” 
(Sztompka, 1999: 26). Distrust is often pervaded with stereotypes and preju-
dices (Sztompka, 1999: 42).
Elster’s (2007) distinction between different types of norms, combined with 
the latest insights of behavioural game theory, could shed light on when 
norms emerge and when they lead to cooperation or to defection. This will be 
described in the following sub-sections.
 5.2.2  Response tendency without norms
For neighbourhoods, it seems clear that neither a situation of experienced 
mistrust nor a situation of experienced distrust is favourable. Both seem to 
pose a serious threat to the quality of life of the residents. A response tenden-
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cy or an interpersonal preference is the predominant way in which one gen-
erally chooses to act in interaction situations (Elster, 2007: 188). In an ideal 
situation, community residents share norms that underlie any collective ef-
fort on their part to establish viability, social order and safety. When residents 
assume that there are shared standards for neighbourhood behaviour, they 
are less likely to have proximity problems. Shared standards for neighbour-
hood life facilitate the management of neighbourhood problems by providing 
a clear measure against which behaviour can be judged (Altman & Wanders-
man, 1987: 59). In this section, the game-theoretical approaches to norms are 
discussed, as they are the engine of collective efficacy and mutual trust. The 
discussion uses Elster’s distinction between moral norms, quasi-moral norms 
and social norms (Elster, 2007). The respective games that are presented will 
be clarified by examples.
Rational egoism without norms
When do norms emerge? According to a widely shared (Coleman, 1990) but 
not uncontested (Elster, 1989) view, the request for a norm starts when ac-
tions cause positive or negative externalities for other people (see also Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004: 185). Even if agents are informed about the norm’s content 
and accept the norm as valid, they do not necessarily conform to the norm 
(Hechter & Opp, 2001: 108). Because people repeat strategies that produce pos-
itive outcomes, they can systematically break the norm because of the temp-
tation to achieve a better personal result. Individuals will recall actions suc-
cessfully applied in earlier situations and behave similarly under new condi-
tions (Dobbin, 1994).
The clash between the normative standards of a social system and the indi-
vidual choice to seek personal material gain or hedonistic success is well 
described in the form of a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). In a PD, any individual 
contribution generates small benefits for many people and large costs for one 
person – the contributor. Although the sum of all contributions exceeds the 
costs, implying that there is a collective interest in contribution, the costs 
typically exceed the benefit to the contributor, so there is no individual inter-
est in contributing. In other words, the effort that is expected from an actor in 
order to serve the norms does not contribute to the realization of the actor’s 
personal material and hedonistic goals.
Because a PD is symmetric, the inequality holds for every participating 
agent. The preference order means that every participating agent will avoid 
option (N,S) and try to arrange situation (S,N) (see Table 5.1). As the inequali-
ty is applicable to every agent in a PD, the collective result is not optimal (S,S). 
When all participants in a PD change their strategies until no participant can 
benefit from changing, an equilibrium in the PD arises: situation (S,S). A PD 
has only one equilibrium and predicts universal noncooperation. According 
to the logic of a PD, self-interested people are just norm violators. The follow-
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ing situation gleaned from an interview illustrates a typical PD. Briefly, when 
people moved out of the neighbourhood, they left behind some empty boxes 
on the street. Other residents were annoyed about the fact that the boxes had 
not been folded up and put in the paper recycling bin.
Example 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma – Neighbour moving out chooses rational ego-
istic option by leaving behind empty boxes on the street (see Table 5.1, option 
(S,N)).
“(…) I think it is simply annoying, look I don’t like it when people make a mess of the 
neighbourhood. When there are seven boxes lying on the pavement because they moved 
out, and they just refused to read the circular that you have to fold them up and put them 
in the container, then you are just lazy. And that is really what bothers me. And I have 
often written letters about that, and sometimes it helps and sometimes it does not.”
 5.2.3  Norm-oriented interactive behaviour
Experimental evidence shows that in an anonymous one-shot (simultane-
ous) Prisoner’s Dilemma, 30-40% of the individuals have a rational egoistic re-
sponse tendency, ignoring norms. This leaves 60-70% of the individuals who 
tend to follow more complex strategies involving some levels of trust and rec-
iprocity (Frey & Benz, 2001).4
Prisoner’s Dilemmas do not adequately describe the differences in motiva-
tion of non-cooperative persons. For instance, in a classic PD, I could decide 
not to travel by train because, as my rational egoism prescribes, I have to go 
by car, or because I see that others do not use the train either. Then it is not 
reasonable that I should have to travel in any less comfort! This motivation 
differs significantly from rational egoism. Game theoreticians and researchers 
in the field of behaviour economics have put forward the concept of ‘strong 
reciprocity’ (Gintis et al., 2005) in this context. A reciprocal person does regard 
it as reasonable to help others but also applies this standard to actions of oth-
ers towards him. Over time, individuals develop a friendly attitude towards 
each other as a result of mutual assistance, not as its cause. In the follow-
ing sections, these other motivations or norm-oriented choices are described, 
and for each of them the preference order is depicted by a specific ‘game’. In 
the first response tendency, moral norms are central. In the second one, peo-
ple follow quasi-moral norms. The third response tendency is based on ‘social 
norms’.
4 Behavioural game theorists rely on data gathered in controlled laboratory and field environments to make as-
sertions concerning human motivation (Gintis, Bowles, Boyd & Fehr, 2005).
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Moral norms
An action H is moral if and only if the consequences of action H in situation S 
are at least as good as any other action that an individual could have taken in 
situation S. The person who has a tendency to act in a moral manner adopts a 
decision-making procedure that ensures that he allows the best consequenc-
es to be determinant in his deliberations.
An action is based on a moral norm when it confers benefits upon other 
members of a group even at a cost to the actor. Altruistic action dictated by a 
moral norm is unconditional, whereas it is ‘pushed’ from behind by a quasi-
internal force, insensitive to circumstances, sticking to the prescribed behav-
iour even if new options become available (free after Elster, 1989: 97). The 
moral norm of altruism is to help others in distress unconditionally, even if 
there is no prior history of assistance. A person who acts upon a moral norm 
will feel shame and guilt when he does not cooperate – i.e. does not conform 
to that norm – whether another person can see his act or not.
Quasi-moral norms
An action H is reasonable if and only if the consequences of action H in situ-
ation S are at least as reasonable as any other action that an individual could 
have taken in situation S. The person who has a tendency to act in a reasona-
ble manner adopts a decision-making procedure that ensures that he allows 
the most reasonable consequences to be determinant in his deliberations. 
This orientation may be classified as quasi norm-oriented.
Like defecting from moral norms, also defecting from quasi-moral norms 
generates a sense of guilt regardless of whether other people are present or 
not. After all, even when I know others haven’t seen my act, I feel guilty when 
reflecting on it. Elster states that quasi-moral norms are conditional, in the 
sense that they are triggered by the presence or behaviour of other people.5
What Elster calls quasi-moral norms would include the norm of reciproc-
ity (help those who help you and hurt those who hurt you). We can distin-
guish between positive and negative reciprocity (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Pos-
itive reciprocity consists of respect, trust and tolerance. You won’t be toler-
ant of another person if he is not tolerant of you. A form of negative reciproc-
ity is altruistic punishment or social sanctioning. An individual has the ten-
dency to be reciprocal if he is prepared (1) to reward those who act reason-
ably (strong positive reciprocity) by acting reasonably himself; or (2) to pun-
5 Social norms, he argues, are triggered when other people can observe what other people are doing. But I want 
to refine this argument. Only when I know that other people have observed what I am doing do I feel ashamed. 
For example: If I see that others help to clean the street and I don’t, I feel uncomfortable (guilt). This is a situ-
ation with a quasi-moral norm that occurs in a situation with the characteristics of an Assurance Game. Quasi-
moral norms are subscribed to by the majority.
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ish (Fowler, 2005) those who are unreasonable (strong negative reciprocity). 
Altruistic punishment is directed toward norm offenders. It is called altruis-
tic because of the costs it takes to punish deviance. The costs associated with 
punishing others include the risk of retaliation or at least potential loss of 
relationship, the loss of time or money, emotional discomfort and so forth. 
An example of altruistic punishment is described in the following quotation.
Example 2: Altruistic punishment. Woman (age 56) lives in a social rented 
house in an apartment building:
“When I see it I will say something about it of course! We have a girl living here and she 
is picked up every morning by a taxi that brings her to her school; she has a certain dis-
ease. While waiting she smokes on that bench downstairs and she drops her fags on the 
ground. I tell her not to throw her fags on the ground, but she doesn’t realize herself 
that she misbehaves. Yes and now she has stopped doing it. At least, that is what I hope, 
because I don’t see her do it anymore. Yes, I think that is just dirty.”
Fehr and Gächter (2002) found in experiments that cooperation flourishes if 
altruistic punishment is possible and that it breaks down if altruistic punish-
ment is ruled out. An essential condition for strong reciprocity is that punish-
ment also takes place without leading to future advantages for the recipro-
cating individual. A strongly reciprocating individual punishes a person who 
does not adhere to the norm, even if doing so costs this individual more than 
he or she may gain from it. This reciprocity is derived not from an egoistical-
ly defined instrumental form of rationality but rather from a perceived sense 
of values.
Very important is the fact that quasi-normative choices change a Prison-
er’s Dilemma into an Assurance Game (AG) (see Table 5.2 for the matrix of an 
assurance game). In game theory, the Stag Hunt is a game that describes a 
conflict between safety and social cooperation. Other names for it or its var-
iants include ‘Assurance Game’, ‘Coordination Game’, and ‘Trust Dilem-
ma’. It originates in a text by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who described a situa-
tion in which two individuals go out on a hunt. Each can individually choose 
to hunt a stag or a hare. Each player must choose an action without know-
ing the choice of the other. If an individual hunts a stag, he must have the 
cooperation of his partner in order to succeed. An individual can get a hare by 
himself, but a hare is worth less than a stag. This is taken to be an important 
analogy for social cooperation. The Assurance Game differs from the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma in that there are two Nash equilibria: one when both play-
ers cooperate and one when both players defect. In the Prisoner’s Dilem-
ma, however, despite the fact that a situation with both players cooperating 
is Pareto-efficient, the only Nash equilibrium is when both players choose to 
defect (Camerer, 2003). In a game-theoretical Trust Game matrix, the choice is 
between the same strategies – normative behaviour (N) and self-interest (S) – 
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as in the PD example. Again, the preference order is given in ordinal numbers.
The outcome is indeed a non-excludable public good like a clean street. 
However, we assume in an AG that every resident contributes a small but 
essential part to a collective good. Individual contributions generate a large 
benefit for a well-defined group of people. Individual costs can be large, but 
they do not exceed the benefits to the contributor. An AG generates two equi-
libria: (N,N) and (S,S). In other words, residents prefer to contribute (N,N) if 
they believe others are inclined to contribute; but they prefer to defect if they 
believe that others are inclined to defect. If, for whatever reason, some resi-
dents conclude that those around them will help sweep the street clean, they 
respond by contributing in kind, prompting still others to contribute and so 
forth and so on until a highly cooperative state of affairs takes root (Marwell, 
1988). But if some residents conclude that others will benefit from a situation 
they are struggling to bring about, though without contributing, then they will 
respond by acting out of self-interest too, spurring others on to do the same 
and so forth and so on until a condition of mass non-cooperation becomes 
the norm (Camerer, 2003). A typical example of an AG is where there is no dis-
crepancy between the personal goals and the collective goal and all residents 
are willing to deliver an essential contribution. In an interview, one respond-
ent recounted what happened when the key to the gate of the collective gar-
den was broken, and all residents paid part of the repair costs. 
Example 3: Assurance Game. All residents cooperate in paying the repair costs 
of the collective garden gate (see Table 5.2, option (N,N)).
“Recently the key to the gate of the collective garden was broken. The neighbour next 
door had put the key in the lock and then it broke off. But yes, that went very smooth-
ly then, when he said “I will call a locksmith.” Then everyone paid 7 euro each to have a 
new key made. That kind of thing – nobody makes a problem of it – goes really naturally. 
As long as somebody just takes the initiative, yes, in my view everybody will cooperate.”
Social norms 
Social norms have to do with status, personal preference and taste, and they 
include rules of etiquette and norms regulating aggression. Taste bears the 
characteristic of a convention equilibrium because it is arbitrary or indiscrim-
inate. But the difference from a convention equilibrium is that the latter has 
been agreed among the members of the collective and taste has not! You can-
not make your own taste absolute and unconditional, because it would be 
exclusive and discriminatory. Social norms can also differ between identity 
groups such as socio-cultural and religious groups or across generations (Sen, 
2006).
So, a person who does not subscribe to the definition of the norm because 
he or she has other priorities cannot necessarily be seen as a non-mor-
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al norm violator. He could have his own inwardly felt definition of the norm 
based on different taste. Community members often have different inter-
ests. That is, the costs and benefits for one person or set of people are dif-
ferent from those of another (see for example Ermakoff, 1997; Heckathorn, 
1993). In these situations, norms are disjoint (Coleman, 1990). Some group 
members want to impose their preferences on others, and there are disagree-
ments among subgroups about what the social norm ought to be. Under such 
conditions, contradictory norms will emerge, or the group with the strongest 
interest will succeed in having the social norms that benefit it prevail (Horne, 
2001: 17).6
Within-group solidarity can thus help to feed between-group discord (Sen, 
2006: 2). Social norms can also be treated as a game with a pay-off matrix; 
one such is the Battle of the Sexes, a twoplayer game used in game theory. 
Imagine two households living next to each other; one has social normset A 
and the other normset B. Normsets A and B are incompatible. Both would pre-
fer to keep their relationship stable. But if they don’t agree, what should they 
do? The pay-off matrix labelled Battle of the Sexes is shown in Table 5.3.
It is even possible that in the same social interaction situation, both games 
– the Battle of the Sexes and the Assurance Game – are intermingled. This is 
the case in the next example.
Example 4: Assurance Game and Battle of the Sexes. Cooperative interaction 
under pressure because of differing social norms (see Table 5.2, option (N,N); 
Table 5.3, options (B,A) and (A,B). A native Dutch lady (age 35) has lived with 
her husband and two young children in Buitenveldert for four years in an 
owner-occupied semi-detached dwelling:
“Yes, I was criticized for that: ‘Could you please trim the hedge’, my neighbour said. We 
do only a little gardening, it’s not a priority for us and we don’t have very much time for 
it either. (…) When it is really necessary to trim the hedge, it is an unwritten rule, we do it 
by turns, it is a hedge so you do it on both sides, you do not say, ‘I will only trim it on our 
side’, but they do it far more often than we do, yes, and then I feel troubled.”
First, the woman wants to contribute to the maintenance of the collective 
good and she behaves in a reciprocal way, but she differs in her opinion from 
her neighbour concerning the frequency of trimming the hedge. The mis-
match in a Battle of the Sexes puts pressure on the trust between the people 
6 Elster states that (besides quasi-moral norms) also social norms are conditional, in the sense that they are 
triggered by the presence or behaviour of other people. But defecting from social norms does not generate guilt.
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involved. Accordingly, mistrust can start in one interaction that can be typi-
fied as a Battle of the Sexes game, but it can spread when the trust between 
the residents is undermined. Thus, an Assurance Game can develop into a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma when the residents are no longer convinced of the Pareto-
optimal option in an Assurance Game. In the following sections the developed 
theoretical framework will be applied to the empirical reality of modern resi-
dential neighbourhoods.
 5.3  Methods
The approach taken in the present research is strongly associated with the ra-
tional choice method known as analytical narrative (Levi, 2003; Bates, et al., 
1998, 2000). ‘Analytics’ refers to the use of game-theoretical models. In analyt-
ical narratives, the narrative and the analytics are intertwined. The analysis 
of narratives establishes the actual players, their goals and their preferences 
(see Tables 5.1-5.3) while describing the logic of the interaction (Levi, 2003: 9).
The goal of this study is not to generalize per se from a sample to a pop-
ulation, but to find as much variation in interaction structures in order to 
arrive at trans-situational knowledge. This is called abduction (Awbrey & 
Awbrey, 1995). Among the residents of the various streets and housing blocks, 
respondents were selected at random by contacting every nth house, depend-
ing on the size of the building block or street. The sample reflects the diver-
sity of residential settings in the neighbourhood’s building types: single-fam-
ily homes; dwellings in multiple-occupancy complexes; and social rented, pri-
vate rented, and owner-occupied dwellings. Furthermore, it is indicative of 
the diversity of the neighbourhood population according to age, gender, edu-
cation and ethnicity.
The interviews started with an eliciting question about unwritten rules, 
inviting people to describe social interaction situations in their neighbour-
hood.7 Questions were asked about negative externalities, neighbourhood use, 
neighbourhood collective goods (shared stairway, entrance, collective garden, 
gallery, park, streets), informal social control, and about the likelihood that 
their neighbours would take action if they saw children misbehaving in pub-
lic and whether the neighbours were willing to help each other. The interview 
material was interpreted on the basis of behavioural game theory, in terms 
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Assurance Game, with the software pack-
age Atlas-ti. The criteria to judge a neighbourhood’s collective narrative as a 
perceived PD are as follows: (1) a respondent perceives a contrast between his 
7 A semi-structured questionnaire was used for the in-depth interviews, based upon insights derived from a 
pilot (Adriaanse, 2004b).
[ 126 ]
personal, hedonistic and material goals on the one hand and the collective 
neighbourhood goals on the other; (2) a respondent finds that he has to invest 
high costs (time, money, effort) in the collective goals and that these efforts 
don’t contribute to his own personal goals; (3) a respondent who contributes 
to (the maintenance of) a collective goal does perceive a great cost in relation 
to his personal interests and perceives only a small contribution of his efforts 
to the collective good. The criteria to judge a neighbourhood’s collective nar-
rative as a perceived AG are as follows: (1) a respondent does not perceive any 
discrepancy between his personal and the collective goals; (2) a respondent 
finds that he makes an essential contribution to the collective goal that is not 
in conflict with his own personal goals. For the statistical analysis, the Atlas-
ti data were imported in SPSS 16.0.
 5.4  Neighbourhood characteristics
All across Europe and the USA, a vast amount of mid-rise and high-rise es-
tates were built shortly after the Second World War. In earlier work, Dutch 
post-Second World War mid-rise neighbourhoods were identified in the reg-
ister data of Wegener and the ABF Woningmarktmonitor 2003. They are char-
acterized by the following three conditions: (1) At least half of the housing 
stock in 2003 was built between 1945 and 1980; (2) the share of the dwellings 
in the total housing stock of the postal-code area is at least two standard de-
viations above the mean percentage of mid-rise flats in all Dutch neighbour-
hoods; and (3) the housing stock in the postal-code area is not predominant-
ly (not 50% or more) of another type (the postal-code area comprises at least 
100 households) (Adriaanse, 2007). Thus, in total, 116 neighbourhoods in the 
Netherlands belong to the category of ‘post-war mid-rise’ (Adriaanse, 2007).
Buitenveldert-Amsterdam belongs to this neighbourhood-type, according to 
these conditions. But at the same time it is atypical. One-third of the hous-
ing stock in Buitenveldert consists of owner-occupied dwellings and another 
third of private sector rental dwellings. The other third consists of social-rent-
ed housing. The large proportion of homes earmarked for owner-occupancy 
made Buitenveldert particularly attractive to the more prosperous segments 
of the Amsterdam population during the 1960s, when it was quite difficult to 
find suitable properties in other parts of the city. For quite a while, relatively 
little new construction was undertaken in the immediate vicinity of Buiten-
veldert. The mean length of residence is as much as 17 years and a quarter 
of the population have lived in the same house since the district’s inception 
(Adriaanse, 2004). In 2004 over one-third (34%) of its population were aged 
65 or above. The vast majority of residents (67%) are of ‘native’ Dutch origin. 
Only 8% can be classified as belonging to the ‘non-Western ethnic minori-
ties’. Both the educational level and the income of Buitenveldert residents are 
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markedly higher than in an average post-Second World War neighbourhood. 
Where the majority of these areas nowadays are confronted with increas-
ing degeneration (see e.g. Heeger, 1993; Musterd & Van Kempen, 2005; Murie, 
Knorr-Siedow & Van Kempen, 2003; Power, 1997; Skifter Andersen, 2003; Turk-
ington, Van Kempen & Wassenberg, 2004; Wassenberg, 1993), Buitenveldert 
has still a good reputation and lacks severe liveability problems. This makes 
Buitenveldert a ‘most likely case’ in terms of finding effective norms of coop-
eration in a suburban multi-family neighbourhood.
 5.5  Sample characteristics
The respondent sample comprised 42 residents of Buitenveldert. It was com-
posed of 16 males and 26 females (n = 42) whose mean age was 61.6 (SD = 
17.9) with a range from 22 to 88 years. In terms of ethnic identity the ma-
jority of the sample was native Dutch (78.6%). Other residents had an Asian 
(4.8%), Jewish (11.9%), Antillean (2.4%), Surinamese or Eastern European (2.4%) 
cultural identity. In terms of the highest level of educational attainment, the 
sample characteristics were as follows: primary school 2.4%; junior domes-
tic science 21.4%; junior general secondary education/ higher elementary 
11.9%; upper secondary vocational 4.8%; pre-university 9.5%; higher profes-
sional 35.7%; and university 11.9% (n = 42). The mean length of residence in 
the neighbourhood was 16.8 years (SD = 12.6), ranging from 1 to 46 years (n = 
42). All respondents gave information about neighbourhood collective goods: 
shared stairways, shared entrances, shared galleries, collective gardens, and 
neighbourhood streets and parks. In total 200 neighbourhood collective good 
narratives were collected.
 5.6  Results
 5.6.1  Prevalence of social dilemmas in Buitenveldert
This section presents the analysis of the Assurance Games and Prisoner’s Di-
lemmas reported by residents during the interviews. In view of the theoretical 
framework and our first impressions of the social climate in Buitenveldert, we 
could expect only a limited number of people to report negative externalities 
and/or Prisoner’s Dilemmas. In the theoretical section, a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(PD) was described as a situation whereby it is better for all when every indi-
vidual cooperates, but it is the best for each individual not to cooperate. An 
Assurance Game (or Trust Game) (AG) was typified as a situation whereby it 
is the best for everyone when everyone cooperates, but each individual has to 
deal with the risk that the other will choose not to cooperate.
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Another assumption that will be tested in this section is that residents who 
perceive Prisoner’s Dilemma situations will also experience negative exter-
nalities. In other words, it is assumed that the perceived PDs are rooted in 
real negative experiences and are thus not imagined by the respondents. Dur-
ing the interviews, the respondents were asked to mention typical interac-
tions with regard to the collective goods in their direct living environment. In 
the context of these neighbourhood collective good narratives, PDs and AGs 
were identified using specific criteria. In order to estimate the prevalence of 
Prisoner’s Dilemmas and Assurance Games in the 200 collective good narra-
tives, the mean of the reported PDs and AGs was calculated across all items 
of the collective good list. The six-item collective good list dealt with shared 
entrance, shared gallery, shared stairway, collective garden, and neighbour-
hood streets and parks.
The mean number of reported collective goods for each respondent was 4 
(SD = 1.48), with a range from 2 to 6. The total percentage of PDs in 200 col-
lective good narratives was 13% (n = 26). The total percentage of AGs in 200 
collective good narratives was 87% (n = 169). Five collective good narratives 
(2.4%) could not be classified as a PD or an AG. The mean percentage of PDs 
for each respondent was 14.64% (SD = 25.8), with a range of 0 to 100 for Pris-
oner’s Dilemmas. For Assurance Games, the mean percentage was 83.4% (SD = 
27.8), with a range of 0 to 100. We can conclude that the respondents reported 
AGs far more often than PDs in their narratives. 
The relation of % PDs and AGs to sex, age, educational level and length of 
residence
The following test results for PDs and AGs were found. The mean percentage 
of PDs and AGs was related neither to age (Pearson’s correlations of 0.05 for 
PD and 0.02 for AG; both ns) nor to sex (t values of -0.23 for PD, p = 0.82 (ns); 
-0.37 for AG, p = 0.72 (ns)) nor to educational level (Anova F values of 0.05 for 
PD, p = 0.95 (ns); 0.14 for AG, p = 0.87 (ns)). The correlation between length 
of residence and the reported PDs was 0.16 (ns), and between length of resi-
dence and AGs the correlation was -0.07 (ns). In order to investigate the rela-
tion between length of residence and the percentage of reported PDs and AGs, 
the list of five dwelling types was dichotomized. An independent t test indi-
cated that respondents living in terraced houses and flats did not differ sig-
nificantly with regard to the mean percentage of PDs from the respondents 
living in detached, semi-detached, and corner houses (t = 0.52; p = 0.6).
Prevalence of altruistic punishment
The respondents reported altruistic punishment 51 times; thus, it occurred in 
25.5% of all (200) narratives. Of the 42 respondents, 83.3% appeared to be al-
truistic punishers themselves; 9.5% were indifferent or not altruistic punish-
ers; and data were missing on the remaining 7.1%. There was no statistically 
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significant relation with sex (χ2 = 0.39, ns). And there was neither a statistical-
ly significant relation with age (t = -1.02, ns) nor with length of residence (t = 
-0.7, ns). Nor was there a significant relation with educational level, as calcu-
lated with a Mann-Whitney test (z = -1.6, ns).
Reported negative externalities
During the interviews, the respondents reported various negative externali-
ties (see Table 5.4). The following nine types of nuisance were mentioned: 
(1) litter on the street; (2) walls and/or buildings defaced; (3) dog dirt on the 
street; (4) nuisance caused by young people; (5) stench, dust, refuse; (6) traffic 
nuisance; (7) nuisance caused by immediate neighbours; (8) nuisance caused 
by local residents; and (9) noise nuisance. In total the 42 respondents men-
tioned negative externalities 54 times (see Tasble 5.4). Of all reported negative 
externalities, 22% concerned noise and 20% litter; 16% were complaints about 
direct neighbours, 12% about local residents, and another 12% about young 
people; only 5% concerned stench, dust, and refuse; 3% were about dog dirt 
and another 3% about defaced walls.
The respondents were subsequently divided in two groups. The first con-
sists of those who reported less than three different types of negative exter-
nalities (group 1) (n = 36); the second (group 2) consists of those who report-
ed three or more (n = 6). On average, each respondent in group 1 reported 0.94 
externalities; each one in group 2 reported on average 3.3 externalities.8
The next step was to cross-tabulate the tally of negative externalities with 
the types of games for each collective neighbourhood good. It appears that 
there is a statistically significant relation between the number of negative 
externalities, on one hand, and the frequency of Prisoner’s Dilemmas per-
ceived in the neighbourhood streets (Pearson χ2 was 35.86, with p = 0.000) and 
on the collective stairs (Pearson χ2 was 26.25, with p = 0.01) on the other hand. 
Accordingly, we can conclude that the number of reported negative exter-
nalities is statistically significantly related to the amount of reported Prison-
er’s Dilemmas in streets and shared stairways. The tendency is the same with 
respect to the other collective goods, but due to the small sample size these 
relations are not significant.
Subsequently, the difference in the total count of reported negative exter-
8 In the following analysis the difference in total count of reported negative externalities is compared with the 
proportion of PDs reported in narratives concerning collective neighbourhood goods. Six respondents reported 
an average of 36% of PDs in their reports of interactions considering collective neighbourhood goods. The major-
ity, 36 respondents, reported 11% PDs in their reports of interactions regarding collective neighbourhood goods.
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nalities is compared with the proportion of PDs reported in narratives about 
collective neighbourhood goods. According to the theory, we should expect 
that respondents who report more than the average number of negative 
externalities will also report significantly more Prisoner’s Dilemmas in their 
narratives. The analysis confirms this expectation. Those respondents who 
reported three or more negative externalities reported on average statistical-
ly significantly more PDs: t = -2.28, p = 0.03. On average, those respondents 
reporting three or more negative externalities reported 34% more PDs than 
the other respondents.
Earlier in this article, the social climate of a residential environment was 
defined as an individual’s expectation of how others will treat him or her, one 
another, and the spatial artefacts within the area that the individual expe-
riences as his or her living environment (Adriaanse, 2005, 2007). The image 
that emerges from the statistical analyses is that Buitenveldert has a favour-
able social climate. The respondents reported AGs far more often than PDs in 
their narratives, except for those who live in small dwellings in flats or apart-
ment buildings. In the following section, qualitative research results will be 
presented in further support of these findings.
 5.6.2 The social climate of Buitenveldert
During the interviews, the respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed 
with statements about trust, mistrust and distrust related to the situation in 
their own neighbourhood and their perception of their fellow residents. All 
42 respondents recognized themselves in the statement that in Buitenveldert, 
generally you can assume that co-residents behave decently towards one an-
other. Nobody recognized himself in either of the other two statements about 
distrust and mistrust. Consider the story of a widow (age 83), who is the own-
er of an apartment on the first floor and has lived in Buitenveldert for 11 
years now.
Interviewer: “So you generally expect co-residents to have good intentions?”
Lady: “Yes.”
Interviewer: “Do you mean in general or especially in this neighbourhood?”
Lady: “No I mean especially in this neighbourhood. Fifteen years ago when I lived in the 
Frans van Mieris-street [which is a street in another neighbourhood of Amsterdam (note 
by the author)] one evening I wanted to get some chips and then… it must have been 
dark… and then, suddenly I heard a voice behind me saying… ‘I think you have some 
money for the streetcar for me…’ Yes that was I think a drug addict or something… That 
will never happen to you here, really never.”
A sense of mutual trust among a critical mass of residents has creat-
ed a trustgenerating atmosphere that can also be ‘sensed’ by visitors pass-
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ing through. For example, on one of my walks around Buitenveldert, I noticed 
cords hanging out of the mail slots on some of the doors. The ‘mailbox cords’ 
– used to pull the latch and open the door without a key – express something 
about the expected behaviour of co-residents. They are a manifestation of the 
mutual trust between residents in the past and are likely to foster a trust-
generating atmosphere in the future. Also the residents themselves perceive 
collective efficacy that leads to a favourable social climate. The following im-
pression comes from an Antillean man, 30 years old, who for two years has 
been living in Buitenveldert in a social rent flat on the 6th floor.
“There seem to be some kind of unwritten rules around here. Because it is all so ehh, civ-
ilized, so neat, nobody has difficulties with anyone else (…). Buitenveldert is never in the 
news in a negative manner. And that’s not because the police are so very busy here. Actu-
ally, I never see the police around here and cameras aren’t here either, at least not that I 
know. Yes, I think it is mainly the residents themselves that together keep it liveable here.”
Apparently it is not the degree of social interaction or social cohesion among 
the residents that would explain their residential satisfaction but the shared 
norms of civility and conduct which lead to the absence of negative external-
ities (Adriaanse, 2004b, 2008a). The following quotation comes from a lady, 51 
years old:
“I think the people here are rather antisocial in the sense that they really live for them-
selves. So, it’s people who simply want to lead their own life and don’t want to get 
involved with anyone else, that’s true of many people here. But they are so that if they see 
someone having trouble then they do something about it and take action. For example 
when there is ice on the sidewalk and people run a risk of falling on it, then they clear it 
away, those are basic manners.”
In this results section, the theoretical framework was applied to a case-study 
neighbourhood of a specific neighbourhood type. It was assumed that the in-
termingling of the physical and social characteristics of a residential environ-
ment can either facilitate and stimulate surveillance by the residents or re-
strict and frustrate it. In particular the structural – i.e. physical and social – 
neighbourhood characteristics specific to post-Second World War neighbour-
hoods can complicate actions of social control and altruistic punishment. 
Thus, these characteristics can lead people with a rational egoistic response 
tendency to perceive collective good games as Prisoner’s Dilemmas.
Buitenveldert is a typical post-Second World War neighbourhood according 
to its physical layout. Nonetheless, it appears to have a social order that com-
prises a normative system rooted in generalized trust and shared norms of 
public conduct. Mutual trust and tolerance towards neighbours with another 
lifestyle or with another religious, cultural, or ethnic background appear to be 
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important preconditions for the development of a trust-generating atmosphere 
that does not discriminate against or exclude certain groups or individuals.
On a theoretical level, the objective of this study was to show that behav-
ioural game theory is appropriate for the description and explanation of the 
behaviour of residents. By extension, this study sought to apply the deduc-
tive methodology, namely analytical narrative, to blend behavioural game 
theory and narration into the study of liveability problems. We can now state 
that the application of the theoretical framework and the quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of the collective neighbourhood good narratives of the 
respondents has led to satisfying results.
 5.7  Conclusion and discussion
Conclusion
The theoretical framework developed in this article explains the proximate 
causes behind liveability problems in neighbourhoods, relying on behavioural 
game theory and especially the strong reciprocity thesis. The method was ex-
pected to enable a precise analysis of the narratives of residents concerning 
social interactions and the perception of negative externalities related to the 
public goods in their living environment. The main elements of the theoreti-
cal framework are the concepts of norms, trust, and dominant response ten-
dencies, based respectively on Elster’s distinction between moral norms, qua-
si-moral norms, and social norms.
Subsequently the theoretical framework, including the Prisoner’s Dilem-
ma, the Assurance Game and the Battle of the Sexes, was applied to the 200 
narratives collected from a small sample of residents, and with encourag-
ing results. We can conclude that the respondents of the viable post-Second 
World War neighbourhood Buitenveldert-Amsterdam reported AGs far more 
often than PDs. The mean percentage of PDs and AGs was not related to the 
respondents’ age, sex or educational level. In Bengtsson (2000) it is concluded 
that norms of cooperation may be institutionalized among residents in most 
types of housing estates, regardless of socio-economic status, social homoge-
neity or stability (Bengtsson, 2000: 183-184). This seems to be well in line with 
the conclusions of this paper.
Multivariate analysis further demonstrated that the number of report-
ed negative externalities is statistically significantly related to the amount 
of reported Prisoner’s Dilemmas in streets and shared stairways. The same 
tendency was found for the other collective goods. The theoretical assump-
tion that respondents who report more than the average number of negative 
externalities will also report significantly more Prisoner’s Dilemmas was con-
firmed by the empirical analysis. The qualitative research results further con-
firmed the finding that Buitenveldert has a favourable social climate even 
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though it bears the physical layout of a ‘vulnerable’ neighbourhood type.
What new insights can be derived from this study? First, it may be conclud-
ed that the social climate of a residential neighbourhood is of decisive impor-
tance for the residential satisfaction of residents. In a neighbourhood context, 
the varying interpersonal preferences of residents – instrumental rationalism 
versus different types of norm-oriented preferences – determine to a large 
extent the degree of cooperative behaviour and the effectiveness of social 
control mechanisms. Second, we can conclude that the key to a better under-
standing of neighbourhood events lies not in the demographic characteristics 
of the population but in the behaviour of individuals in the residential envi-
ronment. As long as certain cultural or religious practices of subgroups do not 
interfere with quasi-moral norms of trustworthy conduct in the whole com-
munity, there will presumably be no problem when people of diverse ethnic 
or religious backgrounds reside in the same area.
A third important insight was that mistrust can start in an interaction 
that can be typified as a Battle of the Sexes game and can spread when trust 
among residents is undermined. So what is important here – especially for 
policy-makers – is to make the residents choose the Pareto-optimal option in 
an Assurance Game and prevent trust relationships from coming under the 
pressure of a Battle of the Sexes game. At the same time, tolerance of peo-
ple with other social norms appears to be not unconditional. Rather, tolerance 
seems to be defined by the implicit demand to act as a trustworthy neighbour 
and not to cause any negative externalities for co-residents.
Finally, altruistic punishment appears to be an effective working strategy to 
make rule-offenders adapt to quasi-moral and social norms regarding neigh-
bourhood upkeep, civility and mutual respect. Follow-up research based on 
the theoretical framework and the method developed in this article can give 
further proof of its applicability.
Discussion
Social problems in neighbourhoods often have to do with the conflicting so-
cial norms of different groups. Such conflicts occur between elderly and 
younger residents or between residents with different ethnic, religious and 
socio-cultural backgrounds. Presumably these problems can be identified as 
Battles of the Sexes, which cause in and out-group perceptions and distrust. 
Follow-up research with an instrument prepared according to the principles 
of behavioural game theory could yield clearer reference points about how so-
cial tensions lead to discrimination and the exclusion of individuals or mi-
nority groups. Policy-makers and practitioners can intervene by introducing 
quasi-moral norms in problematic communities to generate respect and trust 
between people with different social norms. Additionally a clear communica-
tion among professionals and residents about the definitions of the collective 
neighbourhood goods is of vital importance in the effort to prevent liveability 
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problems and to encourage collective efficacy among residents.
It was assumed that the intermingling of physical and social characteristics 
in a residential environment can either facilitate and stimulate or restrict and 
frustrate resident surveillance. Follow-up research could shed some light on 
this point. Especially pertinent to the field of urban studies is the role of well-
maintained and attractive public amenities and public and semi-public spac-
es as the physical conditions for norm transfer and altruistic punishment. 
Another point of both theoretical and practical relevance is the connection 
between the applications of behavioural game theory in the field of urban 
studies – for which a first, albeit modest step has been made in this article – 
and the recent empirical results of experiments with the Broken Window the-
sis (Wilson & Kelling, 2007; Keizer, Lindenberg & Steg, 2008).
The idea that the socio-economic environment shapes the costs and ben-
efits of cooperation and altruistic punishment and is thus likely to be an 
important determinant of social norms seems to be widely accepted. But 
empirically as well as theoretically, we still know little about the underlying 
processes. More knowledge in this area is necessary to gain a better under-
standing about which environment is likely to favour which norms and thus 
to be able to predict when norms are stable and when they will change.
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 6  Mutual trust and verbal 
sanctioning as proximate 
causes of a viable resi-
dential social climate
  C.C.M. Adriaanse. Submitted.
Abstract 
The production and maintenance of collective neighbourhood goods is a de-
termining factor with respect to the environmental satisfaction that residents 
experience. This paper focuses on mechanisms that produce and maintain a 
favourable social climate within a residential environment by facilitating res-
idential cooperation without requiring strong ties or associations. The paper 
develops a game-theoretical framework for analysing the role of cheap talk, 
trust and verbal sanctioning in the production and maintenance of collective 
neighbourhood goods. The framework is empirically applied to 200 narratives 
by 42 residents about neighbourly relationships in a multi-family neighbour-
hood in Amsterdam. The central theoretical concepts are ‘social dilemmas’, 
‘altruistic punishment’, ‘verbal sanctioning’ and ‘trust’. The results indicate 
that mutual trust and verbal sanctioning are important determinants of ‘what 
types of games residents intend to play’, which in turn determine cooperative 
behaviour and the effectiveness of social control in a neighbourhood. 
Keywords
Behavioural game theory, post-Second World War neighbourhood, social di-
lemmas, unwritten rules, mutual trust, altruistic punishment, verbal sanc-
tioning 
 6.1  Introduction 
Disorder and incivility, as much as crime, communicate the failure of a com-
munity to self-regulate. This paper starts from the premise that in a problem-
free residential environment, residents share standards that underlie collec-
tive efforts to establish social order and a viable social climate (Elster, 1989; 
Adriaanse, 2008). These efforts are initiated or pursued informally through 
‘unwritten rules’ directed at collective goods, which express the self-regu-
lating capacity of a neighbourhood, understood as an action arena (Ostrom, 
2005). The defining characteristic of a public good such as a safe and clean 
amenity – be it a neighbourhood, block of flats, collective garden or shared 
stairway – is that no group member can be excluded from its consumption. 
However, each individual also has an economic incentive to free-ride; that is, 
to contribute nothing towards providing the good (Olson, 1971; Hardin, 1971). 
This means that if residents behave according to the economic incentive, they 
will not cooperate, and therefore the public good will not be provided (Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004: 186). This zero-contribution thesis underpins the presump-
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tion in policy textbooks (and many contemporary public policies) that individ-
uals cannot overcome obstacles to collective action; thus, they need external-
ly enforced rules to achieve their own long-term self-interest (Ostrom, 2000: 
137). However, the bulk of people’s daily interactions are not governed by ex-
plicit, enforceable contracts but by implicit agreements and norms (Ostrom, 
1990; Hechter & Opp, 2001; Voss, 2001; Camerer & Fehr, 2006).
The aim of this paper is to interpret the informal mechanisms of social 
control that underlie collective efforts to produce and maintain collective res-
idential goods. The question addressed here is: What are the properties of the 
ensuing social interaction that make residents living in an early post-Second 
World War neighbourhood – which is considered a vulnerable neighbourhood 
type – choose to act in support of collective residential goods?
The analytical framework applied here is derived from behavioural game 
theory (Henrich et al., 2004). Behavioural game theory uses concepts and 
models of overt human behaviour, interaction and underlying social-dilem-
ma situations and social control, all of which have convincing empirical bas-
es in hundreds of studies worldwide (Camerer, 2003; Henrich et al., 2004). This 
makes the theory useful for the analysis of interactions between co-residents 
when they are making interdependent choices and acting repeatedly as pro-
ducers and maintainers of collective and public goods in their daily living 
environment. The application of the theory to interactions between residents 
is rather new. While Bengtsson (1998, 2000) used a game-theoretical frame-
work to study tenant involvement in Swedish housing estates, his empirical 
analysis was carried out at the estate level, unlike the present study, where 
the empirical analysis is carried out at the individual level. The case-study 
area for this article, Buitenveldert-Amsterdam, is a viable neighbourhood 
with a favourable social climate, despite the fact that it has the physical-spa-
tial characteristics of a typical post-Second World War neighbourhood. This 
makes Buitenveldert a ‘critical case’, having strategic importance in relation 
to the general problem at the core of this article (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
The next section expands on the theoretical framework, and the following 
one briefly sketches the case-study district. The methods and sample char-
acteristics are described in the fourth section. The fifth section presents the 
empirical results. The article ends with some concluding remarks and a few 
comments for further discussion.
 6.2 Theoretical framework 
 6.2.1 Spatial characteristics and liveability problems 
Shortly after the Second World War, mid-rise neighbourhoods were built 
across Europe according to the principles of the CIAM (Congrès Internationaux 
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d’Architecture Moderne) movement of modern architects. The areas are char-
acterised by half-open building blocks, open spaces between the blocks, sep-
arated transport routes, and a mix of high-rise and mid-rise blocks of flats 
and single-family dwellings. Some of the dwellings were designated for the 
owner-occupied sector but most were in the social rental sector (Murie et al., 
2003). These post-war housing areas are served by a distributed road network 
running between neighbourhoods. The local streets within the areas have a 
non-distributed structure that discourages through traffic. The streets are not 
only too wide for people to see into neighbouring houses but often do not run 
parallel. Accordingly, the public spaces have low inter-visibility and a low de-
gree of social control, since few windows and doors face the streets (Van Nes 
& Rueb, 2009). Most of these neighbourhoods have become problematic; this 
type of neighbourhood is now associated with sub-standard living conditions, 
deprivation, marginal locations, poverty, a negative image, social isolation, 
pollution and crime (see e.g. Heeger, 1993; Wassenberg, 1993; Power, 1997; Mu-
rie et al., 2003; Skifter Andersen, 2003; Turkington et al., 2004; Musterd & Van 
Kempen, 2005).
 6.2.2 Perceived discrepancy between short-term self-inte-
rest and collective goals 
People who occupy mid-rise and high-rise buildings live close together in 
large numbers within a relatively small area and with several shared spac-
es. Thus, they regularly have coincidental encounters with more or less un-
familiar co-residents, many of whom have different preferences and back-
grounds. They are forced to interact simply because they cannot avoid one 
another. In this setting, satisfaction with the residential environment is partly 
determined by the production and maintenance of collective neighbourhood 
goods. 
Uncertainty about the actions of (unknown) others can easily evoke a sense 
of insecurity in this type of residential area. Unable to predict the future con-
duct of individuals who differ from us, we react to such uncertainty with sus-
picion. Sztompka (1999: 26) uses the term ‘mistrust’ to convey the lack of 
clear expectations as well as ‘hesitation about committing oneself’. For neigh-
bourhoods, neither experienced mistrust nor experienced distrust is a favour-
able situation. Both pose a serious threat to the quality of life there because 
they may degenerate into social dilemmas and liveability problems. In this 
paper, social dilemmas are deemed to arise when there is a discrepancy 
between short-term self-interest and collective goals. Social dilemmas occur 
whenever individuals in interdependent situations face choices in which the 
maximum of short-term self-interest yields outcomes leaving all participants 
worse off than feasible alternatives (Ostrom, 1998: 1). By presenting social 
dilemmas in the form of games, the researcher can make rational reconstruc-
[ 144 ]
tions of events in a social system. In this article, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) 
and the Assurance Game (AG) are applied to interactions in residential neigh-
bourhoods. But here, PD and AG are defined in terms of intentions rather than 
outcomes, as usually done in game theory. The reason to deviate is that this 
researcher has not conducted an experiment but has asked residents for their 
opinions.
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
In the case of a significant perceived discrepancy between short-term self-in-
terest and a collective goal, the interaction could be qualified as a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (see Table 5.1, Chapter 5). A standard Prisoner’s Dilemma situation 
may be attributed to the cleaning of a shared stairway. Let us define a mem-
ber A of a group of co-residents G of an apartment block with the collective 
good of a clean shared stairway. Co-resident A intends to act selfishly (plays 
a Prisoner’s Dilemma) with respect to the clean stairway, which is produced 
by a joint action X, if and only if: (1) co-resident A intends to act selfishly, not 
to contribute or do his part of X; (2) co-resident A has the cognition that suc-
cessful action for the production of X requires at least K co-residents to join 
in; (3) co-resident A believes that he ought to participate in the production of 
X and that each adequately informed member of G ought to contribute; (4) co-
resident A believes that he will gain more in the short term by selfish behav-
iour than from contributing if K co-residents contribute; (5) co-resident A be-
lieves that the outcome resulting from all residents acting normatively in the 
long term is better than the outcome when all act selfishly; (6) co-resident A 
believes that his selfish behaviour involves a cost (possibly nil) to the contrib-
uting co-residents of G; (7) co-resident A is not willing to sanction the co-res-
idents of G-K who do not act normatively; and (8) co-resident A is not willing 
to inform the co-residents of G-K who do not know the norm.
 6.2.3 Trust and the role of communication and cheap talk
Trust and the Assurance Game
As a first approximation, trust may be defined as the expectation that anoth-
er player will not defect in a sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma. Sztompka (1999) 
defines trust as ‘a bet about the future contingent actions of others’. It pre-
supposes a situation of risk, but can also be a matter of routine and normal 
behaviour (Luhmann, 2000). In terms of behavioural game theory, trust is de-
fined as positive strong reciprocity (Gintis et al., 2005). It encourages coopera-
tive behaviour by creating a social obligation: ‘trust in someone engenders re-
ciprocal trust’ (Sztompka, 1999). Uslaner found that generalised trust matters 
because it helps connect us to people who are different from ourselves. Gen-
eralised trustees were found to be tolerant of immigrants and minorities and 
support equal rights for women and gays (Uslaner, 2002). 
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A typical example of a well-defined game where there is no perceived dis-
crepancy between short-term self-interest and a collective goal, and all resi-
dents are willing to provide an essential contribution, is called an Assurance 
Game (see Table 5.2, Chapter 5).
In line with the six criteria which define a PD, I will now define the criteria 
of an AG as follows: Co-resident A intends to act normatively (plays an Assur-
ance Game) with respect to the collective good, which is produced by a joint 
action X, if and only if: (1) co-resident A intends to act normatively, to con-
tribute or do his part of X; (2) co-resident A has the cognition that successful 
joint action for the production of X requires at least K co-residents; (3) co-res-
ident A believes that he ought to participate in the production of X and that 
each adequately informed member of G ought to contribute; (4) co-resident A 
believes that he will gain more by normative behaviour than from acting self-
ishly if K co-residents contribute; (5) co-resident A believes that the outcome 
resulting from all residents acting normatively in the long term is better than 
the outcome when all act selfishly; (6) co-resident A believes that his norma-
tive behaviour is essential to the contributions of the co-residents of G; (7) co-
resident A is willing to sanction the co-residents of G-K who do not act norm-
atively; and (8) co-resident A is willing to inform the co-residents of G-K who 
do not know the norm.
In an Assurance Game situation, community residents share norms that 
underlie any collective effort on their part to establish viability, social order 
and safety. If some residents conclude that those around them will help clean 
the street, they respond by contributing in kind, prompting still others to con-
tribute and so forth and so on until a highly cooperative state of affairs takes 
root (Marwell et al., 1988). 
An Assurance Game can change into a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation when 
the expectations of residents about each other’s future contribution decline. 
Therefore it is important that the co-residents of G communicate their inten-
tions to establish who intends to act selfishly or normatively. In a sequential 
context such as a residential environment, a stable intention and will to con-
tribute reveal a resident’s character or disposition. In behavioural game theo-
ry this revealed aspect is called ‘type’ (Spence, 1974).
The role of communication and cheap talk
Game theorists and economists have found many instances of ‘signalling’, 
as discussed by Spence (1974). Applied to a sequential context such as a res-
idential environment, informed residents will take possibly costly actions to-
wards co-residents G that will reveal resident A’s ‘type’ (Farrell & Rabin, 1996); 
in other words, reveal if someone intends to act selfishly or normatively. The 
game-theoretical concept of ‘cheap talk’ is strongly connected to criterion 8 
from the definitions of the PD and AG, namely ‘co-resident A is willing to in-
form the co-residents of G-K who do not know the norm’. The willingness to 
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inform co-residents of G-K who do not know the norm is costless. In game 
theory this kind of costless communication is called ‘cheap talk’. Experimen-
tal studies of social dilemmas have shown that costless communication leads 
to more efficient outcomes (Ostrom et al., 1992) by overcoming problems of 
strategic uncertainty and coordination failure.
 6.2.4 Essential contribution, altruistic punishment and 
verbal sanctioning 
Recent empirical findings from behavioural experiments show that altruis-
tic punishment effectively enforces cooperation among unrelated and anon-
ymous humans (Yamagishi, 1986; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2003; Falk, Fehr & Fischbacher, 2005). Altruistic punishment is costly, in con-
trast to cheap talk. However, what exactly is altruistic punishment? Altruis-
tic punishment or negative strong reciprocity means that individuals punish 
others, despite the punishment being costly to them and yielding no material 
gain. Fehr & Gächter (2002) show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic pun-
ishment is possible and that it breaks down if altruistic punishment is ruled 
out. A strongly reciprocating individual punishes a person who does not ad-
here to the norm, even if so doing costs this individual more than he or she 
may gain from it, acting thereby not from an egoistically defined instrumen-
tal form of rationality but from a perceived sense of values. Norms of coop-
eration and fairness may evolve only when enough people are committed to 
punishing norm violations (Henrich et al., 2004; Fowler, 2005).
The co-residents of G always have the option to break a rule and act selfish-
ly. If the risk of being monitored and sanctioned by residents K is low, the pre-
dictability and stability of joint action X are reduced and instability can grow 
over time. However, if the risk of exposure and sanctioning is high, residents 
G-K can expect that others will punish. Hence, a critical mass of punishers is 
needed to guarantee the effective sanctioning of free-riding by G-K in the res-
idential social climate action arena.
Altruistic punishment itself represents a second-order public good (Boyd et 
al., 2003; Yamagishi, 1986); that is, the benefits of punishment can be enjoyed 
by all members of group G regardless of their individual contributions. 
Because the act of punishing norm violators is costly (i.e. one must expend 
time and energy to punish, and one risks retaliation), it is in an individual’s 
best interest not to punish, thereby avoiding the costs. Nevertheless, people 
often do punish norm violators, despite the costs and even when the actions 
of norm violators do not directly affect them (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr & 
Gächter, 2002; Henrich et al., 2004).
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Verbal sanctioning
In the game-theoretical literature, the assumption of altruistic punishment 
is usually limited to individuals using monetary or material punishment. In 
neighbourhoods, altruistic punishment also takes place between residents, 
but in a specific form. Slapping a neighbour in the face when he puts his gar-
bage in the hallway is not usual practice (and most likely not the most effec-
tive strategy to achieve one’s goal). An often practiced form of altruistic pun-
ishment for resolving assurance games in neighbourhoods is an immateri-
al form of sanctioning, namely verbal sanctioning. This means that residents 
use verbal communication to criticise each other for not conforming to their 
norms. Like altruistic punishment, verbal sanctioning can also be costly, in-
cluding exiting from mutually beneficial relationships, gossip, quarrels, ostra-
cism and threats of violence. However, acts of verbal sanctioning can deter fu-
ture deviations, thus providing a public good of informal social control.
 6.2.5 Hypotheses 
We reason that (A) Buitenveldert is a typical example of the post-Second 
World War neighbourhood type (see Section 6.2.1). (B) As such it should man-
ifest liveability problems. (C) Buitenveldert has no manifest liveability prob-
lems (Adriaanse, 2004) because the interactions between its residents have a 
specific structure. (D) The defining characteristics of this interactive structure 
are: (1) there is little or no perceived discrepancy between residents’ short-
term self-interests and collective goals; (2) residents have the conviction that 
most of their co-residents make an essential contribution to the collective 
goals; (3) residents are willing to use verbal sanctioning to enforce coopera-
tion among each other. From this, we derive the following hypotheses:
1. Buitenveldert residents trust their co-residents.
2. Residents of Buitenveldert will report verbal sanctioning.
3. Residents play Prisoner’s Dilemmas statistically significantly less often 
than Assurance Games. 
 6.3 Characteristics of the case-study area 
In Buitenveldert-Amsterdam the housing stock consists of 33% owner-occu-
pied dwellings and 33% private rental dwellings. Another 33% consists of so-
cial rental dwellings. The large proportion of homes earmarked for owner-oc-
cupancy made Buitenveldert particularly attractive to the more prosperous 
segments of the Amsterdam population during the 1960s, when it was quite 
difficult to find suitable properties in other parts of the city. For a long period, 
relatively little new construction was undertaken in the immediate vicinity of 
Buitenveldert. As a consequence, 25% of the population has lived in the same 
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dwelling since the district’s inception (Adriaanse, 2004). In 2004 over one-third 
(34%) of its population was aged 65 or above. The vast majority of residents 
(67%) are of ‘native’ Dutch origin. Only 8% can be classified as belonging to 
‘non-Western ethnic minorities’. Both the educational level and the income of 
Buitenveldert residents are markedly higher than in an average post-Second 
World War neighbourhood.
Because Buitenveldert has the typical spatial-physical characteristics of an 
early post-Second World War neighbourhood, we would expect similar prob-
lems here, but we did not find them. According to an objective safety index, 
Buitenveldert is the safest district in Amsterdam (Gemeente Amsterdam, 
2010). Even now – more than forty years since it was established – Buiten-
veldert still ranks among the most attractive of Amsterdam’s residential are-
as, with a good position on the regional housing market (Adriaanse, 2004). 
 6.4 Methods 
 6.4.1 Procedure 
Respondents were selected at random by contacting every n’th house, de-
pending on the size of the building block or street. The sample reflects the 
range of residential settings in the neighbourhood’s building types: single-
family homes, dwellings in multiple-occupancy complexes, and social rent-
al, private rental and owner-occupied dwellings. Furthermore, this range is 
indicative of the diversity of the neighbourhood population in terms of age, 
gender, education and ethnicity.
It was not possible to ask respondents bluntly, ‘What game do you think 
you and the other residents are playing?’ Thus, to find out how residents form 
mental models or perceptions of elements of Assurance Games and the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma – who the players are, what the strategies are, what the pay-
offs are and so forth – we asked a question that elicited the unwritten rules. 
This procedure is based on the cognitive theoretical approach to game theo-
ry described in Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3. In a semi-structured design the inter-
viewer inquired about unwritten rules with respect to six collective goods 
commonly mentioned by residents: (1) shared stairways and gallery, (2) 
shared entrance to the building, (3) collective garden, (4) neighbourhood park, 
(5) neighbourhood streets and (6) shared storage rooms.
The interview material was interpreted using the software package Atlas-
ti. The analysis of the respondents’ narratives established the actual play-
ers, their goals and their preferences while describing the logic of the inter-
action (Levi, 2004: 9). The criteria for judging a neighbourhood collective nar-
rative as a perceived Assurance Game are as follows: (1) A respondent does 
not perceive any discrepancy between his/her personal goals and the collec-
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tive goals; (2) A respondent expects that he/she has to make an essential con-
tribution to the collective goal that is not in conflict with his/her own person-
al goals.
A typical example of an Assurance Game making clear the equivalence of 
the concepts ‘common goals’ and ‘unwritten rules’ comes from a 51-year-
old woman. The common goals mentioned are ‘a safe and clean street’ and 
‘norms of civility and conduct’. The essential contribution is expressed as ‘a 
basic manner’:
“I think the people here are rather antisocial in the sense that they really live for them-
selves. So, it’s people who simply want to lead their own life and don’t want to get 
involved with anyone else; that’s true of many people here. But if they see someone hav-
ing trouble then they will do something about it and take action. For example when there 
is ice on the footpath and people run the risk of falling over, then they clear it away, those 
are basic manners.”
During the interviews the respondents were also asked if – generally speaking 
– they trust, distrust or mistrust their co-residents. Sztompka’s concepts of 
trust, mistrust and distrust were operationalised in the following three prop-
ositions: 
▪ ‘I assume that in general residents of Buitenveldert treat each other pleas-
antly.’ 
▪ ‘In general you don’t know whether residents of Buitenveldert have good or 
bad intentions.’ 
▪ ‘Concerning the attitude of co-residents you must assume generally that 
people have no good intentions.’ 
The criteria to judge a neighbourhood collective narrative as a perceived Pris-
oner’s Dilemma are as follows: (1) A respondent perceives a contrast between 
his/her personal, hedonistic and material goals on the one hand and the col-
lective neighbourhood goals on the other; (2) A respondent expects that he/
she must invest high costs (time, money and effort) to achieve the collective 
goals and that these efforts do not contribute to his/her own personal goals; 
(3) A respondent who intends to contribute to (the maintenance of) a collec-
tive goal does perceive a great cost in relation to his/her personal interests 
and perceives only a small contribution of his efforts to the collective good. 
A typical example of a Prisoner’s Dilemma concerned the collective good 
of a clean and neat gallery and proper use of the lift. Here the respondent 
reports negative externalities and that the norm offender violates the unwrit-
ten rule of ‘not taking a bike or a shopping trolley into the lift and leaving it in 
the gallery’:
“You see them enter the lift with bikes and shopping trolleys from Albert Heijn [Auth: 
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name of shop], and yes you cause damage by doing so!... Yes that is how it happens. 
They come all the way from the shopping centre with such a trolley. [With angry voice:] 
And then they leave it in the gallery and only when they have to go to the shopping centre 
again, they take it back there.”
With respect to the foregoing, verbal sanctioning was defined as dealing with 
the violation of unwritten rules despite the costs and even when the actions 
of rule violators do not directly affect them. A typical example of verbal sanc-
tioning is the following quotation about the collective good of a shared stor-
age room:
“Usually, when you are annoyed at something then you usually say that and when some-
one else gets annoyed at you then he will say so too. But, yes this rarely happens, and 
yes, it is even so that my neighbours use a part of my storage room because theirs is very 
small and I have a big one. And... but yes, the other day they had made a mess of it and 
yes then I have, my son then got immensely angry and told them ‘listen this is out of the 
question, now everything has to be taken out…’, and within half an hour everything was 
removed and cleaned up and yes that is just okay, it just had to be said and then there is 
no problem for the rest.”
 6.4.2  Sample
The respondent sample was composed of 42 residents of Buitenveldert. It 
comprised 16 males and 26 females (n = 42) with the mean age of 61.6 (SD 
= 17.9) and ranging from 22 to 88 years of age. In terms of ethnic identity, 
the majority of the sample was native Dutch (78.6%). Other residents had an 
Asian (4.8%), Jewish (11.9%), Antillean (2.4%), Surinamese or Eastern Europe-
an (2.4%) cultural identity. In terms of highest educational level, the sample 
characteristics were as follows: primary school, 2.4%; junior domestic science, 
21.4%; junior general secondary education/higher education, 11.9%; upper 
secondary vocational, 4.8%; pre-university, 9.5%; higher professional, 35.7%; 
and university, 11.9% (n = 42). The mean length of stay in the neighbourhood 
was 16.8 years (SD = 12.6), with a range of 1 to 46 years (n = 42). Every re-
spondent was asked about the six neighbourhood collective goods, which re-
sulted in 200 narratives. The mean number of reported collective goods for 
each respondent was 4 (SD = 1.48), with a range of 2 to 6. 
 6.5  Results
Even though most of the residents are of Dutch origin – including a large Jew-
ish community – the present-day population of Buitenveldert consists of dis-
tinct groups living parallel lives. Moreover, Japanese, Korean, English and 
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American expatriates tend to live in the Netherlands only temporarily (rare-
ly longer than ten years). Like the members of the Jewish community, the ex-
pats operate primarily within their own group. Few expats speak Dutch. Like 
the Jewish residents, they have their own shops, schools, restaurants, cafes 
and facilities; for instance, there is a Japanese drycleaner and an Asian vid-
eo rental. There are also synagogues, Jewish schools, Jewish-oriented stores 
and a Jewish home for the elderly in the area (Adriaanse, 2004). Unwritten 
rules in Buitenveldert are directed to the domain of semi-public action are-
nas. Respondents mentioned shared entrances, galleries and stairways, the 
collective garden, and the neighbourhood streets and parks. The main pur-
pose of the unwritten rules appears to be maintenance of the shared norms 
of privacy, minimal social group interaction, the maintenance of middle-class 
norms of decency and good neighbouring and, more specifically, proper gar-
bage handling and the prevention of noise pollution. 
 6.5.1  Prevalence of social dilemmas in Buitenveldert
At the end of the theoretical section it was hypothesised that (1) the Assur-
ance Game will be the basic element of the social system of Buitenveldert 
(covered by Hypotheses 1 and 2), and (2) residents of Buitenveldert play Pris-
oner’s Dilemmas statistically significantly less often than Assurance Games 
(Hypothesis 3). An Assurance Game was characterised as a situation whereby 
it is best for everyone when all cooperate, but each individual has to deal with 
the risk that others will choose not to cooperate. A Prisoner’s Dilemma was 
described as a situation whereby it is better for all when every individual co-
operates, but it is best for each individual not to cooperate. 
In order to estimate the prevalence of Assurance Games and Prisoner’s 
Dilemmas in the 200 collective-good narratives, the mean of each of the report-
ed games was calculated across all items of the collective-good list. The pro-
portion of Assurance Games in the 200 narratives was 87% (N = 169), while the 
share of Prisoner’s Dilemmas was 13% (N = 26). Five narratives (2.4%) could not 
be classified as either a Prisoner’s Dilemma or an Assurance Game. The mean 
percentage of Assurance Games for each respondent was 83.4% (SD = 27.8), 
with a range of 0 to 100. The mean percentage of Prisoner’s Dilemmas for each 
respondent was 14.64% (SD = 25.8), with a range of 0 to 100. We can conclude 
that the respondents reported Assurance Games far more often than Prisoner’s 
Dilemmas in their narratives. So, do residents of Buitenveldert trust their co-
residents? In Buitenveldert, despite the fact that people may not know most of 
their neighbours well or even by name, there appears to be common knowledge 
about who lives in the neighbourhood and who does not. All of the respondents 
recognised the co-residents of their own street or apartment building by face; 
all agreed with the first proposition on trust; and all disagreed with the two 
propositions on distrust and mistrust (see Section 6.4.1 Procedure).
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 6.5.2  Prevalence of verbal sanctioning in Buitenveldert 
The respondents reported verbal sanctioning 51 times; thus, it occurred in 
25.5% of the (200) narratives. Of the 42 respondents, 83.3% appeared to be al-
truistic punishers themselves; 9.5% were indifferent or not altruistic punish-
ers; and data were missing for the remaining 7.1%. There was no statistically 
significant relationship between verbal sanctions and gender (chi-square 0.39, 
ns), age (t = -1.02, ns), length of residence (t = -0.7, ns) or dwelling and proper-
ty type. Nor was there a significant relationship with educational level, as cal-
culated by a Mann-Whitney test (z = -1.6, ns). 
 6.5.3 Verbal sanctioning in action
The following narrative comes from an Antillean man (aged 26) who had been 
living in a social rental flat in Buitenveldert for one year. He explains how ver-
bal sanctioning happens in everyday interactions between co-residents: 
“... No, here there are no explicit rules that are mutually arranged, but when you don’t 
obey them, you’ll hear about it... One day, ehm, I had left my bike in front of the door and 
then I was told, yes, that it is not the intention that you leave your bike in the gallery.”
The following example comes from a woman (aged 56) who lives in a social 
rental dwelling in an apartment building. She who acted as an altruistic pun-
isher towards a co-resident who left his motorcycle in the shared passage, 
even though she was aware that doing so might jeopardize the relationship: 
Author: “But are there other people besides you that keep an eye out?” 
Respondent: “Oh yes a lot.” 
Author: “So you are not the only one?” 
Respondent: “No, oh no, there are others too that said, ‘Who is the owner of that thing?’” 
Author: “And how did you notice that?” 
Respondent: “Yes, when they were walking along or when you run into someone in the 
shared storage room and then they say ‘Whose motorcycle is it actually? Can the thing be 
removed?’ Yes that is how things happen here. Yes and because of that we did put a note 
on it with the message, ‘Who is the owner and can the motorcycle be removed, because 
of the risk of fire.’ And after a while it was actually removed.”
Author: “And was it never there again?’”
Respondent: “No, but yes there is another one standing in the way, but it has no fuel in it. 
So we let it stay. It is standing a little bit more in the alcove; the other one was completely 
in the passage. And you must not always be difficult because otherwise they think, ‘There 
is that old bore again.”’ 
Through the pressure exerted by co-residents conforming to an unwritten 
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rule, norm violators cease their deviant behaviour and thereby avoid future 
verbal sanctioning. They adapt to the dominant norm in order to maintain 
their reputation as a decent neighbour and to demonstrate their trustworthi-
ness to their co-residents. The following example comes from a resident who 
had received verbal sanctioning from a co-resident. A native Dutch student, 
aged 22, who had been living in the area with a fellow student for one year in 
a social rental flat, explains: 
“You feel you have to adapt yourself. You can’t do strange things here. They won’t be 
glad if you act strangely, and it will immediately attract attention. Some students are over 
the top and have a party every evening. And because a lot of elderly and working people 
live here, you have to stay a little calmer... Once they came to our place... and, yes, they 
understand it, they said they were also young once... But, yes, now we start around seven 
and we stop the music at midnight... So, yes, we really try to keep it in mind.”
 6.5.4  Interpretation of the results 
In this results section, the theoretical framework was applied to a case-study 
neighbourhood of a specific type. It was assumed that the characteristics spe-
cific to post-Second World War neighbourhoods can complicate acts of so-
cial control and verbal sanctioning. According to its physical layout, Buiten-
veldert is a typical post-Second World War neighbourhood. It is also com-
posed of more than two racial and ethnic groups, between which social inter-
action is relatively rare. As is often the case in neighbourhoods consisting of 
groups that belong to different communities, negotiating the details of dai-
ly life can be problematic. However, in Buitenveldert, the various racial, eth-
nic and religious groups manage to live ‘separately’ but alongside one anoth-
er without encroaching upon or conflicting with the other groups. The neigh-
bourhood appears to have a social order that comprises a normative system 
rooted in generalised trust and shared norms of public conduct. The mutual 
trust built up through communication, including verbal sanctioning, appears 
to be an essential aspect of resolving collective action problems.
An important condition that was necessary for the development of a ‘com-
munity of trust’ in Buitenveldert seems to be the stability of the neighbour-
hood’s population. No rapid transition has occurred that could undermine the 
social order and patterns of cooperation. The fact that 25% of the population 
has lived in the same dwelling since the district’s inception, in combination 
with a selective transience process (the replacement of one individual with 
another of similar identity), has meant that the existing normative order has 
not been challenged.
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 6.6  Conclusion and discussion
The article demonstrates how behavioural game theory, and especially the-
oretical notions about social dilemmas, offer useful tools for the analysis of 
residential interaction situations related to the production and maintenance 
of collective and public neighbourhood goods. Despite the fact that behav-
ioural game theory is not able to predict exactly how future interactions will 
take place, the post hoc analysis of interdependent choices and the patterns – 
presented as games – make us aware of the subtleties of human interactions 
in a social system (Elster, 2007).
The findings of this paper are significant in establishing that voluntary 
cooperation and verbal sanctioning presuppose the existence of an interme-
diate system of unwritten rules or norms of good conduct. This intermedi-
ate system can exist independently of national legal systems. The policies of 
national governments, local authorities, housing associations, the police and 
the public prosecution service (see for example the Dutch ‘Social and Phys-
ical Disorder Action Plan’, SCP 2009) are designed to tackle liveability prob-
lems such as antisocial behaviour by young people and social and physical 
disorder in the residential setting. The conventional approach defines livea-
bility problems from the perspective of a variety of legal systems. This has 
resulted in more police control and camera surveillance, and greater intoler-
ance of residents who have different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. How-
ever, when such explicit material incentives (fines, eviction) are applied to 
the task, there is a risk that voluntary cooperation and altruistic punishment 
will cease to occur because the preconditions for the operation of strong reci-
procity are removed (see Gintis et al., 2005: 20). Policymakers – who may want 
to apply behavioural game theory as an analytical tool with a rich and sharp 
language – should use the concept of ‘unwritten rules’ as an intermediate 
structure between law on the one hand and face-to-face interactions on the 
other. Scholars who focus on material incentives must recognise that subtle 
verbal communication efforts are sometimes very effective for turning what 
could be a Prisoner’s Dilemma into an Assurance Game over time. 
The Buitenveldert case also shows that social mixing in high-density resi-
dential areas can work when members of the different groups share certain 
core social norms and exhibit tolerance towards each other’s beliefs and life-
styles. At the same time, tolerance is not unconditional but delineated by 
an implicit demand to act as a trustworthy neighbour and not to cause any 
inconvenience to co-residents. The Buitenveldert population use subtle com-
munication skills for effectively tackling norm offenders. Whether these con-
ditions apply in less prosperous multi-ethnic neighbourhoods with a larger 
proportion of less well-educated residents remains an open question.
The study of altruistic cooperation is clearly a cross-disciplinary endeav-
our, integrating behavioural ecology, evolutionary biology, experimental eco-
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nomics, sociology and psychology. This article combines insights from behav-
ioural game theory and sociology to study cooperation and verbal sanction-
ing in a residential environment. Ultimately, a deeper understanding of the 
nature of cooperation and altruistic punishment will require further interac-
tion between these and other fields. 
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 7  Conclusion and discus-
sion
This final chapter draws together the strands of the preceding chapters to an-
swer the research questions posed in the Introduction. On that basis, I then 
critically reflect on the research results and offer suggestions for policy and 
further research. The goal of the study underpinning this dissertation was to 
find out which factors contribute to a problem-free or problematic function-
ing of neighbourhoods in general and of early post-Second World War Dutch 
neighbourhoods in particular. Accordingly, a significant part of the book was 
dedicated to the measurement of neighbourhood success, which entailed 
constructing scale instruments based on survey data as well as objective pa-
rameters. 
 7.1  Answering research question one
The first research question was split into a methodological and an empirical 
part: 
1a  How can neighbourhood success be measured with scale instruments? 
1b  Which factors contribute to a problem-free or problematic functioning of neigh-
bourhoods in general and especially of early post-Second World War neighbour-
hoods in the Netherlands?
Let me start with some general remarks on the advantage of using scales as 
outcome measures – of, for example, residential environmental satisfaction or 
nuisance, as described in this book – over and above using a single-item meas-
ure. A scale is a useful technique in a sociometric sense because it distin-
guishes clearly between measurement error and true scores. Using a multiple 
item scale is better: more information comes from combining different varia-
bles that are interrelated and describe the same underlying ordinal construct. 
The first research question was elaborated in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. The point 
of departure for the thesis was the perspective of the residents, specifical-
ly their definition and perception of the success of their neighbourhood. The 
relationship between the person and the environment, with an emphasis on 
the way people perceive and experience their own neighbourhood, was an 
important (basic) principle. The data used in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 were main-
ly drawn from the Housing Demand Survey (WoningBehoefteOnderzoek 2002), 
a random sample of 75,034 respondents that is representative for the popu-
lation of Dutch residents in 2002. The Housing Demand Survey is one of the 
most extensive sample surveys in the Netherlands and is held every four 
years. For specific analyses of neighbourhood characteristics, data from the 
Woningmarktmonitor (ABF, 2003) and the Wegener data file were also used. 
The aim of Chapter 2 was to introduce an integrative and more compre-
hensive approach to the measurement of residential environmental satis-
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faction. Domains of residential environmental satisfaction were empirically 
examined using techniques for multivariate analysis. The results of explor-
atory factor analysis gave empirical support for the usefulness of the theo-
retically proposed three-component model of residential environmental sat-
isfaction. Three separate domains of success are distinguished. First, the res-
ident’s dwelling is perceived as appropriate. Second, the social climate in the 
neighbourhood is perceived as positive. Third, the internal reputation of the 
neighbourhood is evaluated in a positive way. Pattern detection in satisfaction 
severity groups indicated that satisfaction with the subdomain ‘residential 
social climate’ is the most significant component of overall residential satis-
faction. This pattern prevails for Dutch neighbourhoods in general. I focussed 
on the early post-Second World War neighbourhood type that I characterized 
by the following three conditions: (1) at least half of the housing stock in 2003 
was built between 1945 and 1980; (2) the share of the dwellings in the total 
housing stock of the postcode area is at least two standard deviations above 
the mean percentage of mid-rise flats in all Dutch neighbourhoods; (3) The 
housing stock in the postcode area is not predominantly (i.e. not over 50%) of 
another type. It now appeared that the association between residents of an 
early post-Second World War neighbourhood and residents evaluating their 
living situation as unsatisfactory has a monotone upwardly climbing tenden-
cy. Thus we can state that the early post-Second World War neighbourhood 
type must be called vulnerable because, in general, the people living there 
report significantly less residential environmental satisfaction compared to 
the residents of all other neighbourhood types.
The main objective of Chapter 3 was to introduce a comprehensive 
approach for measuring the frequency of perceived nuisance in the resi-
dential environment. To that end, it presented preliminary subgroup analy-
ses investigating whether subsets of residents rate nuisance differently. A 
residential nuisance scale is empirically tested using multivariate analysis. 
The results of an exploratory factor analysis offer empirical support for the 
claim that the proposed model of reported frequency of residential nuisance 
is useful. Reliability and validity tests confirm the adequacy of the Residen-
tial Nuisance Scale – Dutch Language Version (RNS-DLV), since it correlates 
as expected with various criterion measures. Pattern detection in logistic 
regression analysis, with the RNS-DLV as the dependent variable and the indi-
vidual scale items as the independent variable, sheds light on the extent to 
which nuisance is perceived by Dutch residents and specifically on where the 
reported nuisance comes from. It was demonstrated that litter on the street 
and noise pollution are the most significant factors contributing to the overall 
nuisance and that Dutch residents who occupy different dwelling types expe-
rience distinct kinds of nuisance. Focussing on the neighbourhood type that 
is central in this thesis, the results supported the hypothesis that people liv-
ing in a early post-war mid-rise neighbourhood experience nuisance signif-
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icantly more often than people who do not live in a neighbourhood of that 
type. 
In Chapter 4 the results of the foregoing chapters were used to investigate 
the relationship between physical-spatial, demographic and economic risk 
factors, nuisance and environmental (dis)satisfaction. According to the liter-
ature on the vulnerability of neighbourhoods, nuisance and residential envi-
ronmental dissatisfaction are related elements of one structure. I distin-
guished elements of the objective environment – such as percentage of sin-
gle-family dwellings, proportion of immigrants, share of the housing stock 
that is not owner-occupied but private or social rental – and investigat-
ed the strength of their relationship to the residents’ levels of environmen-
tal (dis)satisfaction. Two conceptual models were tested in multivariate anal-
yses (zero- and partial-order correlations). Model 1 implied that these objec-
tive risk factors have a direct bearing on residential dissatisfaction. Model 2 
assumed that the empirical relation between risk factors and residential envi-
ronmental (dis)satisfaction also depends on a third variable, namely nuisance 
and disorder caused by residential behaviour. 
Model 2 appeared to be plausible. It pointed to an empirical connection 
between risk factors and dissatisfaction. This model implied that residents 
living in a high-risk area are likely to report more stress caused by other res-
idents than those residents not living in a high-risk area. It also implied that 
stress caused by other residents is associated with dissatisfaction. 
Now, which risk factors were associated with the experience of extreme 
nuisance? Neighbourhoods with only dissatisfied residents are character-
ized by high population density and relatively small dwellings, built main-
ly in the period 1906-1960. The population of these neighbourhoods consists 
predominantly of immigrant groups. Compared to the neighbourhoods with 
moderately to strongly satisfied residents, the high-risk areas have more sin-
gles, people in the age group of 20-34 and inactive household heads. We can 
explain the extreme dissatisfaction and nuisance as follows: in anonymous 
and densely populated high- and mid-rise neighbourhoods where many res-
idents are underprivileged, we can expect that due to cultural and linguis-
tic barriers, especially between native and non-native groups, residents do 
not develop shared residential norms. Accordingly, an intermediary rule sys-
tem is absent, and a critical mass of residents who are willing to altruistically 
punish norm defenders is lacking. 
 7.1.1  Buitenveldert’s scores on the RESS, the RNS and 
the Risk Scale
What do we find when we look at the data of the case-study area in the da-
tabase used for the construction of the outcome measures, respectively the 
RESS, the RNS and the Risk Scale? Buitenveldert appears to have a mean val-
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ue of 3.64 on the transformed Risk Scale. The mean score of all Dutch neigh-
bourhoods is 6.8. Buitenveldert differs statistically significantly from the 
mean of all other Dutch neighbourhoods (T = -58.95, df = 80,2, P = 0.000) and 
thus must indeed be called a high-risk neighbourhood. 
Subsequently I compared Buitenveldert with all other neighbourhoods 
in the deciles 3 and 4 of the Risk Scale. I hypothesized that the residents of 
Buitenveldert, first, will be less annoyed by nuisance, and second, will be 
more satisfied. This proved to be the case: the mean score of Buitenveldert on 
the Nuisance Scale was 12.9. The mean of the other high-risk neighbourhoods 
was 13.7 (T = -22.8, df = 117.07, P = 0.000). The mean score of Buitenveldert on 
the Satisfaction Scale was 37.2. The other neighbourhoods’ mean score was 
38.7 (T = *.72, df = 84.3, P = 0.000). 
 7.2  Answering research question 2
The finding of Chapter 2 – that satisfaction with the residential social climate 
is significant for the overall residential satisfaction – and the outcomes of the 
preliminary research in the case-study area led to the second aim of the the-
sis: to investigate the proximate causes of a viable residential social climate. 
The theoretical aim was to investigate whether Behavioural Game Theory can 
explain the proximate causes of a viable residential social climate. According-
ly, research question 2 was split into a theoretical and an empirical question:
2.1 Can central concepts of behavioural game theory describe and explain the proxi-
mate causes of a viable residential social climate? 
The empirical sub question is:
2.2 What mediates the residents’ willingness to contribute or not to the production 
and maintenance of collective residential goods? 
An important objective for this thesis was to demonstrate that Behaviour-
al Game Theory, in combination with theoretical notions of social dilemmas, 
can offer useful tools for the analysis of residential interaction situations re-
lated to the production and maintenance of collective and public neighbour-
hood goods. In the Introduction (Chapter 1) and in Chapters 5 and 6, insights 
from Behavioural Game Theory and sociology were combined to study the 
emergence of well-defined collective residential goods. Even though Behav-
ioural Game Theory cannot predict exactly how future interactions will take 
place, the post hoc analysis of interdependent choices and patterns – present-
ed as games – makes us aware of the subtleties of human interactions in a so-
cial system (Elster, 2007).
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In light of the criticism of game theory as described in Chapter 5, I have 
focussed on Behavioural Game Theory, which starts from the premise of 
bounded rationality. Secondly, I have defined the social dilemmas in terms 
of intentions, not outcomes. In this investigation, I found evidence that the 
insights and tools of Behavioural Game Theory (Camerer, 2003) are neces-
sary and sufficient to describe and explain the interactions between residents 
making interdependent choices and acting repeatedly as producers and main-
tainers of the social climate (or, in terms of game theory, of collective and 
public goods) in their daily living environment. In the Introduction to this the-
sis I went into some detail on the main concepts of Behavioural Game Theory. 
Starting the Introduction with a description of the preliminary study I had 
conducted in Buitenveldert, I came up with a working definition of a residen-
tial social climate which I further developed using concepts from the behav-
ioural economic approach. A residential social climate refers to the social 
space in a residential neighbourhood where residents with diverse preferenc-
es interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems and dominate one 
another. These residential action situations and the participants that interact 
in them are defined by the (unwritten) rules participants use to order their 
relationships, by the physical-spatial attributes of the neighbourhood, and by 
the nature of the community within which the social climate exists. Rules, 
the physical-spatial attributes of the neighbourhood, and the nature of the 
community all jointly affect the types of actions that individuals can take, 
the benefits and costs of these actions and potential outcomes, and the like-
ly outcomes achieved. After the theoretical framework was presented, I devel-
oped the following revised definition of a residential social climate:
For any residential neighbourhood N the proportion G of well-defined collective goods 
of all neighbourhood Objects O1,2,...n  ERS, is equal to the degree of viability of the 
social climate of the neighbourhood. Well defined means: (1) when common knowl-
edge about the definitions of the collective goods exists among a significant subset 
of the residents of neighbourhood N; (2) when a significant subset of the residents of 
neighbourhood N intend to behave as strong reciprocators with regard to the collec-
tive goods; (3) when a significant subset of the residents of neighbourhood N agree on 
when and how to reciprocate in a negative or a positive way. 
The concept of neighbourhood, like the concept of community, has many 
definitions and meanings across and within the social sciences. Given the 
breadth of what I already planned to tackle, I did not focus in detail on how 
various attributes of a neighbourhood affect the structure of situations with-
in a community. Here, a neighbourhood is defined as the area that residents 
consider as their daily living environment. The attributes of a neighbourhood 
that have an important effect on the residential social climate include: the 
values of behaviour generally accepted in the neighbourhood; the level of 
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common understanding that potential participants share (or do not share) 
about the structure of particular types of action situations; the extent of ho-
mogeneity in the preferences of those living in a neighbourhood; the size and 
composition of the neighbourhood and the extent of inequality of basic as-
sets among those affected. 
When most residents share a common set of values and interact with one 
another in a multiplex set of arrangements within a small neighbourhood, 
the probabilities of their developing adequate rules and norms to govern 
repetitive social interactions are much greater (Taylor, 1987). 
In Chapter 5 and 6 the game-theoretical framework was empirically exam-
ined by analysing the role of trust and altruistic punishment in the produc-
tion and maintenance of collective neighbourhood goods in the problem-free 
early post-Second World War neighbourhood Buitenveldert-Amsterdam. As 
the results indicate, the strong dependency of a neighbourhood’s viability on 
the willingness of its residents to intervene can be explained by the mutu-
al trust that is built up by communication, including verbal sanctioning. The 
results of the case study demonstrated the importance of building a reputa-
tion for keeping one’s word in the neighbourhood, and showed that the cost 
of developing monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms can be relatively low 
if an intermediary rule system is shared and maintained by a critical mass of 
residents that live in the area for a longer period. 
Chapters 5 and 6 show that Behavioural Game Theory is appropriate for the 
description and explanation of the reasoning and behaviour of residents who 
perceive collective good games. The deductive methodology known as analyt-
ic narrative was used to blend Behavioural Game Theory and narration into 
the study of liveability problems. The results indicate that social norms are 
important as determinants of ‘what types of games residents play’, which in 
turn determines the degree of cooperative behaviour and the effectiveness 
of social control in a neighbourhood. What is perceived in Buitenveldert as 
inconvenience is formulated in – more or less unwritten – broadly accepted 
and operated rules and manners that serve as tools to balance between one’s 
own, somebody else’s and common interests.
The findings of the case-study research in this popular, rather problem-
free CIAM post-Second World War neighbourhood are significant. They estab-
lish that voluntary cooperation and verbal sanctioning presuppose the exist-
ence of an intermediate system of unwritten rules or norms of good conduct. 
The intermediate rule system is construed and maintained independently of 
national legal systems. The social climate with well-defined collective goods 
in the case-study area has proven to be an effective system of informal social 
order. It keeps the neighbourhood safe and liveable even though the area 
belongs to a vulnerable neighbourhood type and even though it is not socio-
culturally homogeneous. 
The Buitenveldert case, corresponding to recent trends in American society, 
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shows that social mixing can work when members of different groups share 
certain core values and exhibit tolerance toward each other’s beliefs and life-
styles. This implies that mutual trust and tolerance towards neighbours with 
another lifestyle, or another religious, cultural or ethnic background, are 
important preconditions for the development of a favourable social climate 
that does not discriminate or exclude certain groups or individuals. These 
results are in sharp contrast with writings emphasizing social tensions in 
ethnically mixed neighbourhoods. Nowadays, the population of Buitenveldert 
is rapidly changing in certain parts. This is due to the departure or decease 
of a large share of its elderly residents and to the influx of residents with dif-
ferent socio-cultural backgrounds. If the residents of a neighbourhood come 
from many different cultures, speak different languages, and are distrustful 
of one another, the cost of devising and sustaining effective rules is substan-
tially increased. The question is, will the strong and viable social climate of 
Buitenveldert come under pressure? It remains to be seen if the social control 
mechanisms and the subtle communication strategies are strong enough to 
cope with such rapid change. 
Another point this thesis has expanded on, a point of both theoretical and 
practical relevance, is the connection between the applications of Behaviour-
al Game Theory in the field of urban studies – for which a first, albeit modest 
step has been made in this book – and the recent empirical results of exper-
iments with the Broken Window thesis (Wilson & Kelling, 2007, Keizer et al., 
2008). The idea that the socio-economic environment shapes the costs and 
benefits of cooperation and altruistic punishment, and is thus likely to be 
an important determinant of social norms, seems to be widely accepted. But 
empirically as well as theoretically, we still do not know enough about the 
underlying processes. More knowledge in this area is necessary to gain a bet-
ter understanding of which environment is likely to favour which norms and 
thus to be able to predict when norms are stable and when they will change.
The very popular and frequently adopted concept of collective efficacy is 
defined by Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) as cohesion among neighbour-
hood residents combined with shared expectations for informal social con-
trol of public space (Sampson, 2003). But the concept appears to be redundant 
when using the conceptual framework of Behavioural Game Theory. Collective 
efficacy can be translated into game-theoretical terms and indicators based 
on game theory can be used to measure it. 
The preconditions for the operation of collective efficacy are not the same 
as the preconditions for strong reciprocity. Namely, when residents play 
a Nash equilibrium1 strategy in an Assurance Game, they look for a best 
1 A Nash equilibrium is the situation wherein all players in a game anticipate correctly on each other’s choice 
and not any player has an incentive to change his or her strategy unilaterally.
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response given the responses of others. If resident 1 anticipates correctly on 
what resident 2 will choose in an Assurance Game they do not necessarily 
experience a strong bond of attachment towards each other. Cohesion and 
collective efficacy imply simultaneity of action in face-to-face interactions. 
Strong reciprocity is needed in a context of sequential interactions. An inter-
mediate system of unwritten normative rules facilitates sequential transac-
tions between more or less unknown co-residents and strangers. Thus, for 
strong reciprocity, simultaneity is not a precondition. Any theory explaining 
the emergence of collective goods in a social system will have to deal with 
sequential transactions between strangers. The normative aspect of ‘unwrit-
ten rules’ implies that an actor will adhere to a norm not because of the char-
acteristics of the interaction partner but because of the inherent value of the 
norm. Therefore, interaction partners can mutually trust each other without 
having to invest in a cohesive bond.
 7.3  Policy implications and suggestions for 
further research
 7.3.1  In general 
In this book three scale instruments were developed and presented: the Res-
idential Environmental Satisfaction Scale (RESS), the Residential Nuisance 
Scale (RNS) and the Risk Scale (RS). All three instruments generate important 
additional information for policy-making on urban renewal and neighbour-
hoods in general as part of a broader neighbourhood-monitoring instrument 
and as an independent indicator of liveability in residential neighbourhoods. 
The scales can be used on every level of aggregation – housing blocks, streets, 
neighbourhoods, cities – when connected to register data on the specific scale 
level. After determining the problematic areas on the specific aggregation lev-
el with the Risk Scale, residents can be asked to fill in the RESS and the RNS 
in order to analyse which specific problems are experienced by residents. Be-
sides the quantitative research, more qualitative research methods must be 
applied to gain insight in which types of behavioural mechanisms and social 
interactions on the block level and in semi-public spaces are responsible for 
specific types of nuisance and which feedback loops are active that create a 
negative social climate. The residential environmental satisfaction scale or its 
abbreviated version, both described in this thesis, can help investigators con-
duct more selective and comparative research on neighbourhood life and the 
conditions for residential environmental satisfaction. So far, little has been 
published on ways to compensate negatively experienced attributes of the liv-
ing environment by other residential attributes. In the future, these compact 
and valid instruments can serve as the dependent or independent variable in 
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research carried out in the Netherlands; and it is already used by researchers 
in other European and Asian countries (Qiao & Zhang, 2008; Wu, 2009, 2010) 
Such research could elucidate which physical-spatial and socio-cultural fac-
tors determine the perception of nuisance in different countries, cities and 
neighbourhood types by relating the RNS to the RESS and the Risk Scale.
Policy-makers who want to apply Behavioural Game Theory as an analyti-
cal tool with a rich and precise language should use the concept of ‘unwrit-
ten rules’ as an intermediate structure between law on the one hand and 
face-to-face interactions on the other. The findings of this thesis are signifi-
cant in establishing that voluntary cooperation and verbal sanctioning presup-
pose the existence of an intermediate system of unwritten rules or norms of 
good conduct. This intermediate system can exist more or less independently 
of national legal systems. The conventional approach defines liveability prob-
lems from the perspective of a variety of legal systems. This has resulted in 
more police control and camera surveillance, but also in greater intolerance of 
residents who have different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. However, when 
explicit material incentives (fines, eviction) are applied to the task, there is a 
risk that voluntary cooperation and altruistic punishment will cease to occur 
because the preconditions for the operation of strong reciprocity are removed 
(see Gintis et al., 2005: 20). Scholars who focus on material incentives must rec-
ognize that subtle verbal communication efforts can be very effective for turn-
ing what could be a Prisoner’s Dilemma into an Assurance Game over time. 
Social climate must be counted among the ‘well defined collective resi-
dential goods’ and can involve collective action. This means that individuals 
share the same goal and take action together in order to maintain the com-
mon goods. The specific character of the social climate in a certain area is 
determined by characteristics of the residents (lifestyle, age, religious and cul-
tural background), the architecture, the available facilities (e.g. schools, shops, 
bus stops, playgrounds) and by the motivated maintenance actions of stake-
holders (e.g. housing associations, local government and municipal servic-
es). Daily maintenance and social management are particularly important 
when vulnerable residents are concentrated in close proximity to areas that 
are physically unattractive or have multiple complications or bad reputations. 
Future investigations could shed light on the role stakeholders can play in 
maintaining a viable social climate by encouraging residents to participate in 
maintenance activities.
Empirical and theoretical work in the future should investigate how a large 
array of contextual variables affects various social processes: of teaching and 
evoking social norms; of informing participants about the behaviour of others 
and their adherence to social norms; and of rewarding those who use social 
norms, such as reciprocity, trust and fairness (Ostrom 2000, p. 154). More 
understanding is needed about the impact of institutional, cultural and phys-
ical-spatial contexts: how they affect the types of individuals who are recruit-
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ed into and leave particular types of collective action situation; how they 
influence the kind of information that is made available about past actions; 
and how individuals can change the structural variables so as to enhance the 
probabilities of norm-using types being involved and growing in strength over 
time. 
Further developments along these lines are essential for the develop-
ment of public policies that enhance socially beneficial, cooperative behav-
iour based in part on social norms. It is possible that past policy initiatives 
to encourage collective action – policies based primarily on externally chang-
ing payoff structures for rational egoists – may have been misdirected. They 
might even have crowded out the formation of social norms that could have 
enhanced cooperative behaviour in their own way. Increasing the authori-
ty of individuals to devise their own rules may well result in processes that 
allow social norms to evolve and thereby increase the probability of individu-
als solving collective action problems (Ostrom, 2000, p. 154). 
Social problems in neighbourhoods often stem from the conflicting social 
norms of different groups (Flache & Koekkoek, 2009). Such conflicts occur 
between elderly and younger residents or between residents with differ-
ent ethnic, religious and/or socio-cultural backgrounds. Presumably these 
problems can be identified as Battles of the Sexes, which nourish in- and 
out-group perceptions and distrust. Follow-up research with an instrument 
designed according to the principles of Behavioural Game Theory could yield 
clearer reference points about how social tensions lead to discrimination and 
the exclusion of individuals or minority groups. Policy-makers and practi-
tioners can intervene by introducing quasi-moral norms in problematic com-
munities to generate respect and trust between people with different social 
norms. Additionally, a clear dialogue among professionals and residents 
about the definitions of the collective neighbourhood goods is of vital impor-
tance in the effort to prevent liveability problems and to encourage subtle 
communication strategies and other forms of altruistic punishment of norm 
defectors.
 7.3.2  Specific
The findings presented in this book can provide pointers for professionals 
working in urban areas at either the neighbourhood or the municipal level. 
The following insights into physical and social aspects of residential areas 
may be of particular interest to practitioners.
Professionals working in the social sphere can play a key role in building a 
good social climate in neighbourhoods
There are neighbourhoods where an absence of informal social control is felt 
by a critical mass of the residents. They do not take it for granted that peo-
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ple will reprimand their neighbours for anti-social or disruptive behaviour. In 
such cases, the first thing a professional wants to know is what has brought 
this situation about. Is it because people residing in the same apartment 
building, using the same entryway or living on the same street are not ac-
quainted with each other and thus do not know exactly to whom they would 
then have to address their complaint? Or even though they usually know who 
the ‘wrongdoer’ is, are they shy about confronting him or her directly? Per-
haps they do not speak each other’s language and are therefore unsure how 
to approach the matter. Or are there simply no straightforward rules, so that 
everybody behaves as they wish or as circumstances dictate? These questions 
will have to be answered before anyone can set out a strategy for tackling the 
situation.
The next thing the professional wants to know is what people think of the 
current situation. What annoys them and what do they want changed? Vari-
ous projects in Dutch cities have given professionals experience in tackling 
problems of civility. A well known example from Rotterdam is ‘Opzoomeren’, 
a grass-roots initiative to lend a helping hand and spruce up the street (Van 
der Graaf & Duyvendak, 2001). Another is Rotterdam’s rules of urban etiquette 
(Diekstra, 2001, 2004). Alternatively, people using the same entryway hold 
‘front porch’ meetings. And elsewhere, the building management gets togeth-
er with the residents to set up written rules for behaviour in and around the 
dwelling and post them in a way that the rules are visible and legible to eve-
ryone (thus, in several languages, if necessary). So doing, the profession-
als of the housing associations can establish a basic norm of how people 
should treat each other and the built environment. Thereby, they lay the basis 
(a ground of common knowledge) on which the residents of a street, shared 
entryway, or apartment building can adhere to the rules themselves and take 
one another to task when the rules are breached.
There is also a role for the professional when the residents, in fear of reper-
cussions, do not dare complain directly to the person causing some nuisance. 
It is then up to the professional to find out why the troublemaker is behav-
ing in that way and whether he is aware that he is bothering others. Depend-
ing on the particular problems that come to light, other social professionals 
would then have a role to play in resolving the problems on the troublemak-
er’s part. 
As the Buitenveldert case has clearly demonstrated, communication skills 
are important tools for the verbal sanctioning of norm offenders but also for 
the introduction of newcomers into the informal rule system that constitutes 
the social climate. Buitenveldert is exceptional because of the high education-
al level of its residents, who may therefore be presumed to have strong com-
munication skills. Many neighbourhoods lack a population with such good 
communication skills, but they also lack a generally known, unwritten sys-
tem of rules. By means of front porch conversations, housing professionals 
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and social workers can appeal to the social and communication competen-
cies of the residents. The professionals can encourage people to confront each 
other about behaviour that harms collective interests or diminishes the resi-
dential satisfaction or privacy of another resident.
For example, in buildings where sound is easily transmitted between par-
tition walls or floors, the residents could be informed about this. They can (if 
necessary) be motivated to adapt their behaviour within their dwelling so as 
not to annoy their co-residents. Where noise nuisance causes many residents 
to move away, an effective solution could be to insulate the dwellings better.
Prevent anonymity and build in intervisibility and a sufficient degree of so-
cial control
Every neighbourhood has a social order, and this plays an important role in 
its safety. Social control, particularly in the form of pointing out unaccepta-
ble behaviour to one’s neighbours and people passing though, is a crucial ele-
ment of that social order with regard to maintaining a sense of safety. In situ-
ations where that social order is poorly developed, usually as a result of wide-
spread anonymity, people do not encounter one another. Thus, they do not 
know each other, so suspicion and a sense of insecurity can prevail. Then 
the danger looms that certain groups will come to dominate the public space 
while others will feel afraid and stay home; in that event, the social climate 
is not good. Poor street lighting, graffiti, scattered litter, closed security shut-
ters, blind walls, vacant buildings and no sign of life in the evenings – these 
are the main ingredients of a recipe for increasing vandalism, aggressive be-
haviour and theft (Van der Voordt & Van Wegen, 1991; Adriaanse, 2010). How 
can the social climate of a neighbourhood be improved? What can be done to 
promote a sense of safety and stimulate the natural processes of social con-
trol? For one thing, the physical layout of a neighbourhood can contribute to a 
healthy degree of social control. First of all, anonymity can be avoided, there-
by enhancing the intervisibility of the streets, by designing dwellings with 
windows and doors facing the street. This would not necessarily diminish the 
privacy of the occupants. The point is that everyone has a need, from time to 
time, to move anonymously through public space. People have to be able to be 
anonymous; what must be avoided is the negative anonymity of places (Alt-
man, 1975; Hakkert & Keus, 2007; Van Dorst, 2005). Another approach is func-
tional mixing – precisely what is now missing at many places in early post-
war residential areas. It too can make an important contribution to the vitali-
ty of street life and thereby contribute to safety on the streets (Wassenberg & 
Blokland, 2008). 
Make it clear who is managing what and engage the residents in the design 
and maintenance
A key condition for a good social climate is clarity about which places are be-
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ing managed by which parties. This may be the housing association or the 
municipality, but it could also be a group of tenants or a single resident. Un-
desired anonymity can also be reduced by careful design and maintenance. 
The ambiance of a place is critical to a sense of safety and an attitude of in-
volvement. Residents, better than anyone else, often know how to create a 
feeling of being at home in or around the building where they live. Involve the 
residents in the maintenance in a way fitting the specific neighbourhood and 
its population. Give them the room and the opportunity to shape their resi-
dential area themselves. The effects have been amply demonstrated in light 
of the Broken Window Theory. 
Make use of public services, social seams and invented public spaces
The presence of ‘social seams’ is important for the development of com-
mon knowledge or public familiarity (Fisher, 1982; Blokland & Savage, 2008) 
among residents of a neighbourhood. Social seams are those points in the 
community where interaction – between, for example, different ethnic and ra-
cial groups – is ‘sewn’ together in some way, to borrow a metaphor from Jane 
Jacobs, who applied it in The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961, p. 
267). A similar concept is used by Elijah Anderson in Streetwise (1990). Even 
where people of different races and ethnicities may be living within small 
clusters of blocks, these seams can bring them together. In some cases, the 
seams may be the schools where children of different races and ethnicities 
come together on a daily basis and where parents interact in the course of 
parent-teacher associations and regular school events. Parks and special com-
munity-wide events can also serve as seams (Nyden et al., 1997).
Thus, appealing, high-quality collective and public spaces and ameni-
ties that can function as social seams are important building blocks for the 
development and maintenance of a viable social climate. These are the spots 
where residents meet and come across each other. And ‘by the way’, they 
demonstrate to each other that they behave according to certain norms, that 
they have the necessary social competencies and correcting mechanisms of 
social control to maintain or improve the viability of the social climate. 
Promote vitality and contact in the neighbourhood
One way to promote contact among various groups with a stake in the neigh-
bourhood – visitors, businesses, property owners and residents – is to organ-
ize activities (Davelaar & Veldboer, 2008). Several municipalities have had 
good experience with this. For instance, annual barbecues, children’s activi-
ties, a Santa Claus parade, or a Christmas market have been arranged. This 
brings people in contact and they become acquainted with one another. The 
municipality can for example set aside a budget for organizing the activi-
ties and the local businesses can play a supporting role in the actual arrange-
ments (Wassenberg & Blokland, 2008).
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 Adapt public spaces in the residential environment and make use of 
knowledge and experience of users
Well developed public and green spaces that are adapted in the course of 
time in response to the changes and needs of the residential population are 
crucial conditions for a viable residential social climate. In 2006, more than 
half of the population of Buitenveldert was over fifty years old, yet there were 
more than eighty children’s playgrounds there. Dating from the sixties when 
young families moved in, they are rarely used and often covered with grass. 
Many of them would better serve the current population if turned into semi-
public meeting places for elderly people; this would require making the space 
accessible by transport equipment such as the scoot mobile and the walker. 
In Buitenveldert the synagogue, the church and the mother-child centre are 
important meeting places for specific identity groups. It is important to in-
vestigate which specific groups in a certain neighbourhood lack a meaningful 
meeting place. The experience-based knowledge of community workers, pre-
cinct police and residents is of great importance in the development of meet-
ing places for specific groups.
Prevent wrong signalling of insufficient physical maintenance
Anti-social behaviour and neglect of shared collective goods and interests in 
the neighbourhood undermine the development of a viable social climate. 
When moral norms, social competencies and the correcting mechanisms of 
social control and altruistic punishment are absent at several spots in the 
neighbourhood, steps have to be taken to prevent a downward spiral of de-
cline. A garbage bag that is put outside too early and a neglected front yard 
in a neighbourhood with a weak social climate give the wrong signal to oth-
er residents. Such signals of indifference evoke other negative behaviour. In a 
neighbourhood with a viable social climate, informal correcting mechanisms 
become active and residents confront each other about such behaviour. If this 
is not common practice, it is very important for professionals to prevent esca-
lation by providing a minimum level of maintenance, thereby setting an ex-
ample for keeping the area ‘clean, whole and safe’. 
Organize and facilitate surveillance within the community itself
A neighbourhood may have an unsafe hotspot of nuisance, for instance near 
a shopping centre. In that case, social control in the neighbourhood could 
be strengthened by organizing surveillance within the local community. The 
impetus would come from the municipality or the police, while the ensuing 
project would also involve other parties: the youth; the agency monitoring 
first-offender juveniles to keep them out of the courts (Bureau Halt); the Public 
Prosecution Office; and private security companies. Various municipalities in 
the Netherlands have had good experiences with such projects.
Neighbourhood Fathers, Neighbourhood Parents, and Neighbourhood and 
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Street Coaches are examples of such projects. Housing associations, the local 
mosque, and social welfare organizations are often involved as well.
Another surveillance project is called Beware Watch Out. In this case, the 
guards participating in the project are themselves young delinquents who 
already have a record of multiple offences. The judge refers these offend-
ers to the project instead of imposing a different sentence. The approach is 
two-pronged: serving as security guards, the youths are themselves (part-
ly) responsible for safety in the shopping centre in their neighbourhood; and 
the young people learn useful skills that they have generally not been taught 
at home. Good results have been booked with this approach in the district of 
Osdorp (Amsterdam). Out of more than 350 juveniles taking part in Osdorp, a 
mere ten per cent have subsequently had contact with the police (Adriaanse, 
2010).
Educate the house hunter about the social climate
The presence of specific identity groups in a neighbourhood can contribute to 
specific characteristics of the social climate. For instance, during an interna-
tional football competition, the current residents might expect newcomers to 
deck out their front garden with flags and bunting in bright orange (the Dutch 
national colour). 
For a sustainable social climate, it is important to strive for a good match 
between the lifestyle and preferences of the prospective new residents, on 
the one hand, and the specific traits of the neighbourhood where they are 
searching, on the other. When meeting with house hunters, the profession-
als of housing associations should give this point due attention and ascertain 
the specific social climate the house hunter is interested in. He then is able to 
better estimate if the prospective resident would fit in socially or not. When 
people move into a neighbourhood on the grounds of a positive locational 
choice, they are more likely to act on the basis of trust. By extension, they 
would be more willing to contribute to the development and maintenance of 
the collective neighbourhood goods.
References
Adriaanse, C.C.M. (2008). Werken aan een goed sociaal klimaat in woonbuur-
ten. In: Ouwehand, A.L., R. van Kempen, R.J. Kleinhans & H.J. Visscher (Eds), 
Van wijken weten. Beleid en praktijk in de stedelijke vernieuwing (pp. 44-55). 
Amsterdam: IOS Press. 
Adriaanse, C.C.M. (2010). Veiligheid. In: Seinpost Adviesbureau and Onder-
zoeksinstituut OTB, Handboek Wijkeconomie. Den Haag: Ministerie van Econ-
omische Zaken.
[ 174 ]
Altman, I. (1975). The environment and social behavior: privacy, personal 
space, territoriality and crowding. Monterey, California: Brooks/Cole.
Blokland, T. & M. Savage (Eds) (2008). Networked Urbanism: Social Capital In 
The City. Ashgate Pub Co. 
Davelaar, M. & L. Veldboer (2008). Goud in de buurt. Over de rol van profes-
sionals in capaciteitsgerichte buurtontwikkeling. Utrecht: Verwey Jonker In-
stituut.
Diekstra, W.F. (2001). Stadsetiquette: aansprekend gedrag in de publieke 
ruimte. In: Hortulanus, R.P. & J.E.M. Machielse, Het Sociaal Debat 5. Den Haag, 
pp. 113-126. 
Diekstra, R. (2004). Stadsetiquette: Over waarden, normen en collectieve zelf-
redzaamheid van burgers. In: Beer, P. de & K. Schuyt (Eds), Bijdragen aan nor-
men en waarden (pp. 107-135). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Dorst, M. van (2005). Een duurzaam leefbare woonomgeving. Fysieke voor-
waarden voor privacyregulering. Delft: Eburon
Fisher, C.F. (1982). To dwell among friends: personal networks in town and 
city. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Flache, A. & M. Koekkoek (2009), Interventies voor een leefbare wijk. Van theo-
rie naar praktijk en terug. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Gintis, H., S. Bowles, R. Boyd & E. Fehr (Eds) (2005), Moral sentiments and ma-
terial interests: the foundations of cooperation in economic life. Cambridge: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Graaf, P. van der & J.W. Duyvendak (2001). Opzoomeren stille kracht? Een 
onderzoek naar de kwaliteiten van het Opzoomeren. Utrecht: Verwey Jonker 
Instituut. 
Hakkert, A. & R. Keus (Eds) (2007). Bouwen met sociale veiligheid in het 
achterhoofd. Secondant, 3/4.
Nyden, P., M. Maly & J. Lukehart (1997). The Emergence of Stable Racially and 
Ethnically Diverse Urban Communities: A Case Study of Nine U.S. Cities.
Ostrom, E. (2000) Collective action and the evolution of social norms. The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14 (3), pp. 137-158.
[ 175 ]
Qiao, L. & A. Zhang (2008). Evaluation and classification of residential green-
belt quality based on factor analysis and clustering analysis: an example of 
Xinxiang City, China. Journal of Forestry Research, 19 (4), pp. 311-314.
Verwey Jonker Instituut (2009). Omstreden ruimte; over de organisatie van 
spontaniteit en veiligheid. Utrecht.
Voordt, D.J.M. van der & H.B.R. van Wegen (1991), Sociale veiligheid en ge-
bouwde omgeving. Theorie, empirie en instrumentontwikkeling (dissertatie). 
Publikatieburo Bouwkunde, Technische Universiteit Delft. 
Wassenberg, F. & T. Blokland (2008). Functiemenging en veiligheid. In: Ouwe-
hand, A., R. van Kempen, R. Kleinhand & H. Visscher (Eds), Van wijken weten. 
Beleid en praktijk in de stedelijke vernieuwing. Amsterdam: IOS Press.
Wu, F. (2009). An Analysis of Quality Attributes of Housing Environment in 
Guangzhou China, Using Expert Judgements. Research Proposal for ERES2009, 
University of Hong Kong. 
Wu, F. (2010). Determinants of Environmental Preference by Housing Con-
sumers in Guangzhou, China, Using Analytic Hierarchy Process. The Univer-




  Over het meten en verklaren van 
buurtsucces; een gedragsecono-
mische benadering
  Carlinde Adriaanse
Het doel van het onderzoek dat ten grondslag ligt aan deze dissertatie is om 
te onderzoeken welke factoren eraan bijdragen dat sommige buurten wel en 
andere niet problematisch functioneren; het onderzoek spitst zich toe op de 
vroeg-naoorlogse middelhoogbouwbuurten. Het proefschrift presenteert een 
drietal instrumenten die van belang kunnen zijn voor sociaal wetenschappe-
lijk onderzoek naar de tevredenheid van bewoners met hun woonomgeving. 
Daarnaast wordt een visie ontwikkeld op de bruikbaarheid bij buurtonderzoek 
van een theorie die bekend staat als ‘behavioural game theory’. 
De dissertatie kent twee onderzoeksvragen. De eerste onderzoeksvraag 
kent een methodologische en een empirische subvraag: 
1a. Op welke wijze kan buurtsucces gemeten worden met schaalinstrumenten? 
1b. Welke factoren dragen bij aan het meer of minder succesvol functioneren van Ne-
derlandse buurten in het algemeen en van vroeg-naoorlogse buurten in het bijzonder?
Het theoretische doel van dit proefschrift is om te onderzoeken of centra-
le concepten ontleend aan behavioural game theory, een verklaring kunnen 
bieden voor de werking van een sociaal buurtklimaat. Onderzoeksvraag twee 
heeft hier betrekking op en kent de volgende theoretische en empirische sub-
vraag:
2.1 Kan behavioural game theory de oorzaken van een wenselijk sociaal buurtklimaat 
adequaat beschrijven? 
2.2 Welke kenmerken van bewoners bepalen of zij bijdragen aan het produceren en 
het onderhouden van collectieve buurtgoederen? 
In het eerste hoofdstuk wordt onder meer beargumenteerd dat wetenschap-
pers, zowel in behavioural game theorie als in vragenlijstonderzoek, het ver-
schil tussen ordenen, sorteren en classificeren enerzijds en meten anderzijds 
vaak negeren. Sociale wetenschappers en speltheoretici gaan hand in hand in 
de veronderstelling dat, wanneer men orde en regelmaat constateert, er ook 
gekwantificeerd kan worden. Bedoelde veronderstelling hangt samen met de 
adoptie van een representationalistische meettheorie. De centrale gedachte 
van deze theorie is dat meten het afbeelden is van waargenomen kwalitatie-
ve relaties binnen een empirisch relationeel stelsel, in het getallenstelsel. Het 
is evident dat het omarmen van een representatieve meettheorie leidt tot de 
door Stevens (1946) verdedigde visie dat meten niets meer is dan de toeken-
nen van getallen aan entiteiten volgens een regel. Het kwantitatief zijn van 
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een kenmerk is echter een wetenschappelijke hypothese waarvan het bewijs 
geleverd moet worden door de empirische wetenschap. Dit bewijs is ten aan-
zien van kenmerken zoals ‘utiliteit’, ‘satisfactie’ en ‘perceptie’ nog niet gele-
verd.
De hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 zijn voornamelijk gebaseerd op de data van het 
WoningBehoefteOnderzoek 2002, een aselecte steekproef van 75.034 respon-
denten, representatief voor de Nederlandse bevolking in het jaar 2002. Voor 
specifieke analyses van buurtkarakteristieken zijn eveneens data gebruikt 
van de Woningmarktmonitor van ABF en van Wegener. Voor de analyses op 
het niveau van de buurt zijn postcodegebieden gebruikt. De hoofdstukken 
twee en drie twee presenteren een vragenlijst met respectievelijk ‘bewoners-
satisfactie’ en ‘ervaren overlast’ met meetpretentie. In deze beide hoofdstuk-
ken is – in het licht van hetgeen is besproken in hoofdstuk 1 – sprake van 
een numeriek verfijnde manier van sorteren en ordenen. Aannemende dat 
satisfactie en ervaren overlast beide meetbare kenmerken zijn, hoewel het 
bewijs voor de meetbaarheid dus nog niet is geleverd, is het in dit proefschrift 
gewaarborgd geacht om statistische analysetechnieken zoals factoranalyse, 
logistische regressie en t-toetsen te gebruiken. 
De resultaten van een exploratieve factoranalyse in het tweede hoofd-
stuk geven empirische grondslag voor de bruikbaarheid van het theoretisch 
model dat duidt op drie componenten van woontevredenheid. De volgen-
de drie domeinen van woontevredenheid worden onderscheiden. Ten eerste, 
de passendheid van de woning. Ten tweede, de waardering van het sociaal 
klimaat in de buurt. Ten derde, de wijze waarop de interne reputatie van de 
buurt wordt geevalueerd. Vervolgens bleek uit nadere analyses onder ernst-
groepen binnen de respondentengroep de tevredenheid ten aanzien van het 
subdomein ‘residentieel sociaal klimaat’ de meest significante component te 
zijn van woontevredenheid. Dit patroon is van toepassing op alle Nederland-
se buurten. Er is speciaal gekeken naar het vroeg-naoorlogse buurttype. Er 
blijkt sprake te zijn van een monotoon stijgend verband tussen het wonen in 
een vroeg-naoorlogse buurt en het ontevreden zijn met de woonsituatie. Om 
die reden stellen we dat het vroeg naoorlogse buurttype inderdaad kwetsbaar 
genoemd moet worden. 
In het derde hoofdstuk wordt een vergelijkbare exercitie uitgevoerd op een 
overlastvragenlijst. Relevant om te vermelden is het gebruik van multivari-
ate statistische technieken bij deze ordinale data. Logistische regressie is in 
staat 92 procent van de bewoners correct te plaatsen in twee ernstgroepen op 
basis van vier klachten: ‘zwerfvuil’, ‘hondenvuil’, ‘lawaai-’ en ‘verkeersover-
last’. Zwerfvuil blijkt, ongeacht de bezitsvorm en de waarde van een woning, 
de belangrijkste klacht te zijn die onderscheid maakt tussen weinig en veel 
overlast. Ten slotte blijkt dat overlastklachten niet gerelateerd zijn aan leef-
tijd, geslacht en opleidingsniveau. Kijken we speciaal naar het vroeg-naoor-
logse middelhoogbouw buurttype dan blijkt dat bewoners die woonachtig zijn 
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in een dergelijke buurt, significant vaker overlast ervaren dan bewoners van 
andere buurttypen. 
Het vierde hoofdstuk bespreekt een risicoschaal. De kenmerken waar deze 
schaal gebruik van maakt zijn kwantitatief, te weten ‘inkomen’, ‘WOZ-waar-
de’, ‘ratio koop-/sociale huurwoningen’, ‘ratio koop-/particuliere huurwonin-
gen’ en het ‘percentage immigranten’. De metrische data zijn dimensieloos 
gemaakt door ze te transformeren tot variabelen met waarden tussen de -1 
en 1. Vervolgens zijn de betrouwbaarheid, de validiteit en de dimensionali-
teit van de schaal onderzocht. De betrouwbaarheid bleek uitstekend met een 
Cronbach’s alpha-waarde van 0.91. De validiteit is bepaald door correlaties 
te berekenen met de variabelen ‘het percentage kinderen op de basisschool 
van ouders met een lage opleiding’, ‘het percentage allochtone kinderen op 
de basisschool van ouders met een lage opleiding’ en ‘het percentage werk-
loze ouders’. Alle correlaties zijn hoog en negatief. Een principale componen-
tenanalyse vindt één factor die 71 procent van de variantie op de risicoschaal 
verklaart. Het instrument blijkt betrouwbaar, valide en één-dimensionaal. 
Via een lineaire transformatie werd er een elfpunts-risicoschaal van 
gemaakt. Met nul als meest kwetsbare buurt en tien als een buitengewoon 
succesvolle buurt. Vervolgens zijn de relaties tussen risico, satisfactie en over-
last onderzocht. De samenhang bleek sterk te zijn. De respondenten zijn in 
vier ernstklassen ingedeeld op de satisfactie- en de overlastschaal waarna is 
onderzocht hoeveel procent van de bewoners tot een ernstklasse behorend, 
woonachtig was in een buurt behorend tot een bepaald deciel van de risico-
schaal.
Uit deze analyse blijkt dat er een monotoon dalend verband is tussen zeer 
ontevreden en zeer veel overlast en de score op de risicoschaal. Bovendien 
blijkt dat in de buurten met een nulscore op de risicoschaal honderd procent 
van de respondenten extreem ontevreden is en extreme overlast ervaart. Dit 
zijn buurten met kleine woningen, veel flats, gebouwd in de periode 1906-
1960, een hoog percentage alleenstaanden, mensen in de leeftijdsgroep van 
twintig tot en met vierendertig jaar en veel werklozen. Met name het histo-
gram in hoofdstuk 4 van dit boek maakt duidelijk dat het sorteren van bewo-
ners op ontevredenheid veel informatie kan geven indien we de sortering op 
decielen bijvoorbeeld relateren aan het woonachtig zijn in een risicobuurt. 
Van de zeer tevreden bewoners woont maar 2 procent in een risicobuurt, voor 
de zeer ontevreden bewoners is dat 14 procent. 
Voor de hoofdstukken 5 en 6 is in de hoog-risicobuurt Buitenveldert-
Amsterdam kwalitatief verdiepingsonderzoek verricht. Buitenveldert-Amster-
dam moeten we op basis van haar score van 3.64 op de risicoschaal inderdaad 
een risicobuurt noemen. De bewoners van Buitenveldert scoren echter signi-
ficant lager op overlast en significant hoger op satisfactie dan bewoners uit 
buurten in het hetzelfde risicosegment. 
Dit is opvallend en vraagt om een verklaring. De vraag is nu hoe een beter 
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inzicht te verkrijgen in de mechanismen die werkzaam zijn op het microni-
veau van interacties tussen bewoners in relatie tot collectieve buurtgoede-
ren. Vragenlijstonderzoek leent zich hier niet goed voor en het uitvoeren van 
een experiment of veldexperiment was niet mogelijk. De best passende aan-
pak is dan het combineren van de kwantitatieve gegevens met de kwalitatieve 
methode van het semi-gestructureerd interviewen van bewoners (triangula-
tie). Centrale concepten uit de behavioral game theory – strong reciprocity en 
altruïstisch straffen in Prisoner’s Dilemma’s en Assurance Games - bleken een 
uitstekend analytisch kader te bieden voor de analyse en interpretatie van de 
interviewgegevens. 
Om de interviewgegevens zo eenduidig mogelijk te kunnen interprete-
ren op conceptueel vlak in de door speltheoretici beschreven interacties, zijn 
‘intenties’ en ‘opbrengsten’ scherp van elkaar onderscheiden door het Priso-
ner’s Dilemma (PD) en het Assurance Game (AG) te formuleren als kenmer-
ken van een individuele intentie. In het proefschrift worden acht kenmerken-
de aspecten beschreven van de intentie van een PD- of AG-speler ten opzichte 
van een welbepaald collectief goed. Speltheoretisch bezien is het voornaam-
ste kenmerk van een PD dat het een niet-nulsomspel is. Is het in dergelijke 
situaties beter om samen te werken met de ander of om voor de snelle winst 
te gaan? Als men voorziet dat een dergelijke situatie met dezelfde partijen 
vaker zal voorkomen is het beter om samen te werken (en beide te zwijgen 
in het voorbeeld). Is de ontmoeting eenmalig dan kan dit anders liggen. Nog-
al wat problemen in buurten vertonen overeenkomsten met het PD. Het gaat 
dan niet meer om twee mensen die wel of niet samenwerken, maar om vele 
mensen. Evenmin is er sprake van een eenmalige keuze, maar dient er steeds 
opnieuw gekozen te worden. We spreken dan van een gegeneraliseerde PD-
situatie. Afval opruimen en het trappenhuis schoonmaken zijn voorbeelden 
van een gegeneraliseerde PD-situatie.
Het idee van het AG komt uit een tekst van Jean-Jacques Rousseau die een 
situatie beschreef waarin twee individuen op jacht gaan. Beiden kunnen 
ervoor kiezen om op een hert of een haas te jagen. Elke speler moet een actie 
kiezen zonder te weten wat de ander besluit om te doen. Als iemand ervoor 
kiest om op een hert te jagen, dan moet hij de medewerking hebben van de 
andere persoon om te kunnen slagen. Een haas kun je in je eentje vangen, 
maar die is minder waard dan een hert. Dit voorbeeld wordt beschouwd als 
een belangrijke analogie voor cooperatie. Het AG verschilt van het PD in het 
feit dat er sprake is van twee Nash equilibria: één als beide spelers samen-
werken en één als beide spelers niet besluiten tot samenwerking. In het PD 
derhalve – ondanks het feit dat een situatie waarin beide spellers samenwer-
ken Pareto-efficiënt is – bestaat het enige Nash equilibrium er uit dat beide 
spelers ervoor kiezen niet samen te werken. 
Het bleek dat in Buitenveldert bewoners vooral intenties hadden die struc-
tureel overeenkomen met de intenties van een speler in het Assurance Game. 
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In tweehonderd interviewfragmenten van bewoners over beheer en onder-
houd van collectieve buurtgoederen, waaronder de gezamenlijke entreehal en 
galerij, de gezamenlijke tuin, straat en gemeenschappelijke berging, bleek de 
prevalentie van Assurance Game intenties 87 procent te bedragen. 
Met andere woorden, bewoners in een, volgens objectieve criteria, kwets-
bare buurt zijn uitstekend in staat met elkaar een goed leefklimaat te creë-
ren. Dit doen zij via een intermediair systeem van ongeschreven regels. Daar-
bij spelen subtiele communicatieve vaardigheden – een specifieke vorm van 
altruïstisch straffen – een sleutelrol bij de overdracht van regels aan nieuwe 
bewoners en bij het aanspreken van bewoners die deze regels overtreden.
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This study combines qualitative and quantitative research methods to explain which 
factors contribute to a problem-free or problematic functioning of neighbourhoods 
in general and especially of early post-Second World War neighbourhoods in  
the Netherlands. An important part of the book is about the development of 
measuring instruments. Special attention is given to the development of a risk scale 
that offers researchers and policymakers the opportunity to distinguish on a metric 
level between problematic and successful neighbourhoods. 
This book brings together key insights from urban studies and central elements of 
Behavioural Game Theory. The notions of strong reciprocity and altruistic  
punishment in Prisoner’s Dilemmas and Assurance Games are applied for the  
description and analysis of interactions between residents of a problem-free early 
post-Second World War neighbourhood when they are making interdependent  
choices and acting as producers and maintainers of the social climate in their  
daily living environment. 
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